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CMP~R I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to investigate the psycholog-
ical nature of the conscience in Freudian theory and evaluate it in the 
light of certain neo-Freudian and non-Freudian findings, 
Special attention will be given to the original work of Sigmund 
Freud and particular emphasis placed on his concept of the super-ego. 
Freud's concept of the super-ego and its importance in the development 
of personality will be examined, Later modifications and contributions 
to the Freudian concept of the super-ego will be cited, 
The importance of the subject of conscience is recognized by all 
concerned with human behavior. The failure of our civilization to solve 
many of its greatest problems in the realm of human behavior while its 
technological advances go steadily on, points to the need for re-exam-
ination of the factor of moral control, the function by which man makes 
choices commensurate with his own best interest and that of the society 
in which he lives. While there have been many attempts to define and 
explain the nature and function of conscience from the philosophical 
and religious point of view, serious study of the pyschological nature 
of the conscience received its major impetus from Freud as he proposed 
l 
2 
,his division of the mirrl into id, ego and super-ego. Not only did Freud 
come to view the function of super-ego as crucial in understanding be-
havior in general and personality growth in particular, but Freudians and 
others who have come later have also pointed to the importance of under-
standing the psychological nature of conscience or super-ego as it relates 
to the total response of a person to his environment. 
2, Limitations 
No attempt will be made in this study to discuss the varied and 
meaningful approaches to the concept of conscience as they appear in 
ethical, philosophical or religious writings. The primary emphasis in 
this study will be to understand the Freudian concept of the conscience 
and subject it to rigorous criticism using certain later psychological 
findings as the basis for such criticism. Major attention will be given 
to psychological theory in order to explore more thoroughly Freud's theory 
of the super-ego. Much is known of Freud's clinical approach but rela-
tively less is known of his theoretical concepts, especially in regard 
to the nature of the super-ego. 
Freud's concept has been chosen by this writer for special investi-
gation because of several reasons. His formulation differs sharply with 
many of the traditional views of conscience. His view of this agent of 
the mind as being essentially harsh, forbidding and primarily destructive 
is radically different than the majority of philosophical and religious 
views which hold that conscience is a good, desirable controlling factor 
in human behavior. While some of the evidence on which Freud erected his 
3 
~heories of the super-ego is now in doubt, such as the instinct theory, 
the universality of the Oedipus complex, and the anthropological data 
regarding primitive society, many of his conclusions have been valuable 
to those coming after him as they have modified and altered his original 
concept. 
3. Previous Ideas About Conscience 
Before reviewing the historic pronouncements of Freud regarding 
the nature and function of the super-ego it will be necessary to note 
some of the ideas about conscience which are evident in philosophical, 
theological and psychological thought. Although a complete and inten-
sive study of the historical development of the idea of conscience is 
not the aim of this dissertation, several trends which were evident 
prior to Freud's investigations should be noted. 
i. The Philosophical Heritage 
One of the major trends noted in the writings of most philosophers 
is the tendency to take seriously the problem of conscience. James H. 
Breastedl traces the dawn of conscience to the valley of the Nile, indi-
eating that as early as 3000 B.C. Egyptian writings record man's recog-
nition of something which either approves or disapproves his action. 
While this tendency to approve or disapprove was noted in primitive man 
no clear formulation of the concept of conscience was noted until the 
writings of Socrates. 
1. J. H. Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Son's, 1930). 
In The Apology Socrates expresses his belief that he should live a 
life completely dominated by reason. Only by the use of reason can he 
feel that he can assume full responsibility for his actions. Socrates 
feels that he is guided in his rational pursuits by a "familiar oracle"l 
which indicates to him acy fallacy in his reasoning. As he speaks in The 
Apology concerning the accusations of his enemies, one of his points of 
defense is that he has not been coo.demned by the "familiar oracle." He 
states 
Hitherto the familiar oracle within me 
has constantly been in the habit of 
opposing me even about trifles, if I 
was going to make a slip or error about 
acything; and now as you see there has 
come upon me that which may be thought ••• 
the last and worst evil. But the oracle 
made no sign of opposition ••• This is a 
great proof to me of what I am saying, for 
the customary sign would surely have opposed 
me had I been going to evil and mt to good. n2 
This first formal statement about the nature of conscience is thus 
described by Socrates as the "familiar oracle." This description is con-
h 
fined to his own experience and no attempt is made to generalize, attribut-
ing the quality to all men. 
Many of the philosophers after Socrates have had something to say 
about conscience. The majority are influenced by the tendency to view 
the nature of man as a duality. Conscience is usually identified with 
a specific part of man's personality. This tendency is noted to a 
1. Plato, The Apology of Socrates, Benjamin Jowett, tr. The Harvard Classics 
series, Charles W. Elliott, ed., 50 vols. (New York: P. F. Collier and 
Sons, 1909), II, P• 22. 
2. Ibid., II, P• 27. 
.5 
greater or lesser degree in the works of Plato, Immanuel Kant and Arthur 
Schopenhauer. 
Plato, along with giving a defense of the ancient belief that soul 
and body are fundamentally different, also alluded to a faculty concept 
of conscience. His theory of the soul precedes later faculty concepts 
of the mind and its eventual division into three parts in the Freudian 
theory of id, ego and super-ego. In the Phaedrus, Plato compares the 
soul to a team of mrses, where Reason, as driver, holds together tre 
two horses, Courage and Appetite. Plato in his description of the soul 
and its parts or faculties also talks of three elements which correspond 
roughly to cognition, conation and feeling, their value being in the order 
mentioned. Such a division of the mind bears a close parallel to the 
division later suggested by Freud. 
In contrast, it must be acknowledged that Aristotle! differed sharply 
with Plato, insisting that the soul is not divided into separate faculties 
or parts. In every organism it is a unit. While distinguishing various 
manifestations of the soul such as the nutritive, sensitive and rational, 
Aristotle claims that in any action it is tre complete soul which func-
tiona. It is this claim for the unitary function of soul that will be 
later suggested as tre primary role of conscience in personality. Aris-
totle appears to have set the stage for the holistic view of mm which 
will be presented as this dissertation develops. 
Immanuel Kant speaks of "the mral law within. 11 2 He contends that 
1. Aristotle, De anima. 
2. I. Kant, Preface to the Metaphysics of Morals, Section 12. 
this moral law originates a priori in the reason and becomes imperative 
for men as reason determines the will, In his Preface to the Metaphysics 
of Morals1 Kant applies this idea to conscience. Although he does not 
equate conscience and moral law he closely relates the two, He states 
that conscience is not a thing to be acquired, but that every person, be-
cause he is a moral being, has it originally within him. Although one 
may pay no attention to his conscience, he cannot avoid hearing it. It 
speaks "involuntarily and inevitably" concerning a person's actions. 
While Kant closely associate.s conscience with reason, Schopenhauer 
reverses the emphasis and gives the predominant place in the structure of 
reality to will, In his leading work, The World as Will and Idea, he 
states that the world is basically will and that phenomenal life is only 
6 
a mirror of will.2 Will alone gives a person the meaning to his own exist-
ence. Conscience to Schopenhauer means the fleeting glimpse by a person 
that his essential nature (will) is somehow identified with the essential 
nature of other people. True virtue proceeds from "that intuitive knowl-
edge which recognizes in the individuality of others the same nature as in 
our own,3 
Some philosophers came to realize that the faculty concept of con-
science was not adequate. Two outstanding writers critical of the faculty 
concept of conscience were Joseph Butler and F. D. Maurice. Butler at-
tempted to find a unity for human nature in Fifteen Sermons Preached at 
the Rolls Chapel, especially in the first three chapters. He agrees with 
Plato and others that various faculties exist within man such as reason, 
1. I. Kant, Preface to the Metaphysics of Morals, Section XII. 
2, A. Schopenhauer, The WOrld as Will and Idea, Book IV, Paragraph 54. 
3. Ibid., Paragraph 1 • 
7 
passion and affection. He takes issue with faculty concepts however, 
in suggesting that one faculty can be supreme, providing a matrix around 
which the others may be organized. Fbr Butler, the unity of human nature 
is found in the nature of conscience, for conscience becomes the supreme 
faculty, providing unity to the whole of human nature. 
Maurice, while sympathizing with Butler's effort to describe the 
unified nature of man, is critical of his attempt to make one faculty 
supreme. Maurice argues that the difficulty is found in the insistence 
that the "I" and the "ought" are not connected. He contends that what a 
person ought to do is determined by his answer to trn question: "Who am 
I?" Thus, Maurice1 contends that the whole self involved in ethical and 
moral decisions may be called the conscience. This view, as we shall see 
later, is now supported by critics of the faculty concept of conscience 
and has been carefully explored psychologically as well as philosophically. 
While no attempt has been made to note all the philosophical contri-
butions to the study of conscience the faculty tendency :in much philosoph-
ical thought has been noted in an attempt to set the stage for a summary 
of trn psychological heritage. 
ii. The Theological Heritage 
Before doing so however, a brief statement regarding the theological 
approach to conscience is needed. At this point no attempt will be made 
to discuss the many and diverse theological concepts of conscience. 
Primary attention will be given to the concept of Augustine in that 
his thought has largely conditioned the main stream of theological think-
1. F. D. Maurice, The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry (London and 
Cambridge: Macmillan and Company, 1868), p. 35-36. 
8 
ing that has come after him. The separation of personality into various 
faculties made a profound impression on Augustine, the formulator of much 
classic Roman Catholic theology. He developed a concept of the body-soul 
antithesis and the faculty explanation of the various functions of person-
ality, concepts with which modern thinkers still struggle. In the tenth 
book of The Confessions is found Augustine's description of the dual nature 
of man. He is, according to Augustine "soul and body, one without, the 
Other Wl."thin."l Th t . . f 1 d t d" G d e ou er man ~s m er or an canna ~scover o • The 
inner man is superior and can know God as He in grace and mercy shows Him-
self to the inner man. Augustine further argues that God resides in the 
memory of man and directs him through the power of recollection. On the 
basis of this recall he is able to "infer future actions, events and 
hopes. n2 There is implied then, some function of judgment or choice with-
in the personality. This function Augustine suggests is given by God, it 
depends not on the efforts or experience of man, it is able to function 
because of God's grace alone, and rather than unifying man's soul and body, 
it stands in opposition to the outer man attempting further to isolate the 
mind from the body. 
In passing, it is interesting to note that Freud, arguing from the 
psychological basis many years later shows a striking parallel to Augus-
tine's reasoning but reverses the terms. Freud conceives the super-ego 
as against the instincts introjected or learned from authorities, whereas 
Augustine sees the function of conscience as being concerned with the 
1. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, Book X, Paragraph 9. 
2. Ibid. 
,biological side of man, dealing with repression of instinctual desire 
particular],y of a sexual nature. 
Two modern theologians who take exception to the segmented view of 
conscience are Paul Tillich1 and Emil Brunner.2 Both argue that it is 
neither the mind or the soul but the psycho-physical whole, the person 
'man' whom God has created on his own image. These two men affirm that 
conscience involves the whole person in the making of choices and that 
9 
the decisions made depend greatly on the self-image the person has. This 
image is not given nor does it exist a priori but depends on a person's 
experience and growth. 
In summary, it has been shown that the faculty concept pervaded much 
philosophical and theological thinking about the nature and function of 
conscience. Today this concept is thought of as the segmented view and 
stands in sharp contrast to the holistic view of man 1 s nature. For cen-
turies conscience has been conceived in terms of a separate faculty re-
sponse of perception, will and feeling involving the whole self in de-
cisions of all types. In common, both theological and philosophical 
writings noted above have assumed that conscience is not dependent on ex-
perience, that it exists prior to awareness on the part of the individual, 
that human effort has little to do with its dictates. 
While such philosophical thinkers as Maurice and Butler attempted to 
look at the psychological nature of conscience it remained for Freud to 
1. P. Tillich, Systematic Theolo~, 2 vols. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1947), I, pp. 1 8-170. 
2. E. Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1947), P• 216. 
10 
undertake t:1e first major invGstigation of the nature and +'unction of 
conscience from a J!Sychological analysis. The psyc':1oa.nal;ytic concept of 
the super-ego has fon,,ed the foundation for the bvlk of' research w'"'-d '>rrit-
ing carried on from the psychological point of ·.riew sincG tte tur:1 of the 
century. In psychoaYla.lytic li te:rature conscience is r~iscusse.:l 3.S aupGr-
c;o. Freud describes tr-~e super-ego as a segment of the personali t,:r w~ich 
develops in terms of the need :"or prohibition 2.11d inhibition. It develops 
as a spec.ialization o.f the :"unction of the self 2.s the self atterr,pts to ad-
just to the surroundinc world. In his initial cone l;Jt of tl"e suj)er-ego 1 
Freud refers to it as the "highest ment.<:l evolution attainable by man." 2 
Beginning w;_th his assu1-r.pti.on about the fixsd ~:::::. -u.nchar:::::."::, life 
and death instincts, Freud devoted much of his writing about the super-
ego to a description of its harsh and destructive aspects. :fe reluc-
to.!ltly came to the conclusion that the super-0~0 was oftGn in leat.:ue 
t,li th the id aJ.Ld against t:1e e;o. One ol' the chief goalo of the 
therapist, according to Freud, was to set about rcdaci:J[; tete str8;o,;th 
c:= tl1e supor-o~o, t21ereby enabling id forces tc ::"ind th:ru. the e::o more 
adequate a"!d appropriate gratification. Seein,; tre c·1pcor-o;o priC'.~.:>-ily 
as a.71 unconscious and perr.:anent influence of early authorities, ?reud 
further concluded. t::.;:t the super-ego tands to accant tl1e severity ;md 
restrictiveness of t!'Je p::trents far more than their love and kind-
ness. 
l. 3. Freu:l, Thej;go and the Id, Joan Riviere, tr. (London: Ho::;arth Prass, 
1927), P• 30.-
2. L. A. Brill, tr., The Basic Hritint;s of Sigmund l7reud (iicM York: The 
Hodern Library, l93"BY; p.l2. 
ll 
J. C. Flugel in Man, Morals and Society attempts to apply the findings of 
psychoanalysis to ethical theory.1 Accepting Freud's faculty explanation 
of conscience Flugel discusses the sources and inconsistencies of con-
science differing only slightly from Freud. Whereas Freud assumed the 
ideal self-image was always distorted and unrealistic Flugel acknowledges 
that given certain favorable environmental circumstances the conscious 
aspects of the self-image may well be realistic and worthy of serious at-
tention. 
Not only have psychoanalytic writers tended toward a faculty concept 
of conscience, but many have taken a negative attitude toward it. The 
trend is toward depreciating the value of conscience. This attitude is 
reflected in the work of Edmund Bergler. He describes his view of the 
dual nature of conscience in The Battle of Conscience. Conscience, he 
says, is not only dual because it is both conscious and unconscious, but 
also because it is both benevolent and malevolent. He describes the end 
process of conscience as follows 
The result is that inside every human 
being an internal torture chamber is 
installed ••• out of inescapable ne-
cessity the child creates in himself 
his worst enemy. The battle of con-
science start~ in the cradle, and ends 
in the grave. 
In summary, it might be said that psychoanalysis tends to emphasize 
the unconscious, irrational and negative aspects of conscience. Uncon-
1. J. F. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society: A Psychoanalytic Study (New 
York: International Universities Preas, 1947). 
2. E. Bergler, The Battle of Conscience: A Psychiatric Study of the Inner 
WOrking of the Conscience (Washington Institute of Medicine, 1948), P• 7. 
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s.cious, repressed material has been identified with the immoral or in-
stinctual desires, particularly those of a sexual or aggressive nature. 
Furthermore, conscience has been reified in psychoanalysis. It is made 
"the conscience", a thing within the personality. In general it is de-
scribed as a mechanically functioning process. 
More recent psychological research has moved away from this reduc-
tionist approach of psychoanalysis. In contrast to the highly individ-
ualistic and segmented approach of psychoanalysis is the field approach 
of many writers currently involved in psychological investigation of the 
nature and function of conscience. This approach is based on the Gestalt 
insight that the whole is more than the sum total of its elements. 
The self is described in terms of the total psychological environ-
ment. Many of these writers argue that feelings of conscience arise from 
the total self. Conscience develops because there is "a self observed 
with whatever degree of realism one can muster, and a self clearly or dimly 
glimpsed as something to be realized.1 The strength of conscience thus is 
based on the degree to which a person aspires to be the self to be real-
ized. 
Nee-Freudian writers like Fromm and Horney argue that there is a vast 
difference between the childish self-image which is often perpetuated into 
adulthood and an ideal self-image having its roots in the growing experi-
ence of the individual. Non-Freudians such as Allport and Mowrer contend 
that conscience is not an agent of repression but of affirmation. They 
l. G. Murphy, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure 
{New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), P• S39. 
see conscience as the source not msrely of parental prohibitions carried 
over from childhood, but of moral and ethica:C s tar::~.d.rC:s ;;':ich need to ba 
integrati·.re activity rather than a particular faculty of t::te personality. 
Since conscience is a .functional quality of the c8lf, it dev8lopc a.s the 
self develops. A limited self concept implies a limited conscience. It 
is only in the limitecl conscience where experiences requiring change or 
producing pain have been dissociated or repr0ssed that we .finJ no;;ative 
qualities predominant. In the grcwing self conscience is see~ ~s an 
affimative, ethical al'.d moral fu.nction leadins not to repression but to 
fulfillment. 
4. The Need For Tha Study 
The need for e dissertation on the psycholor;ical nature of con-
science in Freudian theoJ-:;" is intensified because of the recent renewal of 
interest on the part of nee-Freudian and non-Freudian Hriters in this con-
cept. To evaluate properly their studies and conclusions a clear under-
standing is needed of the Freudian theory upon whici1 the major part of 
recent investigation has been built. The powerful influences of Platonic 
dualism and faculty soul concepts which have led to t~3 understanding of 
conscience as a segment of personality have been noted. The Horks of 
Kant and Schopenhauer have been mentioned to illustrate the effect of 
Platonic thought on philosophy. In t:1e field of theology tho dualistic, 
faculty approach to personality was directly incorporated in the thought 
of Augustine. The body-soul anti thesis r<L'llain3 a basic postulate in 
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~uch theology at the present moment. In the area of psychology Freud 
accepted the faculty orientation of Plato almost in toto, probably with-
out recognizing it. In fact, the step from the feeling, conation and 
cognition of Plato to the id, the ego, and the super-ego is indeed a 
short one. 
5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
As this study proceeds an attempt will be made to trace Freud's 
early concept of the function of censorship (1900) to the developed idea 
of the super-ego. Later analytical modifications of the super-ego will 
be noted. The Freudian concept will then be evaluated in the light of 
neo-Freudian and non-Freudian criticism. Finally it will be the conten-
tion of this dissertation that in Freudian theory we find a description 
of the immature conscience, essentially authoritarian and repressive. 
In contrast it will be argued that creative conscience while influenced 
somewhat by early parental admonitions, derives its sentiments from self-
chosen goals, from a continuously productive relationship between the 
individual and his environment. The creative conscience will be con-
ceived not as a separate entity existing parallel to the self, but as 
integral with the self. Conscience will thus be seen as the function 
of the total self as it moves toward or away from that which is conceived 
as valuable. to the person in his complex relationship. Conscience will 
be defined as a functional dynamic quality rather than a constitutional 
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part of the self as conceived by Freud and his followers. 
CHAPTER II 
DEVEIJJPMENT OF SUPER-EGO TI~ FREUDIAN THEORY 
1. Freud Proposed Three Divisions of the Mind 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to trace the development 
of the Freudian concept of the super-ego. In order to do this we must 
begin not with the forces of the ego or super-ego but with the forces 
of the unconscious. It was in the 1890's that Freud first became con-
scious of powerful forces at work in the human personality that were 
largely inaccessible to the mind, hence unconscious. In one of his 
earliest books The Interpretation of Dreamsl he develops the idea of 
the unconscious and lays the foundation for the later conceptualiza-
tion of personality which today forms the bases for Freudian theory of 
personality and the techniques utilized ir, analytic therapy. 
In The Ego and the Id published in 1921, Freud postulated his clas-
sical method for generalizing all psychological phenomena, whether con-
scious or unconscious. Psychological data could be described in terms 
of three systems which together comprise the total personality. These 
he named the Id, the Ego, and the Super-Ego. 
i. The Id 
The word id Freud borrowed from George Groddeck who suggested in 
1. Consult Bibliography for further information. 
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one of his essays tm t we are 'lived 1 by unknown and uncontrollable 
forces. The id (literally the it) is a term which aptly describes the 
impersonal, non-human, non-conscious nature of instinctive energy in 
17 
its original aspects. The libido which represents the sum total of 
sexual energy mtivating the individual toward finding pleasurable sat-
isfaction remains an "It" in the id, Id impulses are originally inde-
pendent of one another. For example, in primitive form aggression is 
the wish to kill or destroy. In the id this impulse is not fused with 
libidinal components which alone could turn simple aggression (the wish 
to kill) into creative and productive acts which are of'ten the observ-
able resultant acts of primitive id impulses after they have been cen-
sored and modified by the ego. Another chief characteristic of the id 
is its subordination to the pleasure principle; id impulses demand im-
mediate gratification and attempt to move toward such a goal irrespec-
tive of reality problems or external demands. Hence the reference to id 
impulses as irrational, unorganized and amoral. 
ii. The Ego 
For Freud, the ego was that part of the id which had been mdified 
by its nearness to the external world and the influence that the exter-
nal world had on it. The ego takes over the task of representing the 
external world for the id. Without such representation the id, in ef-
fort to find gratification for its instinctual needs, w:>uld undoubtedly 
meet disaster from the superior forces of the outside world. The pleas-
ure principle which is enthroned in the id is modified by the realicy 
principle of the ego. The ego is given the difficult job of controll-
ing the instincts. 
It is easy to see from this definition that the goal of analytic 
therapy was to strengthen the ego function so that it could ward off 
the restrictive demands of the stper-ego and allow the id to find suit-
able and acceptable outlets by which instinctual gratification could 
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be achieved. In his thought, Freud progressed from his concept of the 
unccnscious, one of his lasting and fundamental contributions to psy-
chology, to what he termed "ego psychology." It was in his investiga-
tion of this agency of the mind called ego, the function which is mostly 
conscious and interprets and coo):"dinates the impressions from the outer 
world and from our own bodies, that he arrived at the third system which 
he called super-ego. 
iii, The Super-Ego 
In a paper published in 1914 "On Narcissism" he suggested that not 
all of the libido was connected oath primitive bodily satisfactions or 
directed to the self (conceived as an enduring bodily and mental whole). 
He then suggests that the portion of the libido so directed to ourselves 
could be referred to as the narcissistic libido. In the course of fur-
ther development this portion of the libido itself undergoes differen-
tiation, A tart of it remains directed to ourselves as we really are. 
But this does not satisfy us. As the real self is perceived to be im-
perfect and less than omnipotent and we become aware of its defects and 
limitations, physical, mental and moral, we compensate by building up in 
imagination a sort of ideal self, Wl.ich we would like to attain. It is 
as though we refused to stay contented with our real self as a love 
object, once its deficiencies become apparent, and set out to construct 
a better and more worthy self, yet one which has some recognizable re-
semblance to the self. 
To this ideal ego is now directed the 
self-love which the real ego enjoyed 
in childhood. The narcissism seems to 
be now displaced onto this new ideal 
ego, which, like the infantile ego, 
deems itself the possessor of all per-
fections ••• That which he (man) projects 
ahead of him as his ideal is merely his 
substitute for the lost narcissism of 
his childhood-- the time when he was his 
own idea.l 
Freud's word •super-ego' never refers to reasonable objective ego 
judgments, but it does refer to the unconsciously working repressing 
forces of the mind. It also by necessity includes the standards these 
forces have adopted, whether they be known or unknown. Later, we shall 
consider the division within the super-ego which resulted in the dis-
tinction between conscious and unconscious aspects of conscience. 
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Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external 
world of reality, the id is "a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement. n2 
Freud pictures the super-ego as the representative of the id attempting 
to find ways in which the id impulses can be discharged. This means that 
the super-ego and id are closely related and often aligned against the 
ego function. 
Freud, in one of his earliest descriptions of the super-ego says, 
"the super-ego is, however, not merely a deposit left by the earliest 
1. S. Freud, "On Narcissism," Collected Papers, Vol. IV, (London: Hogarth 
Press, Ltd., 1924), PP• 132-133. 
2. s. Freud, New Introductory Lectures (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1933), 
P• 102. 
object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction-
formation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not ex-
hausted by the precept: 'You ought to be such and such (like your fa-
ther)'; it also comprises the prohibition: 1 You must not be such and 
such (like your father); that is, you may not do all that he does; many 
things are his prerogative 1 ••• 111 In response to criticism of lois ana-
lytic research which appeared destined to ignore the higher, moral, spi-
ritual side of human nature, Freud says 
Here we have that higher nature, in 
this ego-ideal or super-ego, the rep-
resentative of our relation to our 
parents. When we were little children 
we knew these higher natures, we admired 
them and feared them; and later we took 
them into ourselves. 11 2 
2. From Simple Censoring to Super-Ego 
The concept of the super-ego was a long time in developing. Its 
conceptualization was largely a result of two theories postulated by 
Freud: (1) the theory of instincts and (2) the theory of repression. It 
was not until 1915 in a paper on "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" that 
Freud developed his theory of instincts. He insisted that an instinct 
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is a sum of psychic energy which imparts direction to psychological work. 
One can speak of the transformation of bodily energy into psychic energy 
as well as the transformation of psychic energy into bodily energy. For 
example, we think {psychic energy) and then we act {muscular energy). All 
1. s. Freud, 
2. Ibid., P• 
The Ego and the Id (London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1935), 
P• 2$8. 
259. 
energy is obtained from the instincts. The principal sources of in-
stinctual energy are bodily needs or impulses. Instincts are inborn. 
i. The Basic Instincts 
Freud said the number of instincts is to be determined by bio-
logical investigation. In his final reckoning, Freud recognized two 
great groups of instincts, those in the service of life, and those 
in the service of death. Freud was convinced that ag ,ressiun is not 
necessarily a product of the life-instincts and that a tendency to 
repeat earlier situations explains much of hwaan behavior. In the 
death-instinct these two convictions found an explanation. The energy 
of this instinct is definitely destructiveness or aggresoion that is 
directed primarily toward the self. The repetition compulsion theo-
retically is related to the death-instinct. It is an expression of 
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the tendency of life to return to earlier states. As Freud says, this 
is the tendency of organic life to return to the inorf,anic. The death-
instincts are little known, only their derivatives of which aggression 
and destructiveness are the better known are observable. The life in-
stincts are better known because their effects are more public. They 
are mental representatives of all the bodily needs whose satisfaction 
is necessary for the survival and propagation of human life. The sex 
instincts are studied by Freud almost to the exclusion of any others. 
The principal derivative of the sex instincts is Jove. The sexual in-
stincts include not only direct genital stimulation and manipulation, 
but also the use of other bodily zones for pleasure. The three principal 
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:~:ones are the oral, anal and genital zone. In this order the child may 
be observed finding satisfaction with his body over the early years of 
his life. From the recorded reports of adults and some young people 
about their childhood experience, Freud makes his assumptions about the 
life-instincts. The genital stage, characterized by object-choices ra-
ther than by narcissism comes with adolescence and adulthood. At this 
stage the person is involved in socialization, group activities, marriage, 
serious vocational choices, etc. 
The form of energy which is used by the life-instincts is called 
"libido", but no special name was ever given by Freud to the form of en-
ergy employed by the death-instincts. While the term "libido" was orig-
inally used to denote sexual energy, Freud later used it to describe the 
energy of all the life-instincts. 
Analysts coming later have given the death-instincts the name of 
"thanatos" as opposed to "eros." They suggest that thanatos constitutes 
an activity of the mind and not merely a reaction from need frustration 
in other areas. It is acknowledged that these two basic instincts never 
appear unmixed. They are combined, in quantitatively varying degrees, at 
different times. 
The instincts reside in the id, but they come to expression through 
the processes of the ego and super-ego. The ego is the principal agent 
of the life-instincts. By helping these instincts find bodily satis-
faction and by transfonning the death-instincts into forms that bring 
life rather than death the ego fulfills a vital function. Thus, the 
primary death wish in the id becomes transformed in the ego into aggres-
sion against outer objects (enemies). When a person becomes aggressive 
tpward outer objects rather than the self, notably authority figures and 
enemies he encounters counter-aggression. In order to avoid punishment 
the person learns to identify with the age;ressor. This means that he be-
comes aggressive against the very impulse which makes hbt hostile toward 
others. According to Freud, the person develops a super-ego which plays 
the same role in controlling his impulses as an external authority does. 
Calvin S. Hall in A Primer of Freudian Psychology describes the se-
quence in the following way. The super-ego upon becoming an internalized 
authority seeks to modify the demands of the ego, especially when they 
contain hostile or aggressive feelings toward an external authority figure, 
We might imagine the process workjng in the following way: (l) The child 
feels hostile toward the father, (2) this produces antagonism in the 
fether which results in his punishing the child, (3) the child (through 
ef:"orts of the super-ego) identifies with the punishing father, (4) as 
a consequence of this process the authority of the father is internalized 
and becomes in essence the super-ego (S) and from then on the super-ego 
punishes the ego when it breaks a moral rule of the super-ego. This con-
ception led to the belief that neurosis was the consequence of repression 
which the ego and super-ego turned against the forces of the id. It will 
be the purpose of this dissertation to show later that the reverse is 
what actually takes place in the development of neurosis; namely that 
neurosis is the product of id and ego functioning in league against the 
super-ego. 
This sequence, described above, which is Freudian in pattern indi-
cates clearly why Freud regarded the super-ego through most of his 
career as something harsh, destructive, and harmful to the personality. 
If the ego is the agent of the life-instincts, the super-ego by striv-
ing to destroy the ego has the sane aim as the original death wish in 
the id. This is why Freud arrived at the reluctant conclusion that the 
super-ego is the agent of the death-instincts. 
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Later we shall attempt to show that the super-ego harbors not merely 
the deposit of the death-instincts, but holds the key to full expression 
of the life-instincts. As Freud drew near the end of his life he acknowl-
edged that possibly the super-ego embodied not only harsh restrictions 
but also the clue to real personality development. In the New Intro-
ductory Lectures he says 
mankind never lives completely in the 
present; the ideologies of the super-
ego perpetuate the past, the traditions 
of the race and the people, which yield 
but slowly to the influence of the pre-
sent and to new developments, and, so 
long as they work through the super-ego, 
play an important part in man 1 s life, 
quite independently of economic conditions.1 
Freud's first topographic conception of personality involved the 
uncmscious, the conscious, and the censor, formulated in The Inter-
pretation of Dreams. The theories about unconscious processes and re-
pressions were first worked out in connection with hysteria. Freud 
soon discovered that something similar happened in obsessional neuroses 
and phobias. The first type of repression consisted of putting out of 
consciousness single traumatic episodes, while the second type involved 
the repression in the deep unconscious of impulses and desires which 
never did become conscious. 
1. s. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: 
w. s. Norton Co., 1933), p. 96. 
ii. Simple Censorship Redefined in Concept of Super-Ego 
If repression was a characteristic of all neurotics it was nec-
essary to postulate some kind of censoring activity. It was natural 
that at first the repressions themselves occupied Freud's attention; 
soon he turned to the repressing activity. It was found that the con-
tents of the mind that were inaccessible to consciousness were often 
either in themselves or through their associations, unaware of moral 
distinctions in that they did not meet the approved standards of the 
day; in particular they ~re often connected with sexual or aggres-
sive thoughts and actions. In attempting to make these thoughts con-
scious it was discovered that resistance was manifest by the patient 
and this discovery led in turn to the whole doctrine of repression and 
conflict which is at the heart of psychoanalytic theory and practice. 
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It seemed clear that if the repressed contents were a-moral the re-
pressing forces were themselves acting on behalf of socially accepted 
standards or morality and this view found expression in the term cen-
sorship which was at first applied to the total of the repressing forces. 
It is interesting to note that this idea was suggested to Freud by 
Breuer in the early 1890's. Breuer's theory was that a thought memory 
or desire became unconscious because of the accidental mental state of 
the patient .bile Freud thought there was always a motive for forgetting. 
Breuer believed that certain conditions such as fatigue, pain, trauma, 
etc., favored dissociation. Freud came to the conclusion that a 
thought, or desire must become unconscious for a purpose. In other words, 
a thought or memory must be actively put out of tre mind because, for some 
reason, it is unbearable. Thus, he concluded, purposive effort is 
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required to make an experience unconscious, and he called the process 
repression. 
It was this early conclusion about repression that led to the first 
formulation about censorship. As has been previously indicated, r'reud 
came to picture the mental anatomy of personality, normal and neurotic 
in the following way. 
The unconscious is a large anteroom, 
in which the various mental excitations 
are crowding one another, like individ-
ual being&. Adjoining this is a second, 
smaller apartment, a sort of reception 
room, in which consciousness resides. But 
on the threshold between the two there 
stands a personage with the office of door-
keeper, who examines the various mental 
excitations, censors them, and denies them 
admittance to the reception room when he 
disapproves of them •••. The doorkeeper is 
what we have learned to know as resistance 
in our attempts in analytic treatment to 
loosen the repressions. 
Now I know very well that you will say 
that these conceptions are as crude as 
they are fantastic and not at all per-
missible in a scientific presentation ••• 
Still, I should like to reassure you that 
these crude hypotheses, the twc chambers, 
the doorkeeper on the threshold between the 
two, and consciousness as a spectator at 
the end of the second room, must indicate 
an extensive approximation to the actual 
reality.l 
According to this conceptual scheme, feelings or impulses which 
are objectionable to the censor are kept imprisoned as effectively as 
possible in the anteroom; i.e., in the unconscious. In this early scheme 
Freud believed that the imprisoned impulses were primarily sexual in na-
ture. 
1. (New York: 
He says 
every time we should be led by analysis 
to the sexual experience and desires of 
the patient, and every time we should 
have to affirm that the symptoms served 
the same purpose. This purpose shows 
itself to be the gratification of sexual 
wishes; the symptoms serve the purpose of 
sexual gratification for the patient; they 
are a substitute for satisfactions which 
he does not obtain in reality,l 
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At this point much is left to be desired with respect to the origin 
and nature of the censor. Some implications, however, seem to be ilnplic-
it. By this time (1920) it was assumed that neurosis was due to conflict 
between repressed desires and the repressing force. This first discovery 
showed that the censorship was not always efficient. It was further shown, 
that the neurotic conflict could be reduced by ventilating the repressed 
impulses rather than by attempting to strengthen the repressing force. 
If neurotic behavior involved the inhibition of sexual or other im-
pulses when, in reality, the way was open for their gratification, it 
could easily be assumed that the censor, far from being able and sensitive 
had become a rigid, archaic institution, often tragically out of touch 
with the realities of adult life, and often separated from the conscious 
adult personality, as also from contemporary society. The assumption fur-
ther suggests that a person is abnormal because his censor is abnormal, 
How the censor becomes abnormal and why did not concern Freud at this point. 
The next formulation of the mind attempted to be more explicit in de-
1. s. Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoana1ysis, P• 263. 
scribing the nature and origin of the repressing factor. In the New Intra-
ductory Lectures Freud talks of the unconscious still as a "large anteroom, 
in which the various mental excitations are crowding one another, like in-
dividual beings." But he develops the second and third of the three con-
ceptions much further. In his chapter on "The anato~cy of the mental per-
sonality" he announces that psychoanalysis is beyond the stage of being a 
psychology of the unconscious and announces that it embodies something new 
which he calls "ego psychology." 
Freud then takes up the task of describing the super-ego. It will be 
remembered that in the earlier scheme he had said little about the origin 
and development of the censorship function. In this book he attempts to 
define specifically the nature and origin of this function which is now 
redefined in terms of the super--ego. 
After describing the tendency of psychotics to be pre-occupied with 
violent self-criticism and delusions of persecution Freud says 
Under the strong impression of this 
clinical picture, I formed the idea 
that the separating off of an observ-
ing function from the rest of the ego 
might be a normal feature of the ego's 
structure; this idea has never left me, 
and I was driven to investigate the 
further characteristics and relations 
of the function which had been separated 
off in this way. The next step was soon 
taken. The actual content of the delu-
sion of observation is only a first step 
towards conviction and punishment, so 
that we may guess that another activity 
of this function must be what we call 
conscience ••• I will henceforward call 
this function in the ego the 'super-ego•.l 
1. S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoana1ysis, pp. 8S-B6. 
Xhe foregoing statement coming in 1933 repres2nts Freud's classical 
formulation of the mind; up until his death psychoanalysis accepted 
this formulation as being basically correct. Modifications by Freud-
ian analysts have been few since that time. 
In summary, it has been pointed out that in the first Freudian 
conceptualization the idea of censorship was postulated as a conse-
quence of the clinical evidence pointing to repressing activity which 
formed the primary basis for neurosis. In the second conceptual scheme 
the 'censor' was redefined as super-ego. The super-ego was given a 
place of considerable prominence in the Freudian scheme and many quali-
ties were attributed to it that were missing in the first idea of the 
censor, i.e. notably aggressive, moral and ideal aspects. 
iii. Aggressive Aspects of the Super-Ego Largely Unconscious 
Bergler and others have recently restated the Freudian position 
with respect to the aggressive aspects of the super-ego. They have 
agreed that a large part of the super-ego is inaccessible to conscious-
ness ••• that in particular the aggressive and destructive parts are 
unconscious. The aggression contained in the super-ego constitutes the 
accumulation of hate, anger and frustration which the child feels so 
deeply in his early years. One of the significant discoveries of psy-
choanalysis is that among the various lines of displacement along which 
an impulse can be re-directed, turning inward or against the self occu-
pies an important place. In other words, although a child finds it 
difficult to strike back at parents and other authority symbols, he can 
take his aggression back into himself. The severity observable in the 
super-ego is due to a recoil against the self of aggression caused by 
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frustrating objects in the outer world. Thus, not only does the person 
have to deal with his aggression which he is unable to direct toward them, 
but also it is inaccessible to consciousness. This aggression torments, 
punishes, produces guilt and anxiety in spite of conscious efforts to deal 
with external situations realistically. 
iv. Ego-Ideal and 11Daimonian" Parts of Super-Ego 
The ego-ideal, as has been previously stated, constituted for Freud 
a self-image constructed to maintain the image of power and glory we held 
when still children. It was his idea that as the person grew older and 
realized his deficiencies and inadequacies he set out to construct a better 
and more worthy self, yet one which had some recognizable resemblance to 
the self. Portions of the ego-ideal are reflected in the conscious moral 
precepts which a person maintains for himself. Yet, his "search for glory" 
as it is characterized by Horney, remains largely unconscious. The sector 
which contains the infant's unlimited "dreams of glory" is inaccessible 
except through psychoanalysis. 
Previously attempts have been made to define the ego-ideal. The 
11 daimonian" refers to the body of aggression, hate and cruelty which 
the person has taken into himself, primarily over the long years of 
infancy when he was helpless and dependent on external authorities. 
The term "daimonian" was coined by Bergler. He in turn borrowed it 
from Socrates who claimed that every human being harbors a "daimonical 
something within himself." In Plato's account in Apologia of Socrates' 
speech before his judges in Athens during his trial for "corruption of 
youth," Socrates describes "daimonian" thus: "A godlike and daimonical 
.something •• some kind of voice that deters me from th:ings I wish to 
do, but never gives positive advice." The modern daimonian bears no 
connotation of demons, devils, or other spooks, but refers to the 
negative aspects of the super-ego, which :in effect constitute an anti-
hedonistic pr:inciple, ooe which torments the ego-ideal with its fail-
ure to realize its goals. 
If there is an immense gulf between the ideal and the reality, a 
person inevitably feels dissatisfied, guilty and anxious. These feel-
ings are not so much a result of failures in the real world as they are 
of the inability of the ego to attain the superiority and goals held up 
by the ego-ideal. While a person would not be critical of average per-
formance by another individual he would be extremely unhappy over his 
own failures and mediocre achievements primarily because of his reluct-
ance to sacrifice his "search for glory" in favor of a realistic ego. 
In the operation of this mechanism we see a vindication of Adler's 
contention as to the widespread desire for superiority, and at the 
same time a justification of Freud's theory of "secondary narcissism" 
attaching not to the real self but to the ideal one. IT successful 
treatment of neurosis involves a sacrifice on the part of unrealistic 
id demands, a reduction of no less unrealistic aspirations and require-
ments of the super-ego are also required. 
3. Disharmonies Within Ego-Ideal 
It is obvious the t the place where psychoanalysis differs with 
other schools :in relation to the super-ego is at the po:int of dishar-
monies. Implicit in otmr approaches to this function is the idea that 
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the self-regarding sentimnt is primarily an asset and that it is rela-
tively consistent in wanting the person to go on to bigger and better 
things. Within the ego-ideal as developed by Freud and others, there 
are acute conflicts, some of which will be mentioned in the following 
pages.l 
i. Ambivalent Role of Parents 
One of the obvious sources of conflict is to be found in the parents. 
Simultaneously, they represent a source of love and frustration. A child 
is completely dependent on the parents for love, help and protection; on 
the other hand the parents represent the source of prohibitions, fear, 
and thwarting. It is interesting to note that several writers, while 
not accepting Freudian theory canpletely, have noted the factors con-
tributing to this source of disharmony. Suttie in The Origins of Love 
and Hate points out that our dependence on society in later life is 
connected with dependence on maternal care in infancy and early youth. 
He contends that we suffer from 1 separation anxiety' when we feel that 
we have lost the love of mother or society. Horney in New Ways in Psycho-
anal.ysis speaks of 1basic anxiety' of infantile origin which can be re-
duced only by the establishment of a satisfactory social adjustment 
while Fronm in Escape From Freedom points to man 1s sense of loneliness 
and insecurity which lead him to such mechanisms of escape as authori-
tarianism. All of these writers agree that man's need of social support 
stems from attitudes acquired during the long dependent and helpless 
stage of infancy in which the child both fears and loves the parental 
authorities. 
l. J. c. Flugel, Man~ Morals and Society (New York: International Univer-
sities Press, 194 ), PP• 49=63. 
ii, Parents• Super-Ego 
Another source of conflict is found in the fact that the aggres-
sive and more cruel aspects of the super-ego are derived not from a 
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true picture of the parents as they are, but rather from the super-ego 
of the parents. If the parent's ego were adopted by the child, Horney's 
contention that the super-ego forms a need rather than an agency of the 
mind would have more validity. But the fact that it is not the gentle, 
rational primarily loving aspects of the parent's nature but the stern, 
punishing aspects of the super-ego that are taken over by the child, 
reinforce the Freudian contention that the super-ego is no mere super-
ficial need but one of the basic components of the mind. Klein in her 
study of children gives additional evidence suggesting that the child's 
super-ego does not consist merely of the parental values and ideals, 
but actually attempts to incorporate the more impossible values of the 
parental super-ego. With such a pattern prevailing, it is impossible 
to conceive of an ego-ideal containing harmonious qualities. 
iii. Oedipal Complex 
Connected with this distinction between the parent's real ego and 
his super-ego is a distinction between those aspects of the parent's 
conduct which it is considered desirable for the child to imitate and 
thus incorporate into his super-ego, and those which are considered ac-
ceptable for the adult and taboo for the child, Notable among these 
are those of a sexual nature. These present real difficulty especially 
when they are considered in the light of the Oedipal situation. 
;i.v. Conflict Within Super-Ego 
A fourth source of disharmony is often found in the conflict pre-
vailing between the more or less conscious aspects of the ego-ideal 
(concepts of the self prevailing at the adult level) and those deeply 
unconscious aspects of the ego-ideal probably extending back to early 
formulations in infancy. These disharmonies between the prevailing 
attitudes at different levels of experience constitute a serious source 
of disharmony within the ego-ideal, 
4, Four Basic Sources of Super-Ego 
i, Narcissistic Libido 
It was one of Freud's great discoveries when he noted that not 
all of the libido was connected with primitive bodily satisfactions 
or directed on to outer objects, but that part of it was directed to 
the self, Previously this process has been described in terms of 
"self love." It was pointed out that we become dissatisfied with our 
real self as a love object and set out to construct a more worthy ob-
ject, yet one which resembles the real self, Thus, the ideal self 
is constructed and to it is attached the love called secondary nar-
cissism. This source contributes most of the love and idealism which 
may be found in the suj:er-ego. 
ii. Introjections 
Another source is from the process of inclusion into one's own 
mind of the principles, morals and attitudes of others, notably those 
of the parents and other authority symbols that appear in early life. 
34 
Along with whatever ego-ideal the child has for himself he looks to 
the important people in his realm of experience for material by which 
to further shape this ideal self, It is well known that social, moral 
and religious values are preserved and given continuity primarily be-
cause they are transmitted through this kind of incorporation on the 
part of children, 
iii. Recoil of Aggression 
Freud and others make much of the fact that it is due to the long 
period of helpless infancy during which the child is compelled to hate 
those whom he must also most love that he begins to make himself an ob-
ject of hate which he often feels toward these powerful people, It is 
one of the remarkable discoveries of psychoanalysis. Freud and his fol-
lowers deserve the credit for discovering that the super-ego or so-
called higher self embodied severe aggression. As has already been 
noted, the super-ego is no mere echo of the moral standards of the day, 
in many respects it appears to be more severe. Klein, Jones and others 
of the English school contend that the severity and aggression of the 
super-ego is only incidentally related to the parents and that it stems 
primarily from this mechanism of recoil whereby anger that should be 
directed outward is taken back into the self. It was partly because of 
this formation that Freud was so critical of the super--ego function. 
iv, Sado-Masochistic Tendencies 
The tendency to take pleasure in the exercise of mastery and in 
the infliction of pain for their own sake over and above such inevit-
able consequences of aggression like cruelty and domination has pre-
,sented a difficult problem to students of human nature. Later on an 
attempt will be made to describe the origins of the sado-masochistic 
tendency. Fort he present the terms may be defined in the following 
way: (1) Sadism, in its more general psychoanalytic sense, is defined 
as the wish, conscious or unconscious, to inflict pain (physical or 
psychical); (2) masochism is defined as the wish to experience pain. 
Freud showed how these two tendencies were related to morality. In 
moral masochism he claimed there was a need to suffer, especially in 
ways dictated by unconscious punishment phantasies. He insisted that 
conscious and unconscious guilt constituted not only punishment for 
tabooed wishes, but at the same time a special form of sexuality. 
5. Sources of Aggression 
i. Parents 
Since the early discoveries by Freud, psychoanalytic writers have 
been in general agreement that one of the causes of aggression is to 
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be found in the long relatively helpless and dependent relationship 
which the child has with his parents, a relationship in which he finds 
himself both hating and loving the parent. As it is too dangerous to 
express the destructive or hateful feelings toward this all-powerful 
symbol the child either redirects it outward or incorporates it into 
himself. This returning aggression appears to attach itself to the 
super-ego where it acts as a tormentor and cruel judge toward the ego 
function. The child seems to prefer to deal with his aggression toward 
the parental figures within himself evidently feeling that when it is 
internal he has more of a chance to keep it under control. 
ii. "Nemesism" 
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Thus far we have described the aggression that has an external 
source in the behavior of the parents or other moral authorities and 
the w~ in which it becomes internalized and attached to the super-ego 
as the result of the introjection of these external authorities. If 
this were the only source of ag~ression the super-ego would not present 
so many problems as it does. There is another source of aggression 
that springs from the person's own anger and revolt against the 
frustrating parent figures. With Flugel and others we propose to uti-
lize Rosenzweig's suggestion and use the term "nemesism" as an alter-
native and technical term for aggression turned against the self. This 
term first appears in a book by Murray and others entitled Explorations 
in Personality (1938). Rosenzweig points out in a chapter of this book 
that the term aggression has been used generally without any attempt 
to designate the source of the aggressiveness. We agree with him that 
there is considerable difference between the external aggressive feel-
ings that are introjected and the aggressive elements that arise out 
of anger directed against the self, both as to source, degree and even-
tual treatment program, Such a term has the advantage of being easily 
compared and contrasted with the already familiar "narcissism" which 
designates the comparable process of love directed to the self. 
This nemesism is distinguished from other aspects of the super-ego 
in at least the following ways: (1) Instead of holding before us an 
ideal or goal toward which we ought to strive it appears as a relentless 
source of punishment and torment which distorts and diminishes any goal 
or ideal: (2) it is primarily concerned with prohibitions rather than 
steps by which a goal might be attained. It in essence says "no" with-
out giving reasons or alternatives, acting as a constant source of 
frustration to the ego function; (3) its chief relation to the ego is 
one of hate rather than love. It sees no tenderness or affection in 
the self, only the prototype of the child's pictures of the parent as 
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a harsh, forbidding, terrifying and punishing person; (4) nemesistic 
aspects of the super-ego are largely unconscious and thus beyond aware-
ness. The effect we are fully cognizant of but the sources of the feel-
ing forever escape us. 
iii. Sadism and Masochism 
This idea of aggression that is directed against the self seems 
to date from Freud's paper on "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" pub-
lished in 1915. In this work he emphasized the important transforma-
tions of instinct, as when a person instead of desiring to exercise 
mastery desires himself to be mastered. This was followed by a paper 
in 1917 on "Mourning and Melancholia" in which he drew attention to 
the fact that the judgments which the melancholic patient would, with-
out apparent justification, bring against himself, could be applied to 
some person who had been important in the life of the patient. Freud 
suggested that melancholia resembled mourning in the sense that the 
patient had lost the important person either through death, separation 
etc., and had solved his problem by introjecting the lost object; when 
the lost object became a part of the patient's self, the love was re-
placed with hate and this hate was turned upon the object introjected, 
i.e. upon the self. Thus by 1917 Freud had established three important 
clinical observations: (1) the loss of a love object produces traumatic 
feelings; (2) the lost object is introjected into the self; (3) hate 
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is substituted for the love which was originally felt toward the object 
which now must be directed toward the self, The example of melancholia 
was especially suited to bring into prominence the element of aggres-
sion that has been called nemesism in this chapter ••• nemesistic aggres-
sion reflected back from an object in the outer world, put in the ser-
vice of the super-ego and directed against the self. 
In the development of Freud's thought on sadism and masochism,at 
least three levels of development can be traced. In the Three Contri-
butions to the Theory of Sex published in 1905 sadism and masochism 
were looked upon as more or less independent members of a long list of 
component instincts. His second theory is expounded further in his 
article on "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" where he suggests that 
masochism has its origin in the connection between sex and pain, sadism 
in the connection between sex and force, and since the use of force and 
the suffering of pain so often go together, the two tendencies tend to 
become associated. In this view Freud considered sadism turned against 
the self, the external partner taking over the active role of sadist. 
Freud's third theory was developed in the article on "Economic Problems 
of Masochism" published in 1925 in which he suggests that sadism and 
masochism are to be differentiated from nemesistic aggression in that 
the latter there has been a defusion of the life and death instincts, 
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i.e, a desexualization, This idea was connected with the theory of a 
death instinct. In order to be consistent with the theory of a death 
instinct, it was necessary to assume that the destructive drive was 
directed primarily against oneself and was only secondarily turned 
outwards in aggression toward others. Thus the third theory considered 
masochism as the most direct type of union between libido and destruc-
tiveness, and sadism as a secondary development, whereas his early idea 
had been that sadism was primary and masochism was the result of turn-
ing sadism against the self, 
iv. Contributions of Other Authors 
(1) Reik and Jones 
Both Reik and Jones look with skepticism upon the theory of the 
death instinct and insist that the origins of sadism and masochism are 
tied to the intrinsically aggressive nature of much infantile activity. 
Both feel that the roots of these two characteristics are to be found 
in the ambivalence and fusion of love and hate that is characteristic 
of the very young child and in the important part played by primitive 
aggressive tendencies in the earliest days of life. 
(2) Abraham and Ferenczi 
Karl Abraham and Sandor Ferenczi were two followers of Freud in 
the early days who expanded Freud's ideas as to the sources of aggres-
sion. Abraham in a paper entitled 11 The First Pregenital Stages of the 
Libido" which was included in the Selected Papers published in 1927 
noted that the infant might experience acute anxiety at the earliest 
oral stage and that something which might be called guilt could occur 
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at the next or anal stage. Freud had connected the super-ego with the 
childish attitudes toward the parents that made up what he called the 
Oedipus complex. The super-ego he called the "heir" to the Oedipus 
complex. It seemed unlikely to Abraham and Ferenczi that the super-
ego should come into final form with the passing of t.OO Oedipal stage. 
This idea that the primitive aggression and hence primitive super-ego 
development began in the earliest stages of life was later, as we shall 
see, verified by Klein and Isaacs in their experiments with child analy-
sis. 
Ferenczi, with Freud, emphasized that some of the earliest and most 
important aspects of the child's education are concerned with learning to 
control the processes of excretion so that they might occur at a time 
considered right and convenient on the part of the adults involved. The 
attempt to meet the parent's demands in this area constituted the child's 
earliest moral endeavors. This idea Ferenczi carried further in an arti-
cle "The Analysis of Sexual Habits" published in 1925. What he wrote in 
this connection seems important enough, in its attempt to establish the 
origins of aggression and super-ego function at a very early age, to be 
quoted in part. 
The anal and urethral identification ••• 
with the parents appears to build up 
in the child's mind a sort of physio-
logical forerunner of the ego-ideal or 
super-ego. Not only in the sense that 
the child constantly compares his a-
chievements in these directions with the 
capacities of his parents, but in that a 
severe sphincter-morality is set up which 
can only be contravened at the cost of 
bitter self-reproaches and punishment by 
conscience. It is by no means improbable 
that this as yet semi-physiological moral-
ity forms the essential groun1work of 
later purely mental morality. 
Here we find the beginning of an idea suggesting that the early 
formation of the super-ego is connected with pregenital functions that 
certainly antedate the Oedipal situation let alone its passing. This 
idea seems to have formed the pattern for the theories developed later 
by Klein, Reik and Suttie. 
(3) Klein 
A member of the English school of psychoanalysis, Klein has done 
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much research in the area of child analysis. Along with Ernest Jones she 
has made many vital contributions to the anal~~ic conception of personal-
ity. In a volume, Contributions to Psychoanalysis she describes the ori-
gins of aggression in small children. 
According to Klein the growth of the super-ego is a relatively slow 
process having its beginning in the earliest stages of life. According 
to her observations, the super-ego has its origins at the same time the 
child makes its earliest oral introjection of its objects, called the 
oral-sadistic stage. It is during this pregenital stage that the child 
experiences the fusion of libido and destructive instincts, resulting 
in the high degree of sadistic impulses. 
In his book Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud put forward his 
theory that at the outset of human life the instinct of aggression, 
or the death-instinct is being opposed by the libido or life-instinct. 
P.. fusion of the two instincts follows and gives rise to sadism. In 
order to escape from being destroyed by its own death-instinct the or-
1. S. Ferenczi, "The Analysis of Sexual Habits• (1925), in Further 
ontributions to the Theo and Tecbni ue of P choanal sis, tr. 
by Jane Suttie, N.Y.: Boni and Liveright, 1926 , p. 
~anism makes use of its narcissistic libido to project the aggressive 
instinct outward toward objects in the external world (the first ob-
jects being parental figures). Klein carries this theory further in-
dicating that parallel with this projection of the death-instinct out-
ward, there goes on an internal defense reaction against that part of 
the death instinct which could not be externalized. The anxiety then 
experienced by the infantile ego is caused not merely by external ob-
jective dangers but by its perception of this internal danger from 
that part of the death instinct that could not be directed outward. As 
theego attempts to mobilize the force of the life instinct it meets 
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with only partial success, owing to the fusion of the two basic instincts. 
A division takes place in the id, by which one part of the instinctual 
impulses is directed against the other. Klein goes on to say that this 
early attempted defense on the part of the ego constitutes "the founda-
tion-stone of the development of the super-ego, whose excessive violence 
in this early stage would thus be accounted for by the fact that it is 
an offshoot of very intense destructive instincts, and contains, along 
with a certain proportion of libidinal impulses, very large quantities 
of aggressive ones.l 
This argument leads us to the following conclusions: (a) the super-
ego of the child does not coincide with the picture presented by its real 
parents, but is fashioned out of imaginary pictures of them which the 
child has taken into himself; (b) its fear of real objects is based upon 
fear both of its unrealistic super-ego and of objects which are real in 
1. M. Klein, Contributions to Psychoanalysis (London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 
1950), P• 269. 
themselves but which it views in a distorted light due to the influence 
exerted by the child's super-ego. Thus the projection of the child's 
own aggressiveness creates a phantastic notion of the cruelty and se-
verity of the parents, in which their real tendencies to be aggressive 
become insignificant. In addition, Klein notes two additional observa-
tions. First, at this early oral-sadistic stage there is no clear per-
ception of persons as such. The child does not recognize its mother as 
a unity, it only distinguishes the parts that are important, i.e. the 
nipple and then the breast. Secondly, the child makes no adequate dis-
tinction between his impulses which are highly ambivalent. They are 
mixtures of love and aggression to a high degree of fusion seldom found 
in later life. 
Other writers like Ernest Jones have been so impressed with Klein's 
findings that they have thought of the parents' real aggressiveness as 
being hardly negligible suggesting that such aggression as may exist in 
the parents is exploited by the child in an attempt to find a suitable 
outlet for his own fierce aggressive tendencies. In this connection 
Jones has developed the term "aphanisis" referring tc the child 1 s fear 
that his primitive desires and aggressions may result in the permanent 
loss of all sources of satisfaction. He believes that it is to guard 
against this psychic loss rather than to protect against external with-
drawal of love that the super-ego is built up. 
From a study of Klein and Jones several conclusions may be drawn: 
(1) the super-ego has its origins in the primitive aggressiveness experi-
enced by the child in infancy; (2) the child attempts to get rid of its 
cruel, harsh impulses by projecting them outward onto objects rather 
than complete persons; (3) corresponding to this series of projections 
is a series of introjections whereby primitive impulses originally dis-
placed outward are turned inward again and incorporated into the organ-
ism. (4) It is these objects or persons, endowed with the child's own 
impulses that are incorporated and that the child feels he possesses 
within his own being. (5) It is these introjected objects or persons 
that constitute the beginnings of the super-ego, (6) It is obvious 
that the parent figure (or object) introjected is colored by the ex-
treme aggressiveness of the child himself, and in this way the super-
ego acquires its harsh, cruel, punishing aspects that struggle so 
fiercely with the loving, tender uplifting qualities often observed in 
the ego-ideal, 
Reik, with Klein and Jones, emphasizes the aggressive aspects of 
infancy and early childhood. He contends that this quality accounts 
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for the origins of sadism rather than the existence of a death instinct. 
He suggests that the close relation of mother and child provides the 
source for much infantile aggression, During this period the child is 
totally dependent upon a mother who is not always loving, but sometimes 
threatening, other times demanding, still other times withdrawing love .. , 
all of which is very threatening to the child thereby producing his 
highly ambivalent feelings of love and hate which at this stage are 
intimately fused, Reik argues that the super-ego arises in response 
to the ego's request for help in dealing with the aggressive demands of 
that portion of the id which cannot be directed outward, In a sense, 
this argument sets the stage for a brief examination of a view held 
by another author. 
(4) Suttie 
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Suttie in The Origins of Love and Hate takes issue with Freud's 
theory of a death-instinct. He considers that love of mother is pri-
mary in so far as it is the first formed and directed emotional re-
lationship. He disagrees with Klein and Horney who accept the Freud-
ian formulation of the infant first directing love and hate toward its 
own self and then directing it outward on to other objects. He claims 
that in early infancy there is no discrimination of "other" from "self", 
that the child does not even make a distinction between object and self; 
the second stage involves the love (and anger) of others. Hate or ag-
gressiveness is not regarded as a primary independent instinct but as a 
development of "separation-anxiety" which arises as a consequence of a 
threat against love. Suttie considers the aggressiveness of the child 
as his supreme way to command and preserve the love relationship. Rath-
er than being the instrument of death, it is used as the final effort 
to restore the love relationship. 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to trace the development 
of the super-ego in Freudian theory. Freud's first division of the 
mind into id, ego and super-ego has been presented, Special note has 
been made of the harsh, forbidding and negative qualities which Freud 
soon attached to the super-ego function. Further contributions of other 
Freudians to this concept have been mentioned including those of Flugel, 
Bergler, Klein, Jones and Reik. Ih the next chapter an attempt will be 
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made to trace manifestations of the super-ego in human thought and action. 
The Freudian contention that many of the primitive characteristics of the 
super-ego may be seen in adult behavior will be discussed and evaluated. 
CHAPTER III 
MANIFESTATIONS OF SUPER-EGO IN HUMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to trace the development 
of the super-ego in Freudian theory. Freud's theory of the unconscious 
was developed in considerable detail. Then followed a treatment of the 
doctrine of repression, finally resulting in the division of the mind 
into id, ego, and super-ego by 1915. Contributions by other authors 
such as Klein, Bergler, and Flugel were discussed and it was shown how 
their research further advanced the Freudian understanding of the con-
science, In particular it was suggested that the Freudian conscience 
was primarily irrational, destructive and determined to annihilate the 
total personality through its demands for instinctual gratification. The 
aggressive qualities of the super-ego and early beginnings of super-ego 
were outlined as developed by the analytical school. The pre-oedipal 
beginnings of super-ego development were also cited. 
1. Taboo the Forerunner of Super-Ego 
In this chapter it will be our purpose to trace the expression of 
the super-ego in human thought and action. As will be shown, the con-
tention of Freudian theory is that many of the primitive characteristics 
of the super-ego are still observable in adult behavior today, 
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Freud believed that the system of totem and taboo prevalent in 
primitive society revealed characteristics that parallel the behavior 
pattern of neurotic people of our day, In an article published in 1910 
called "Totem and Taboo" he attempted to make a connection between the 
system of taboo in primitive society and the pattern of neurotic behav-
ior observed in his patients. 
i. Taboo Equated with Religion or Social Sanction 
It will be recalled that in primitive society taboo consisted of 
a prohibition that carried with it a supernatural or social sanction, 
It was the chief method of insuring conformity to the accepted social 
order. At the earliest level it was believed that the sanction followed 
automatically from the operation of 1mana 1 , a powerful force which re-
sided in the tabooed object and which could be relied upon to punish or 
destroy those who violated the taboo relating to the object in question. 
At a higher level magic was replaced by animism, the sanction being en-
forced by spirits or demons who would become angry whenever a taboo was 
broken, At a still higher level the spirits gave way to gods and the 
breaking of a taboo gave rise to divine displeasure and divinely admin-
istered punishment. 
Freud discovered that historically taboo expressed itself in a 
series of prohibitions and restrictions that seemed to have been self 
imposed by primitive people on themselves without any apparent reason, 
Violation of the prohibition or restriction would result in punishment. 
Even innocent transgressions of prohibitions were punished. Taboo was 
attached to all sorts of things such as dead people, women while in the 
menstrual period, certain animals, places where certain battles or deeds 
had taken place and people who occupied particular places of authority 
such as the tribal elder, or medicine man. The oldest, and to Freud the 
most important, taboos were two: namely not to kill the totem animal and 
to avoid sexual intercourse with totem companions of the other sex. 
The foregoing summary of taboo has valid historical documentation 
and is generally accepted today by anthropologists and historians alike. 
It is at this point that Freud departs from the record and reconstructs 
the origin of taboo in such a way as to show clearzy what to him is the 
connection between this primitive means of moral control and the con-
science function within modern man. In developing Freud's argument it 
should be acknowledged that while anthropologists today do not hold as 
valid the historical documentation, these theories have empirical rel-
evance for us in our attempts to explain the Freudian approach to con-
science. 
Freud's explanation of the origin of taboo which in turn sheds 
light on the beginnings of super-ego development will now be set forth. 
He makes use of certain theoretical reflections of Charles Darwin, J. 
Atkinson, and especially Robertson Smith. Freud combines the theories 
and speculations of these men with his findings from psychoanalytic 
practice. 
From Darwin comes the hypothesis that originally men lived in small 
hordes. These hordes were ruled by one powerful male, probably the fa-
ther. The women of the horde were his exclusive possession, and any a11-
tempt on the part of young males, even his own sons to gain possession 
so 
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of the women of the horde resulted in either their expulsion or death. 
If expelled from the horde, the young man would live alone until able to 
conquer the leader of another horde and thus possess his women. This 
hypothesis as to how man first began to live with others suggested to 
Freud a pattern of exogamy. 
From Atkinson Freud accepted the theory that this patriarchal sys-
tem finally came to an end through a rebellion of the sons who united 
against the father, overpowering him and together consuming his body. 
Then the sons discovered that they were still in a dilemma for none of 
them alone was powerful enough to control the others. To avoid self-
destruction and in an attempt to live peaceably with one another, the 
brothers renounced the women for whose sake they had killed the father, 
and agreed to practice exog~. This meant that the power of the fa-
ther was broken and that families were regulated by matriarchy. 
From Smith, Freud further took the theory that after the killing 
of the father by the sons, he was substituted with a totem animal which 
stood for their ancestor and protecting spirit. No one was allowed to 
hurt or kill it. Once a year, however, a feast was held during which 
the whole clan killed the totem and ate it. 
ii. Ambivalence of Taboo 
With these theories in mind we will now attempt to show how Freud 
related some of his psychoanalytic findings to these historical theories. 
He saw a connection between the system of taboo in primitive society and 
the pattern of neurotic behavior observed in his patients. He began with 
the premise that every taboo involved a double attitude, desire and fear, 
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attraction and repulsion. His examination of the system of taboo re-
vealed that underneath each prohibition is a real or potential desire, 
for according to Freud people do not take the trouble to prohibit things 
that no one wants to do. In its predominance of the negative aspects, 
taboo seemed to exhibit a special resemblance to one particular form of 
neurosis, the obsessional or compulsion neurosis. Freud believed that 
the super-ego had its origin in an attempt to enforce the taboo regu-
lations. He says 
Conscience is the inner perception 
of objections to definite wish im-
pulses that exist within us; the 
rejection doesn't have to depend on 
anything else. It probably origin-
ates on the basis of an ambivalent 
feeling from quite definite human 
relations which contain this ambival-
ence. It probably originates where 
one component of the two contrasting 
feelings is unconscious and is kept 
repressed by the compulsive domination 
of the other component.l 
Freud endeavored to explain at one step both the nature of the 
desires underlying the two main taboos and the reason for their coax-
istence. He maintained that these two main classes of taboo were the 
negative aspects of the tendencies operative in the Oedipus complex. 
2. Oedipus Complex and Taboo 
Because of the signifance of this complex in psychoanalytic lit-
erature and the strong resistance with which it is met in other psycho-
1. S. Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, tr. A. A. Brill (New 
York: Random House, 1938), p. 859. 
logical literature we will treat the origin of the myth and Freud's use 
of it. 
i. Freud's Sexual Interpretation of the Myth 
53 
Oedipus, in Sophocles's drama, was the son of Laius, King of Thebes, 
and Jocasta. Laius is warned by an oracle that the still unborn child 
would be his father's murderer. The child consequently grew up as a 
prince in an alien court. In manhood he questioned the oracle as to his 
origin and was warned to avoid his home since he was destined to murder 
his father and take his mother in marriage. On the road. leading away 
from what he believed was his home he met King Laius and slew him. Later 
having solved a riddle for the Thebians he was made their king and given 
Jocasta 1 s hand in marriage. After living harmoniously with her and hav-
ing children he learns of his acts - his murder of his father and takiq?; 
of his mother sexually. Appalled at the abomination which he has unwit-
tingly perpetuated, Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his heme. The 
oracle has been fulfilled. 
In this drama Freud saw a validation of the process he had observed 
constantly in his analytical work. He believed that our first sexual im-
pulses are directed towards our JWther and our first hatred and our first 
murderous wish against our father. Freud maintained that the basis of all 
neurosis could be found in the operation of this so-called "Oedipus com-
plex." We are .free .from psychoneurosis only when we succeed in detaching 
our sexual impulses from our mothers and in forgetting our jealousy of our 
fathers. Freud maintains that biological nature or physical existence has 
been responsible for this complex and that in our repression of these 
childhood wishes or refusal to acknowledge them we sow the seed of neu-
rotic behavior. 
None of the findings of psychoanalysis has provoked such denials 
and fierce opposition on the part of critics as this indication of the 
childhood impulses towards incest which Freud claims persist in the un-
conscious. Historically the Oedipus complex was touched upon for the 
first time in too Interpretation of Dreams published in 1900. Accord-
ing to Anna Freud and James Strachey in a footnote contained in their 
edition of the above work the gist of the idea of the Oedipus complex 
was put forward by Freud in a letter to Fliess as early as October 15th, 
1897• The actual term •Oedipus complex• seems to have been first used 
by Freud in his published writings in the first of his "Contributions 
to the Psychology of wve 11 in 1910. 
ii. Myth as Symbolic of Separation Anxiety 
The generalization which Freud made from the ~th of Oedipus has 
been sharply called into question by many representatives of psychother-
apy. Suttie in Origins of wve and Hatel for example, suggests that the 
maternal rejection is a vastly more effective cause of repression than 
the mere paternal castration threat defined as being primary by Freud. 
Suttie believes that the idea "mother 110uld never consent" is the con-
elusive barrier to the Oedipus wish, even at fantasy level. Suttie then 
goes on to suggest that fear of separation rather than incestuous wishes 
toward the parent form too basis of all neurosis. Later in critizing 
the Freudian theory of too conscience we will return to his position in 
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1. I. D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (New York: The Julian Press 
Inc., 1952). 
greater detail. 
Regarding the Oedipus myth Suttie points out that in the legend 
itself the initial aggression came from Laius, the jealous father, not 
from the son, He suggests that the father is jealous of babies as such, 
girls and boys alike and that the basis of this jealousy is not sexual. 
For Suttie the ambivalance toward parents on the part of children is 
based not on sexual desire or repulsion but on the fear that love will 
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be withdrawn, particularly by the mother. He feels the nucleus of neu-
rosis is found in separation anxiety and that the mother, not the father, 
holds the key to its resolution. 
iii. Myth as Symbolic of Self-Knowledge 
May in Man's Search for Himself indicates that the myth of Oedipus 
gives us an age-old but ever new picture of the inner pain and conflict 
in finding out truths about ourselves. It is in the blinding episode 
rather than the sexual experience that we find the significance of this 
drama. May believes that man's unwillingness to look at himself and his 
desires has more importance here than Freud's interpretation of this myth 
which suggests that every child has incestuous desires toward the parent 
of the opposite sex. 
iv. Myth Suggests Sexual Basis of Neurosis 
Freud published in 1909 an "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old 
Boy." In this case study Freud emphasized the infantile sexual basis for 
all neurosis, further implementing the idea taken from the Oedipus myth. 
Hans had a phobia of horses, and as a result refused to go out in the 
street. He expressed a fear that the horse would come into the room and 
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bite him. Freud learned that this fear on the part of the boy was based 
on his wish that the horse would fall down or die. To Freud it became 
evident that the boy was struggling against wishes which had as their 
subject the idea of his father being absent. Hans regarded the father 
as a competitor for the favors and love of his mother toward whom his 
sexual wishes were aimed. In the analysis it was reported by the father 
that the boy wishes to sleep in his 100ther 1s bed. When forbidden to by 
the father Hans feared castration. Thinking his mother, like the horse 
he observed, had a penis; Hans was shaken to discover this organ miss-
ing in his mother. This meant to him that she must have lost the penis 
as punishment for having done something forbidden. 
In the analysis Freud discovered that Hans found relief from the 
conflict arising out of his ambivalent emotional attitudes toward his 
father by displacing his hostile fearful feelings oo to a substitute 
for his father. In the case of Hans the object of displacement was the 
horse, a totem symbol existing in many primitive societies. one other 
insight stemming from this analysis must be mentioned herG. Hans not 
only was frightened of horses; he also approached them with admiration 
and interest. As soon as his anxiety began to diminish, he identified 
himself with the fearful animal and in his giraffe phantasy bit his fa-
ther. Thus to Freud the ambivalence manifested by primitive people to-
ward the two main taboos was further explained by the results of this 
analysis. 
If we substitute the father for the totem animal the tOiO main rules 
of totemism as conceived by Freud (a) not to kill the totem animal and 
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(b) not to have sexual relations with a woman belonging to the same 
totem agrees with the two crimes of Oedipus. According to Freud, 
totemic systems thus are a result of this Oedipus complex. 
For Freud, then, the super-ego developed as a result of the at-
tempts of men to deal with their original desire to kill the father. 
According to Freudian theory this effort to control the Oedipus com-
plex which is central in all neurosis, resulted in the creation of the 
totem, the substitute for the father. Gradually the external totem was 
replaced by the internal super-ego. With the compulsive neurotic as 
with the primitive savage the real genesis of taboo or restriction is 
impossible to find, When plagued by harsh restrictions the motive is 
unconscious to the contemporary neurotic as it was to the primitive 
savage. 
3. Modern Equivalents of Taboo 
Flugel1 suggests that the equivalents of primitive taboo may be 
found in several areas of modern society. Considerable amounts of re-
pression and control once exercised by taboo have been taken over by 
super-ego development. One of the results of highly individualized be-
havior and personality development has been the transfer from the group 
to the individual of the function of repression. Particularly in obses-
sional neurosis can the evidence supporting this idea be seen. Even if 
the individual is not neurotic he must use his conscience to restrain 
him from many anti-social actions to which his instincts would prompt 
1. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society (New York: International 
University Press, 1947). 
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bim. What Flugel calls "rational restraint" on the part of the individ-
ual is therefore a substitute for taboo. 
i. Religious Belief 
In religious laws and beliefs we find another manifestation of prim-
itive taboos. They differ from human law in that they apply only to the 
believers and in that the source of authority is non-human, namely God 
himself. This means that displeasure on the part of the deity is to be 
greatly feared and by necessity must be placated. Later in discussing 
guilt and punishment we will attempt to describe the numerous religious 
practices which came into being as an effort to deal with the overwhelm-
ing feelings of guilt connected with the breaking of the religious laws. 
ii. Social Custom 
Convention and good manners have many similarities and at many points 
are impossible to separate, Ih both however, the sanction is provided by 
social disapproval or contempt. The social disapproval is not rigid and 
unbending, but for the most part is more variable than superstitions both 
in time and space. One convention which is arbitrary and often absurd is 
the one vogue in New York City where men are expected to change from one 
kind of hat to another on a certain date regardless of the weather. In 
many conventions there is no intrinsic factor of usefulness or conven-
ience but there is no doubt about the very real feelings of guilty dis-
comfort that failure to conform produces in most people and these feel-
ings are similar to those aroused by the breaking of more primitive and 
permanent taboos. Good manners tend to apply to relatively intimate and 
personal contacts and not so much to social situations. While many of 
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.them are useful and helpful others tend to live on after their usefulness 
had disappeared. A breach of manners, as with the breaking of a conven-
tion, produces real guilt feelings in the :r:e rson involved and thereby re-
sembles a more primitive taboo. 
iii. Language 
Linguistic taboos are psychologically very interesting and socially 
of considerable importance. Ernest Jones in an article, "A Linguistic 
Factor in English Characterology", included in Essays in Applied Psycho-
analysis has suggested that when we break verbal taboos involved in the 
practice of swearing, particularly in the use of words relating to re-
ligious objects of symbols that we are finding an outlet for our aggres-
sion by directing it against the moral authority embodied in the taboo, 
even though the actual meaning of the words employed may have no rele-
vance to the situation that has aroused our anger. 
It appears that the mixed attraction and aversion we have toward 
many words is paralleled to the ambivalence Freud discovered in primi-
tive people concerning taboos and totems. 
Analysts in general agree that the relief and enjoyment experienced 
when we defY the social authorities and the super-ego in breaking a con-
vention or using a forbidden word gives us some idea of the severity 
with which the super-ego still rules and the strain which obedience to 
the archaic and often meaningless demands of the super-ego imposes upon 
us. 
In summary it should be pointed out that in at least three ways the 
institution of taboo in our society corresponds to the function of the 
super-ego in the individual. It is the basic factor in roral control; 
its roots are primitive and archaic; it is primarily dependent on in-
tuition and usually out of touch with reason. According to Freudian 
theory its survival indicates that in spite of modern development, man 
is still fearful of his instinctual urges and finds it difficult to 
face the requirement confronting him within or without, 
4. Guilt 
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Along with the function of taboo the Freudian theory has maintained 
that guilt points to the existence and function of the super-ego, It 
will be our purpose here to describe the function of guilt as one mani-
festation of the super-ego function. No attempt will be made to explore 
the many approaches made to this subject by writers in other disciplines. 
It must be acknowledged that guilt exists as fact and feeling, While of-
ten related, our main concern at this point will be to deal with guilt as 
feeling, Guilt as feeling refers to the erotional aspect of the experi-
ence of one who stands in judgment upon himself, and condemns himself, 
The intensity of the emotion may bear little or no apparent relation to 
the fact with which it is associated, It is, indeed, the disproportion 
between fact and feeling that constitutes for the Freudian conclusive 
proof that guilt is directly related to super-ego function. 
i. Rootage of Guilt in Repressed Negative Feeling 
The Freudian maintains that guilt arises out of certain human experi-
ences. The infant, helpless and anxious, depends upon his JOOther, loves 
her because she satisfied his needs, and wishes to possess her wholly so 
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that he may have her to himself. The father is felt to be a rival, a 
threat to such a wish, and the very young child resents the father's 
place with the mother, feeling an elemental hostility toward him as a 
thwarter whom he hates. Any expression of hostility toward the father 
is promptly frowned upon, forbidden and punished with the result that 
even the impulse toward such expression of hostility cannot come into 
full, conscious view. Should such feelings begin to emerge they are 
pushed down - repressed - with accompanying intense feelings of guilt. 
The feeling of guilt is, itself, so painful that it cannot be admitted 
into full consciousness; and yet it is insistently felt, so much that 
one also dimly feels the necessity of punishing himself to "atone" for 
his wrong. 
Freudian guilt then, is directly associated with the parent-child 
relationship. Ernest Jones and others maintain that the guilt arising 
from ambivalent feelings toward parents is repressed to an inaccessible 
strata. He suggests that stratification of guilt is found in the fol-
lowing sequence: (l) there are two strata in emotional experience, one 
being open to conscious awareness and reflection, the other a more prim-
itive type of feeling for which an individual can give no explanation 
to himself; (2) a possible sequence of emotions at each level; (3) the 
possibility that a deeper sense of guilt may underlie and set off a 
more superficial anxiety and hostility; and (4) the possibility that 
each of the conscious states named may grow out of a much deeper one 
of kindred nature. 
In other words, guilt implies a condition of tension between the 
ego and the super-ego, which in turn corresponds to tension between 
child and parents. On the conscious level there may be awareness of 
infraction of rules, customs and tradition; but on the deeper level 
guilt involves the feeling which once was manifest toward the parents 
and through the efforts of super-ego functioning were repressed. The 
penalty for repression is the feeling of guilt. 
ii. Guilt as a Consequence of Repressed Good 
Other writers have suggested that guilt arises not only as a con-
sequence of failure to avoid certain negative feelings (such as hostility 
toward the father), but from failure to enact positive feelings (such as 
expressions of love toward parents). Mowrer in Learning Theory and 
Personality Dynamics discusses anxiety and symptom formation. He agrees 
with Freud that a neurotic symptom, so-called, is any habit which re-
solves anxiety but does not lessen the ultimate, realistic problem which 
the anxiety represents. He also agrees with Freud's contention that re-
pression is necessary to an adequate theory of anxiety. He disagrees 
sharply as to the essential nature of anxiety itself. Freud holds that 
anxiety comes from evil wishes, from acts which the individual would 
commit but dares not. Mowrer suggests the reverse; that anxiety arises 
from acts which the individual has committed but wishes that he had not. 
In his words "it is ••• a guilt theory of anxiety rather than an impulse 
theory,"l In the next chapter more attention will be given to Mowrer's 
theory of super-ego or conscience function and the Freudian conceptu-
1, Q, H. Mowrer, Learning Thee~ and Personality Dynamics (New York: 
The Ronald Press, 19SO), P• 37. 
1llization will be criticized and compared to it. This paragraph here 
seemed pertinent to the discussion of guilt as one manifestation of 
super-ego functioning. The more basic question revolves around the 
motive for feelings of guilt rather than whether guilt feelings exist. 
5. Punishment 
In their investigation of guilt Freudians soon discovered a close 
connection between guilt and punishment. As punishment is the natural 
method of reducing tension between parent and child, so the rreudian 
maintained punishment became the natural method of reducing tension 
between the ego and super-ego. 
i. Need for Punishment 
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Flugel suggests that we appear to be the victims of a complex he 
refers to as the "Polycrates complex," after Polycrates the tyrant of 
Sames (whose story is told by Herodotus and who is the subject of a 
well-known poem by Schiller). The unprecedented run of success enjoyed 
by this potentate aroused ever-increasing alarm among his friends who 
began to think that his balance of ill-luck must be accumulating at a 
most alarming rate. It was suggested that it might help to avert dis-
aster if he were to make some voluntary sacrifice. M0 ved by those sug-
gestions, he threw a valuable ring into the sea. The ring, ho;rever, ;ras 
swallowed by a fish, which was caught by a fisherman and, being an ex-
ceptionally fine specimen, was served up at the tyrant's table. To the 
consternation of all the ring >ras duly found inside; it was clear that 
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the sacrifice had not been accepted and that the gods were unwilling to 
mitigate the penalties they had in view. In fear of an approaching ca-
tastrophe, his ally, Amasis of Egypt, left the doomed man's presence 
with unseemly haste. 
In this legend Flugel sees an illustration of the need for punish-
ment which he maintains is the most effective way of reducing feelings 
of guilt. In the previous chapter some consideration was given to the 
nemesistic or aggressive aspects of the super-ego in which punishment 
is inflicted upon the ego for failing to live up to the demands of the 
super-ego. It was pointed out that the super-ego not only imposes se-
vere restrictions upon the instinctual desires of the id but that it 
turns with aggression toward the ego. Flugel maintains that wherever 
super-ego development is strong one can find a corresponding strong 
need for punishment. 
ii. Reparation 
There are devious ways in which we find equivalents of punishment. 
Flugel maintains that in the equivalents of punishment we have a clear 
demonstration of the function of the super-ego. One method is that of 
reparation. Jean Piaget in The Moral Judgment of the Childl shows 
clearly that reparation or making good is a method used by children to 
relieve feelings of guilt. Klein and her school show that at least some 
crude notions of reparation are to be found at a very early age. In 
fact, were it not for the predominance of aggressive elements in the 
super-ego and in our general moral standards it seems likely that reps-
1. J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (London: R. Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1932). 
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ration would replace simple punishment as the chief method of reducing 
guilt, In the institution of sacrifice particularly, the motive of re-
paration is predominant. The savage may throw back a portion of the 
food he has gathered to appease the gods; in the higher religions the 
worshiper makes an offering to please god and show his love for him; 
the analyst sees in the Christian comnrunion an enactment of this idea 
of reparation whereby in the sacrifice to God of the body and blood of 
Christ a reduction of guilt is effected in those participating in the 
act. Ih spite of the difficulty we have morally, educationally and 
otherwise in furthering the idea of reparation instead of simple punish-
ment the desire persists, perhaps pointing to the fact that the super-
ego, when stripped of some of its deeply unconscious and aggressive roots 
is essentially empowered with discrimination ability and concerned with 
more than instinctual gratification, 
iii. Confession 
Another alternative to punishment is confession. All of us can 
testify to the effectiveness of this method in reducing feelings of 
guilt, Reik has made a special study of confession from the psycho-
analytic view. He suggests that this method reflects growth in moral 
discernment on the part of individuals and society. Ih the primitive 
state punishment is inflicted without opportunity for confession. The 
next stage involves punishment and confession being intimately blended; 
in the third stage punishment is reduced for those who confess and some 
significance is attached to the act itself; in the fourth stage confes-
sion is often considered as a sufficient substitute for punishment. Con-
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fession as a means of reducing guilt has assumed increasing importance 
in the modern development of religion indicative of the importance at-
tributed to the motive of an immoral act as distinguished from the act 
itself. Piaget in his study of the child has discovered that at the 
earliest stage the child considers guilt to be entirely proportionate 
to the material consequences, a greater injury brought about by accident 
being regarded as more blameworthy than a smaller one deliberately con-
trived. At this stage the attitude of the child is similar in many re-
spects to that implied in taboo in which punishment follows automatically 
without respect to motive. Piaget discovered that as growth continues con-
siderations of lll)tive take an ever larger place. Freudian thought seems 
reluctant to acknowledge the full implications of this evidence - namely 
that the super-ego function in a small child need not be comparable to 
that of an adult. The material produced by Piaget, Klein and others 
suggest that the factor of moral control, the super-ego, attempts to grow, 
rationally distinguishing acts and motives rather than grimly going on 
upholding primitive and archaic methods of control and judgment. Freud-
ian evidence indicates to this writer that the super-ego while being the 
custodian of primitive aggression is also potentially the source of what 
Sherrill in Guilt and Redemptionl refers to as the "capacity for moral 
discrimination." 
iv. Rationalization 
Still another alternative to punishment is rationalization in which 
we endeavor to assuage our guilt by finding a secondary justification for 
1. L. J. Sherrill, Guilt and Redemption (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1945). 
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the guilty action as when we attribute "unusual circumstances" to a situ-
ation in which we transgress ths accepted code. 
v. Projection 
Projection affords still another alternative to punishment. In this 
alternative guilt is projected on to some other party who is then re-
garded as responsible so that we ourselves feel innocent. Freudian the-
ory claims that projection involves an element of delusion. Freud demon-
strates how persons with delusions of persecution, characteristic of par-
anoia, project onto others their aggressive and guilty impulses so that 
such persons become scapegoats. 
6. Alliances Between Id and Super-Ego 
Some analysts, notably Franz Alexander, have suggested that because 
of the peculiar relations of interdependence that obtain between the 
satisfaction and punishment of guilty desire that there appears to exist 
a sort of alliance between the id and super-ego. He suggests that the 
super-ego, like a harsh judge, often is open to bribe. Certain instinc-
tual gratification of desire is permitted so long as a bribe is paid in 
the form of suffering a punishment. Alexander reasons that if the super-
ego, as Freud conceived it, is a split-off portion of the ego and the ego 
itself a modified part of the id, that it is conceivable that the id 
should attack the ego through the super-ego, the guardian of morality and 
ideals. 
Bergler in the Battle of Conscience also suggests that under certain 
conditions the super-ego seems vulnerable to corruption. He indicates 
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.that the neurotic conscience or super-ego licenses inuer wishes and id 
desires for gratification in exchange for the bribe of depression, pun-
ishment and guilt, He goes on to suggest that the "criminotic con-
science" is even more corrupt and demanding insisting that for allowing 
instinctual gratification the conscience demands total annihilation, He 
says, "every criminal unconsciously bargains for prison or the electric 
chair,"l 
7• Religion 
i. Religion as Super-Ego Projection 
Freud was convinced that the existence of religion in general and 
Christianity in specific can be explained as a projection of the super-
ego, In Totem and Taboo he developed the idea that in primitive society 
taboo consisted of a prohibition that carried with it a social sanction. 
The sanction operated on different levels as society advanced, On the 
lowest level the sanction followed automatically from the operation of 
•mana•; a powerful force which resided in the tabooed object. At a 
higher level magic was replaced by animism, the sanction being enforced 
by spirits or demons who would become angry whenever a taboo was broken, 
On the religious level spirits were replaced by gods and the breaking of 
a taboo gave rise to divine displeasure and divinely administered punish-
ment. 
il'hile the king, spiritual 1e ader, or head of the state is the high-
est earthly figure on whom we can project our super-ego, there is beyond 
1. E. Bergler, The Battle of the Conscience (Washington, D. C.: Washing-
ton Institute of Medicine, 1948), p. 261, 
this the sphere of the superhuman and divine. Freud maintains that with 
earthly figures we are liable in some degree to a repetition of the dis-
appointment that we suffered when we realized the limitations of our own 
original p>rents. As a final refuge we can turn to God, and are at least 
relatively safe for God is obscure and not immediately experienced and 
thus not liable to those imperfections 'itlich are sooner or later discern-
ible in all human figures, 
Even in the projection onto God however, there are difficulties. 
Two basic components of the super-ego eventually find expression even in 
God, One is the strong ambivalence which in primitive days resulted in 
the conviction that God not only loved but judged his children, At the 
primitive level the savage often regards his gods as punishing, malig-
nant beings as well as helpful ones. At the higher level, including 
Christianity, this ambivalence often results in a fragmentation into 
God and the devil. This explains to Freud the reason for the constant 
regression within Christianity from a god of love to one who is to be 
feared because of his harshness and judgment that he levies against his 
people, 
The other component of the super-ego that eventually reveals itself 
in the nature of God is that referred to earlier in this chapter as the 
need for punishment. This need explains the feeling often expressed by 
people when afflicted with illness or affliction that perhaps God is 
punishing them for sins of omissioo or commission, 
In two works, Future of an Illusion and Civilization and Its Dis-
contents published in 1928 and 1930 respectively Freud summarizes the 
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advantages that religion shares with all animistic beliefs: it gives the 
believer an opportunity to deal with the forces of nature as with people; 
he can bribe, flatter or even threaten them, When spirits become ex-
alted into gods, a continuation of the protection and guidance that was 
given by parents in infancy can be rontinued, Freud contends that it 
is especially when man feels overwhelmed and threatened that he projects 
his super-ego on to God for then he desires to be protected and guided 
by a power greater than his Oli!l. In danger man has a tendency to regress 
into the dependent infant position rather than endeavoring to stand cou-
rageously alone and realistically attempt to deal with the problem at 
hand. 
ii. Religion as a Form of Neurosis 
In Moses and Montheism (1939) Freud comes close to Jung 1 s position 
that raciaL archetypes play an extremely important part in religious be-
liefs and account for the remarkable similarities of dogma and symbolism 
found in many different parts of the world. This view is particularly 
difficult to accept in that it implies the inheritance of acquired char-
acteristics, even innate ideas--a view which runs counter to a vast pre-
ponderance of the evidence available at present from biology and genetics. 
Freud suggests that the rise of religion parallels the appearance of neu-
rosis in the individual. He maintains that mankind as a whole passed 
through conflicts of a sexual, aggressive nature as did Moses and that 
these conflicts have left permanent traces, even though for a long time 
they were latent. 
The hypothesis of this book is that through the efforts of Ikhnaton, 
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king of Egypt in the lhth century B. C. a new type of religion came into 
existence. This was an advanced religion which banished ritual, dogma 
and even belief in an after life. Freud contends that during Ikhnaton 1 s 
reign there lived a man whose last name was "mose" an Egyptian word 
meaning child. This Moses, a high ranking rember of the government in 
charge of an outlying province attempted to enforce these concepts which 
heightened their self-confidence. It did at least these things: (1) it 
allowed the people to share in the grandeur of its new conception of God; 
(2) it maintained that the people had been "chosen" by this great God and 
were destined to enjoy the proofs of his special favor; (3) these new 
concepts brought about spiritual progress, opening the way for further 
intellectual growth and greater instinctual renunciations. Elaborate 
attempts are made further in this book to show how eventually this Moses 
was killed and the people combined the new religion with the old, the re-
sults being Judaism as we know it in the Old Testament, 
Following the traumatic and latent period we see in the rise of re-
ligion the beginning of the active period in which previous concepts 
come to the surface. In religion the super-ego ~rks out actively feel-
ings that once were active in primitive times when the sons killed the 
father and took the women of the tribe for themselves. The totem ani-
mal which originated in an endeavor to assuage the guilt over killing 
the father gave way to the projection onto God. In religion Freud sees 
a pattern similar to that followed by the neurotic, particularly in the 
obsessive-compulsion patterns characteristic of much of religious prac-
tice. In the practice of asceticism Freud saw an ability on the part of 
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the individual to turn his aggressiveness inwards and then put it in the 
service of morality. He claims that in much religious asceticism such as 
fasting, denial of sexual pleasure, dietary and living restrictions, the 
religious person is imposing on himself punishment for feelings of guilt. 
The more harsh and demanding the super-ego, the more rigorous the ascet-
ic practice. 
Far from saying that religion is meaningless, Freud does say that 
it has a basis in wish fulfillment. (The realization of the wish for a 
close, ccnstant relationship with God is an example.) An illusion for 
Freud represents a wish fulfillment for some of the oldest desires of 
mankind, one that evidence suggests we are incapable of fulfilling. He 
doesn't characterize religion as a delusion but only as symptomatic of 
unrealistic wishes which have persisted since primitive time. 
iii. Psychoanalysis and Religion 
Flugel points out several important relationships between psycho-
analysis and religion. (1) Although analysis has taken issue with much 
of the dogma and belief of religion it has no power to disprove the 
claims made by religious groups. (2) By demonstrating the fundamental 
nature and infantile origin of the needs underlying religion analysis 
has given great significance to religious belief. While doubting the 
metaphysical implications of religious beliefs, analysis has taken seri-
ously the emotional feelings of an infantile situation as a necessary 
condition of growth. Both demand a child-like quality as a prerequisite 
to healing. 
Pfister1 sees Christianity as an attempt to escape from the author-
1. o. Pfister, Christianity and Fear (Thomas W. H. Johnston, New York: 
Macmillan, 1948). 
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;ltarian father-figure and the archaic aspects of tha super-ego. It is 
to him preeminently a son and brother religion rather than a father re-
ligion, 
Flugel makes two criticisms of Christianity with respect to its at-
tempt to deal adequately with the demands of the super-ego. They are 
that it has failed both to remove internal guilt and to abolish external 
aggression, 
The implication through all of the discussion of religion by the 
analyst is that there are no other manifestations of religion other than 
those which characterize the primitive, harsh, restrictive demands of the 
child's super-ego, A few, like Flugel, acknowledge that the religion of 
Jesus did succeed in reducing guilt, replacing judgment with love, and 
offered effective ways of handling anxiety. Freud and his followers onl.y 
emphasized the regressive and primitive aspects of religion, All reli-
gious expression need not be like that described by Freud, interpreted 
through the medium of the Oedipus principle. As the child must outgrow 
this situation Freud insisted that the adult should outgrow the neces-
sity for religion. Suttie claims that mature Christianity does two things 
which enable the mature super-ego to become a blessing rather than a curse. 
It offers the conception of social life as based upon love rather than 
upon authority and thus tends to substitute a conception of the Deity as 
a "free-giver and forgiver" rather than as withholder, rewarder and pun-
isher, It also emphasizes the attitude of religious behavior being 
concerned with good social relationships between men rather than with 
74 
the individual duty of every man toward his God. It is only the anx-
ious, jealous regressive child that clings to his dependency with 
marked ambivalence and jealousy. So with growing religion Suttie main-
tains, the primitive demands are outgrown and replaced with qualities 
described before. 
iv. Nee-Freudian Criticism 
Suttie sees in these two qualities a parallel of what happens with 
a child in its relationship to parents. As the child grows up both ap-
prehension and expectation from the parents are diminished. He recog-
nizes them to be good and kind rather than harsh and judgmental. As 
his love and confidence in the parent figures grow so also does his so-
cial activity. No longer is he jealous of others, but finds himself able 
to play happily with others. Only the anxious, jealous regressive child 
that clings to his dependency with marked ambivalence and jealousy shows 
increased negative behavior. Suttie claims that Freud made the error of 
assuming all religions had to deal with the Oedipus complex; Suttie af-
firms that mature religion transcends such a complex even as do adults 
who have achieved maturity. 
Fromm in Escape From Freedom (1941) and Man For Himself (1947) in• 
sists that while Freud explains religion as a form of neurosis that neu-
rosis is actually a form of religion. For Fromm religion brings a frame 
of orientation and devotion, one of the necessities for man as he seeks 
to find meaning and purpose for his life, Fromm stresses the fact that 
a 1a rge number of man 1 s strivings cannot be explained by the force of 
his instincts. After he has found food, drink and sex his real problem 
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b~gins. Man's real needs transcend those of his animal origin. He has 
an imperative drive to restore a unity and equilibrium between himself 
and the rest of nature, he needs a mental frame of reference from which 
he can derive an answer to such questions as where he stands and what he 
ought to do. In religion, especially those which emphasize love and 
freedom rather than authority and judgment, Fromm sees such a frame of 
reference. He describes much of religion as standing for irrational 
authority which is based not on competence but on power over people. Re-
ligion that intends to emphasize love, forgiveness and understanding pro-
vides a frame of reference for which modern man desperately seeks. In 
discussing the Oedipus complex Fromm makes a detailed criticism of Freud's 
theory which will be discussed in the next chapter as some nee-Freudian 
theories of the super-ego are discussed. In part, Fromm claims that the 
Oedipus myth has to be understood not as a symbol of the incestuous tie 
between mother and son, but as the rebellion of the son against the au-
thority of the father in the patriarchal family; and that the marriage 
of Oedipus and Jocasta is only a secondary element, only one of the sym-
bols of the son's victory, who takes over his father's place and with it 
his privileges. 
In view of this argument that the core of neurosis is not to be found 
in infantile sexual striving but in an effort to find freedom and accept-
ance we can look to the religion of Jesus as a supreme example of a mature 
religion. In the "son and brother religion" which Christianity brought to 
us we are provided with a frame of reference, a new concept of love and 
authority, and are given a new concept of our own status and significance, 
While Fromm does not put it in these o«Jrds, the evidence suggests that 
he would evaluate Christianity in one way and more primitive religions 
in quite another. 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to describe three ways in 
which manifestations of the super-ego can be seen in human thought and 
action. The system of taboo was described both in primitive and modern 
society. Guilt was discussed and evidence was introduced to show that 
it constituted one source of super-ego functioning. Religion was ex-
plained from the Freudian point of view and criticized in the light of 
material presented by anotrer school of thought. Thus far we have 
traced the origin and development of the super-ego according to Freud-
ian theory. In the next chapter we will present a psychoanalytic eval-
uation of conscience by Freud and others wm are Je ading exponents of 
his thought. 
CHAPJ'ER IV 
PSYCHOANALYTIC EVALUATION OF CONSCIENCE 
Thus far an attempt has been made to trace the development of the 
conscience in psychoanalytic and psychological literature. Considerable 
attention was given to Freud's early formulations regarding the concept 
of repression and censorship finally resulting in the Freudian concept 
of the super-ego, Contributions of other psychoanalytic writers were 
cited as this concept was expanded, 
The purpose of this chapter is to deal with certain psychoanalytic 
evaluations of the conscience. As the reader is undoubtedly aware, this 
function or agency of the mind is accepted by maqy writers both within 
and without the analytic tradit5.on. 
In this chapter the evaluation of three psychoanalytic authors con-
cerning the conscience will be considered. These three have been chosen 
because to the writer they are representative of three distinct views 
prevailing within psychoanalysis at the present time. At the risk of 
being repetitious Freud's original concept of the super-ego or conscience 
will be stated. This statement will be brief due to the extended treat-
ment of Freud's idea of the super-ego received in Chapter Two. J, c. 
Flugel, a British analyst, professor at University College, London and 
author of widely known psychoanalytic writings discusses the concept of 
the super-ego in a significant fashion in Man, Morals and Society which 
has been referred to previously in this dissertation. His evaluation of 
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the super-ego as it modifies and expands Freud's concept of the ego-ideal 
will be presented. Edmund Bergler, born and educated in Vienna and now 
practicing in Washington, D. C. is a contemporary representative of clas-
sical Freudian analysis and has been accused of being "more Freudian than 
Freud." He has restated the Freudian position with some new emphasis in 
a book The Battle of the Conscience. His treatment of the destructive 
aspects of super-ego function and the ultimate role this function occu-
pies within the personality calls for critical examination. 
1. Freud's Evaluation of the Conscience 
i. A Repressing Forc.e 
In the first Freudian conceptualization the idea of a censor was 
postulated as a consequence of the clinical evidence pointing to repress-
ing activity which formed the primary basis for neurosis. It will be re-
called that one of Freud's first and most basic discoveries was that the 
neurotic is a person who has at sore prior stage in his life cycle re-
solved a powerful psychic conflict by means of repression. Freud also 
saw that the forces behind the resistance which are encountered in any 
therapeutic effort are the same that have produced and subsequently 
maintained the original repression. By 1920 Freud assumed that neurosis 
was due to conflict between repressed desires and the repressing force 
then called the censor. It was further shown that neurotic conflict 
could be reduced by ventilating the repressed impulses rather than by 
attempting to strengthen the repressing force. If neurotic behavior 
involved the inhibition of sexual or other impulses, when, in reality, 
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tbe way was open for their gratification, it could easily be assumed that 
the censor, far from being able and sensitive had become rigid and archa-
ic, often tragically out of touch with the realities of adult life and of 
contemporary society. 
ii. Its Rootage in Oedipal Complex 
For Freud the neurotic conflict originates in the fact that the over-
whelming power and disciplinary efforts of parents are pitted against the 
biologically given drives of the small and helpless child. In a sense 
this may be said to have been his major premise, one that is accepted by 
this writer and many others who cannot accept what may be called Freud's 
second or minor premise. His minor premise was that because the child is 
so completely and for such a long ti!lll dependent upon his parents, the 
latter's demands are relatively quickly and powerfully introjected. Freud 
believed that once this has happened there follows an endless battle be-
tween the super-ego and ego, on the one hand, and the id on the other. 
This battle he located in the family struggles of the Oedipus complex. As 
has been previously stated, he believed it was characteristically resolved 
by repressions which bring infantile sexuality and aggression under con-
trol during the so-called latency period and which, in the normal instance, 
are dissipated in adolescence. But, said Freud, if these repressions are 
initially too strong or overdone, they are not sufficiently undone in ado-
lescence and may persist on into adult life, with the pathological conse-
quences which we refer to as neurosis. 
To put the whole discussion into a therapeutic rather than abstract 
context what could be clearer as the duty of the therapist than to set 
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~bout undoing, belatedly, these too-strong repressions, weakening the 
severity of an oversevere super-ego or counteracting disciplinary ef-
forts of parents which have "taken" only too well. For Freud, and many 
others, neurosis was the consequmce of repression which the ego and 
super-ego have turned against the forces of the id. The thesis being 
developed in this dissertation is exactly the opposite; namely that 
neurosis is rather the product of id and ego functioning in league a-
gainst the super-ego. 
iii. Parent's Super-Ego Introjected 
Freud himself recognized that the human infant is in the beginning 
"all id", and as the ego evolves it is predominantly a pleasure ego, an 
id-ego. It is during the period of so-called socialization, between two 
and six that serious conflict first arises. During this period the con-
flict is mainly external between parental figures and child. By the age 
of five the child cannot shut out the voice of authority simply by stop-
ping his ears, he resorts to repression wherein a similar result may be 
produced. The internalized criticism and admonitions of parents and com-
munity are then muffled and no longer heard clearly, but they are still 
capable of breaking through into consciousness as depression, anxiety, 
and inferiority feeling. B,ymptoms are then formed as defenses against 
such feelings and sooner or later the individual involved may become a 
full-fledged neurotic. 
Freud assumed that the therapist, confronted with such a neurotic 
person had only one option; to assume that the patient's super-ego was 
too severe and join forces as it were with the (presumably repressed) id 
81 
and thus attempt to woo the ego away from its allegiance to and domina-
tion by the tyrannical super-ego to a more friendly and understanding 
relationship with the id. As many critics of this Freudian position have 
pointed out (notably Alexander and French, Mowrer and Allport) this strat-
egy often results in nothing beneficial to the patient but in a deep nar-
cissistic regression. Mowrer advances the probable explanation that such 
an outcmre is to be found in the mistaken belief that neurosis rests upon 
a conflict in which the ego and super-ego are aligned against the id. 
This writer agrees with Mowrer's position, namely that neurosis is a re-
sult of conflict between an id-dominated ego and an unassimilated or re-
pressed super-ego, a view which will be further developed in a later 
chapter. If this theory is correct it can be readily seen why orthodox 
Freudian treatment often serves to prolong neurosis rather than to reduce 
it. 
iv. Primitive Ideas in Super-Ego 
Returning to Freud 1 s concept of the super-ego it is clear that he re-
garded it as a more or less archaic relic of childhood and the tradition-
al values, and morality of the race as equally outmoded carry-overs from 
earlier states in the history of the human race. In Civilization and Its 
Discontents he advances tre theory that human culture is transmitted from 
generation to generation through the super-ego. At the same time he re-
jects Jung' s idea of the collective unconscious dismissing the concept as 
being unnecessary maintaining that the super-ego has allocated to it the 
activities of self-observation, (one which he then does not go on to de-
velop), repressing functions and the holding up of ideals. He indicates 
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that the super-ego takes over the same content as that of the parent's, 
it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which 
have been handed down (in a similar way) from generation to generation. 
He seems not to have considered the possibility that culture and tradi-
tion while embodying some archaic and primitive ideas also has much to 
contribute to the growth, happiness and good of the human race. Because 
of this bias Freud felt that one of the primary tasks of the therapist 
was to reduce the strength of the super-ego. In Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1930) we find Freud expressing a negative opinion of the 
super-ego. 
In our investigations and our therapy 
of the neuroses we cannot avoid find-
ing fault with the super-ego of the 
individual on two counts: in conrnand-
ing and prohibiting with such severity 
it troubles too little about the happi-
ness of the ego and it fails to take into 
account sufficiently the difficulties in 
the way of obeying it--the strength of 
instinctual cravings in the id and the 
hardships of external environment. Con-
sequently in our therapy we often find 
ourselves obliged to do battle with the 
super-ego and work to moderate its de-
mands. Exactly the same objections can 
be made against the ethical standards of 
the cultural super-ego.l 
The writer has qmted at length from Freud because this statement 
so emphatically declares his evaluation of the super-ego function. 
v. Super-Ego as Deterent to Pleasure 
Freud equated happiness to pleasure in the sense of instinctual 
pleasure. In his own experience he took many detours that required 
1. S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London: Hogarth Press, 
Ltd., 1930), P• 199. 
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~ain and discomfort as he searched for insight and knowledge concerning 
personality, its patterns and drives. On the one hand he shows a pene-
trating grasp of the reason why human growth is always difficult and 
filled with much dissatisfaction. In his concept of the pleasure prin-
ciple having full sway in the child and giving way to the reality prin-
ciple in the adult, a principle which requires postponing immediate sat-
isfaction for the pursuit of long-term goals, he stated a principle with 
which this writer is in full agreement. He also correctly insisted that 
the reality principle does not involve a repudiation of the pleasure 
principle but rather a refinement and channeling of' it. Why, sensing 
all this and outlining it in such clear terms Freud failed to assign to 
it the real significance it appears to have for a total theory of per-
sonality remains a mystery. 
It is surprising that he could overlook the evidence for "conscience 
pleasure 11 (Mowrer 1 s term) or as Allport puts it, satisfaction from "pro-
priate striving" which is more than the limited pleasure gained by brief 
and indirect gratifications of his instinctual impulses. This writer 
suggests that in adult life man replaces immediate infantile instinctual 
pleasures by more enduring satisfactions which are to be found in the a-
chievement of religious and moral values; satisfactions which may be ex-
perienced more by following the demands of the conscience than by decreas-
ing the strength of such demands. While acknowledging the contribution 
of Freud in giving the concept of super-ego and assigning to it certain 
harsh, destructive functions, we find clinical evidence for another func-
tion by which the super-ego nourishes some of the basic values and atti-
tudes which undergird a mature personality. 
vi. Anxiety and Super-Ego Function 
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To look further into this issue which marks the difference between 
Freud's concept of the super-ego function and this writer's, let us turn 
to his concept of anxiety. Here we find that Freud is again convinced 
of the essentially negative function of the super-ego. It will be re-
called that he put forth two theories of anxiety. The first suggested 
that anxiety occurred whenever the powerful force of libido, essentially 
sexual in nature, was frustrated. Under normal conditions when libido 
was discharged it was experienced as pleasurable; when repressed it be-
came painful, manifesting itself as anxiety. Freud further suggested 
that the presence of anxiety indicated a primitive impulse about to e-
rupo into consciousness. The task of the therapist in dealing with anx-
iety thus became clear. It was to reduce the force of the repressing 
agency--the super-ego--and allow the blocked impulse to come into con-
sciousness and find appropriate gratification. Such reasoning could only 
lead to the conclusion that the super-ego and ego were functioning in 
league against the id. If the goal of life was to find more adequate 
opportunities for id expression the super-ego was the villain to be dis-
sipated. It is this theoretical belief that we find it necessary to 
question. To Freud must go undiminished credit for this first formula-
tion of anxiety. His conclusion as to what produced the anxiety is open 
to reconsideration. 
The second theory of anxiety represents a considerable advance over 
the first. In brief, Freud suggested in this second theory that anxiety 
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was not merely transformed libido, but rather an anticipation of some 
kind of social punishment or disapproval which is set off whenever re-
pressed impulses (sexual or aggressive) threaten to return to conscious-
ness and demand expression. 
This theory seems quite valid until we attempt to explain why people 
most free in their sexual expressions are often most anxious. Nor does 
this theory help in understanding feelings of inferiority and inadequacy 
which stem not from regret over things that have been done but from re-
gret over goals that have not been achieved. In other words it seems to 
this writer that anxiety can arise not only because man's sexual and ag-
gressive impulses press for gratification, but also because man's impul-
ses toward goodness, love and gentleness press for realization through 
the function of the super-ego, a function which may also become a source 
of the roore noble, rooral and religious impulses which have been a part 
of the human experience since the beginning of man. 
In the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933) Freud 
speaks of this second theory of anxiety and lays down one of the funda-
mental premises of psychoanalysis. Because of its vital reJa tion to the 
problem under discussion the two paragraphs in which he sums up the dis-
cussion of anxiety are quoted in part. 
The division of the mental personality in-
to a super-ego, ego and id, which I spoke 
about in the last lecture, has forced us 
to take up a new position with regard to 
the problem of anxiety. In assuming that 
the ego is the only seat of anxiety, and 
that only the ego can produce and feel 
anxiety, we have taken up a new and secure 
position, from which many facts take on a 
new aspect. 
I cannot tell you all the individual steps 
of an investigation of this kind; let it 
suffice to say that, to our astonishment, 
the result was the reverse of what we had 
expected. It is not the repression that 
creates the anxiety, but the anxiety is 
there first and creates the repression! 
But what sort of anxiety can it be? It 
can only be fear of a threatening external 
danger; that is to say objective anxiety •• l 
86 
For Freud, this objective anxiety involved the internal feeling of 
the boy for his mother as an external object. But this being in love 
seems to the boy to be an internal danger, which he must avoid by re-
nouncing his object, because it involves an external danger situation. 
The basic question is this. If it is not the repression that ere-
ates the anxiety, but the anxiety that is there first and creates the 
repression, what is threatened in the experience which produces anxiety? 
Freud thought it was the instinctual impulses motivating the child to-
ward the parent of the opposite sex. In a way this is the only conclu-
sion he could reach considering his belief that the end of man was to 
find more adequate opportunity for expression of his libidinal impulses. 
May in The Meaning of Anxiety (1950) comes closer to our proposed 
answer to the question when he writes 
The threat is to something in the 'core 1 
or •essence' of the personality. Anxiety 
is the apprehension cued off by a threat 
to some value which the individual holds 
essential to his existence as a personal-
ity. The threat may be to physical or 
psychological life, or it may be to some 
other value which the individual identi-
fies with his existence •• 2 
1. s. Freud, New Jntroductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 118-119. 
2. R. May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950), 
P• 191. 
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This discussion of anxiety is relevant here because it is a major 
factor in repression, one of the primary functions of the suplr-ego, The 
theory here advanced is that what is threatened when anxiety appears is 
not always the break-through of primitive impulses into consciousness 
but many tines it is occasiored by the rise into consciousness of what 
Hadfield in Psychology and Morals calls "the voice of too repressed good." 
This repressed good is objective and not nere~ an extension of the per-
son's super-ego. 
vii. Strength of Su}Er-Ego Should be Diminished 
In summary, Freud's concept of the super-ego as a more or less ar-
chaic relic of childhood plus the traditional values of morality has been 
reviewed. It has been further shown that Freud assumed the super-ego and 
id to be in league against the ego in its attenpt to cope w.i th the real-
ity principle of the external world. Freud believed that the instinctual 
demands of the id had to find expression either through direct gratifica-
tion or in the process of sublimation, Because of this he believed the 
strength of the super-ego should be diminished so that the ego could per-
mit such gratification to occur. His concept of anxiety has been devel-
oped as an illustration of the way in which he believed the roper-ego 
functioned. The final paragraphs were devoted to a criticism of the 
Freudian evaluation of the super-ego ending with the suggestion that this 
function rather than acting as the agent of the instinctual forces was 
actually the potential agent of the forces of love, truth and beauty. 
These forces while linked to those of the instincts, yet transcend the 
biologically given drives. 
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2, Flugel 1s Assessment 
i, Earlier Anticipations 
Flugel shows how Freud's concept of the super-ego was anticipated 
by other writers. He indicates that these other writers agreed to the 
positive factors inherent in a concept of "self-regard" or "guiding fic-
tion," Baldwin, McDougall and Adler all anticipated to some extent the 
Freudian formulation of the super-ego. Baldwin, writing as early as 
1897 referred to something within the self that demands obedience to 
its claims and at the same time something the nature of which is deter-
mined by social and moral influences from outside. McDougall as early 
as 1907 speaks of the "sentiment of self-regard" mich he describes as 
a standard by which the individual regulates, or at least passes judg-
ment on his own conduct. McDougall thus recognizes both the existence 
and great moral influence of the ideal self, together with the fact that 
it is acquired from models (parents) in the environment. McDougall at 
that time, however, took no account of the concept of unconscious forces 
or of the possible negative consequences that might come from the senti-
ment of self-regard. Adler, a follower of Freud until his secession 
from the psychoanalytic school in 1912, early formulated a theory that 
fundamental to human nature is a will to power or an urge to achieve 
superiority. He contends that early in life when it becomes painfully 
evident that we are not superior but actually inferior in many ways, we 
erect a "guiding fiction", an ideal corresponding to that which we are 
not but which we would like to be. This "guiding fiction" corresponds in 
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some important ways to Freud's concept of the ego-ideal, one which he 
never developed to any extent believing that even if the super-ego had 
the ability to hold before the individual a good image that it -would be 
distorted by the more aggressive and unconscious aspects of this partic-
ular function of the mind. Adler attributes the origins of the "guiding 
fiction" largely to the individual's effort to canpensate for inferior-
ity. Like McDougall, Adler suggests that the "guiding fiction" is prima-
rily an asset to personality and makes no allowance for the possibility 
of negative consequences resulting from a failure on the part of the in-
dividual to realize the "guiding fiction." 
ii. Two Aspects of Super-Ego 
Flugel suggests that Freud inferred there were at least two parts 
of the super-ego; that part which was unconscious and not accessible to 
consciousness containing the aggression, hate and cruelty which arise as 
a consequence of the given components of personality, and the ego-ideal 
representing the more or less conscious moral precepts which a person 
maintains for himself ani which arise as a conseqrence of his own inter-
action with parents and others in the external world. 
Odier and Bergler suggest that the term 'super' is generally asso-
ciated with a more conscious as opposed to a subconscious level in psy-
chology and with a 1higher 1 rather than a 1 lower 1 value in ethics, and 
therefore tends to be understood in ways different from and actually con-
trary to trose intended by Freud in this connection. They would call the 
unconscious and more aggressive aspects of the super-ego the "super-id" 
to emphasize especially the characteristic of being unconscious which it 
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shares with the Freudian id. Alexander, speaking in a similar fashion, 
prefers to use the 1super-ego 1 for the more unconscious and irrational 
elements, and the 'ego-ideal' for the more conscious and adaptable ones. 
iii. Importance of Ego-Ideal 
Flugel acknowledges that Freud failed to follow up the ideal aspects 
of the super-ego and concentrated his attention too exclusively on the 
introjective and aggressive factors of the super-ego. He admits that 
Horney and other neo-Freudians (whose views we shall examine in some de-
tail in the next chapter) have a point when they distinguish between an 
ideal self toward which the individual strives through many and devious 
routes and the childish •search for glory" which reflects one of the un-
realistic demands of the super-ego. Flugel contends that within this as-
pect of the super-ego called the ego-ideal, presupposing adequate and en-
vironmental experiences there exists the possibility of constructing an 
ideal which is both practical and attainable through individual striving 
and effort. He keeps reminding the reader however, that much misery in 
life is a result of the individual's failure to reduce unrealistic and 
unreasonable aspirations and requirements of the super-ego. He seems to 
favor thinkers of the eastern cultures who suggest that man will find 
more happiness by reducing his desires so that he ;d.ll be satisfied with 
less. The other side of such an argument is obvious. While one manner 
of securing happiness is to reduce desire another method is exactly the 
opposite; namely that of making such efforts as may be necessary to bring 
about a greater measure of fuUillment. This approach, called by Allport, 
'propriate striving' is seen particularly in the quest of religious people 
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who endure all types of deprivation, frustration and agony in their at-
tempt to shorten the gap between their real self (ego) and their ideal 
image (ego-ideal). To be sure there exists in many an obsessive compul-
sion which is undesirable an:i in others a hopelessly high goal which 
tends in the long run to reduce both :Lnterest md achievement. 
Flugel appears to this writer to be on more solid ground when at 
the conclusion of his arguments he suggests that it is the task of men-
tal hygiene to discover the optimum ideal that is neither too far above 
nor too far below the level of capacity. He seems to imply that there 
could be both a diseased and a healthy super-ego function and that be-
tween the two might be found some important differences. The heal thy 
super-ego would be able to discriminate between unrealistic and realis-
tic demands of an idealistic nature; it would tend to reduce the more 
primitive and archaic demands of the un·~onscious aspects of its function; 
it. would show characteristics of forgiv.mess rather than judgment, inter-
pretation rather than condemnation. In short, a healthy super-ego would 
provide incentive for meaningful strivir:g on the part of the individual, 
it would help develop a flexible and growing morality, while acknowledg-
ing the power of instinctual demands it 010uld point the way to other de-
mands as powerful and infinitely more satisfying which the individual 
ought to heed. 
3. Bergler 1s View 
Bergler in two works The Battle of ti1e Conscience (1948) and The 
Super-Ego (1952) has restated the F.reudiru1 position especially with re-
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.spect to the aggressive aspects of the super-ego. He notes that a large 
part of the super-ego is inaccessible to consciousness. In particular 
he speaks of the aggressive and destructive parts of tre super-ego, those 
containing the accumulation of hate, anger and frustration which the 
child feels so deeply in his early years. Bergler expands Freud's orig-
inal observation about the severity of the super-ego and suggests that 
it is due to a recoil against the self of aggression caused by frustrat-
ing objects in the outer world and a corresponding amount of repressed 
impulses of agr;ression which exist independent of tre child's relation 
with persons or objects in the outer world. 
i. Aggressive Aspects of Super-Ego 
Bergler chooses to develop almost exclusively Freud's emphasis on 
the aggressive aspects of the super-ego. He dismisses the importance of 
human relations or "disturbed relations" as being of little consequence 
in understanding the super-ego function. He also dismisses with equal 
ease the more conscious or rational aspects of the super-ego designated 
in this work as the ego-ideal. According to Bergler 1s thesis it is the 
"unconscious inner conscience" alone "Which has the final say in human be-
havior, This inner conscience consists primarily of the 11 daimonian" or 
the repressed impulses of aggression arising out of instinctual demands 
coupled with the aggression which the person has taken unto himself pri-
marily over the long years of infancy "When he was helpless and dependent 
on external authorities, 
In his book Beyond Tne Pleasure Principle, it will be recalled, 
Freud put forth a theory according to "Which at the outset of the life of 
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the human organism the instinct of aggression, or the death-instinct, is 
being opposed and bound by the libido, or life-instinct. A fusion of 
the two instincts ensues, and gives rise to sadism. (Thie concept was 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two.) In order to escape from being de-
stroyed by its own death-instinct, the organism utilizes its narcissis-
tic, or self-regarding libido to force the former outward, and direct 
it against its objects. Parallel with this deflection of the death-
instinct outward against objects, a similar type of reaction goes on 
within, with an internal reaction of defense being raised against that 
part of the death-instinct which could not be externalized. 
Bergler, Klein and others feel that the danger of being destroyed 
by this instinct of aggression sets up an excessive tension in the ego, 
which is felt by it as an anxiety, so that it is faced at the very begin-
ning of its development with the task of mobilizing libido against its 
death-instinct. Because of the fusion of the two instincts the ego can 
only imperfectly fulfill this task. A division therefore takes place in 
the id by Which one part of the instinctual impulse is directed against 
the other. Bergler maintains that this apparently earliest measure of 
defense on the part of the ego constitutes the foundation stone of the 
development of the super-ego whose excessive cruelty and aggression can 
thus be accounted for by the fact that it is an offshoot of a very in-
tense destructive instinct, continuing along with a certain proportion 
of libidinal impulses very large quantities of aggressive ones. 
ii. ~amic Negative Qualities 
Bergler then goes on to make a significant observation, namely that 
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while many writers in psychoanalysis have considered the conscience mere-
ly as a restricting censor, it has become clear to him that the uncon-
scious inner conscience is a dynamic force with decisive results for the 
personal history of the individual. 
Bergler does not acknowledge the possibility that this dynamic force 
of the unconscious conscience could be the source for something good and 
meaningful. Biased by his belief in the instinctual theory of person-
ality he does not allow for the finding of happiness through other than 
the instinctual gratification. To be sure one must find such pleasure, 
but evidence is overwhelming to suggest that this is a limited rather than 
an ultimate source of real happiness. By the term happiness the writer 
refers to a sense of lasting achievement, one which is not temporary and 
fleeting as is instinctual pleasure but one which is experienced in spite 
of frustration, pain and denial. Bergler's real value to our understand-
ing of the super-ego and its function is in his emphasis on its instinct-
ual beginnings. His error is in assuming that such beginnings can never 
be transcended. 
While working on this section the writer is spending some time at 
the ocean. While sailing the other day he felt a strange attack of anx-
iety. Following Bergler's thesis the cause should have been discovered 
in some instinctual demand that was about to erupt into consciousness. 
Later in discussing the experience with his wife the writer finally de-
duced that the anxiety had its source in a desire to get on with the writ-
ing and that while the sailing episode offered opportunity for instinctual 
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gratification, the writing offered opportunity for a real sense of a-
chievement, which would long endure when the former had passed away. Ac-
knowledging that anxiety could have its source in instinctual demands 
and that often its source is to be found not in one but in two directions, 
this illustration is offered to show that many times conscience rather 
than being a restricting censor, acts as a dynamic force urging the per-
son on toward the goals which he regards as important to him. Yielding 
to conscience demands in this instance brought infinitely more satisfac-
tion than concentrating on reducing them. 
Bergler is correct in reminding us that the super-ego is not simply 
a necessary restrictive institution. He is only partially correct when 
he maintains that it is the anti-hedonistic force in the personality 
over-run with derivatives of the death-instinct. He assumes with Freud 
that the accumulation of experience which is stored in the super-ego re-
presents only destructive remnants of human nature. Never does he allow 
for the possibility that the experience of the race also includes some 
positive factors and that relations with parents and others, along with 
providing for an accumulating of hate and anger, also often result in 
the experiencing of love and affection. Starting with given biological 
and fixed drives Bergler selects only the evidence which helps maintain 
this original presupposition. 
iii. Three Types of Super-Ego Functioning 
In one chapter1 he does suggest that in persons who are not psychot-
ic, three main techniques are used in coping with the super-ego. The so-
l. E. Bergler, The Battle of the Conscience, Chapter XV, 
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.called normal conscience when confronted with an unconscious wish, of an 
instinctual nature, automatically gives a "stop" signal. As a consequence 
these wishes are driven back into the repository of the unconscious, emer-
ging either as raw material for dreams or reappearing in a sublimated 
form after being transformed into a socially approved function. Evident-
ly a normal conscience for Bergler consists of one that cannot be bribed. 
Its primary function, that of censoring is impossible to impregnate. 
The neurotic conscience differs from the normal, according to Berg-
ler, in that the "stop" signal is only the beginning of an inner drama of 
compromise and eventual corruption. He feels that this type of conscience 
allows inner wishes to be modified and at points find license for grati-
fication in exchange for depression, anxiety and guilt, all of which are 
accepted by the neurotic conscience in return for the privilege of cer-
tain id gratification. 
The "'criminotic" conscience is even more corrupt and demanding. The 
deepest core of the criminal's conflict is the pre-oedipal helplessness 
and the feeling that the mother and her successive representatives do not 
believe that the child can help himself, even in revenge. If this pre-
oedipal helplessness has been particularly intense and overwhelming, in 
adult life the person's behavior becomes criminal according to Bergler, 
in direct connection with the amount of inner passivity he once experi-
enced and the intensity of the masochistic expression needed for the solu-
tion of the infantile conflict. 
iv. Super-Ego Primarily Unconscious 
For Bergler, conscience may function on any of the three levels men-
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tioned above. He does suggest that with most people there is seen a 
variation of all three levels manifested at different stages of life. 
For him the SUJ'B r-ego, its ego-ideal and daimonian function are uncon-
scious and inaccessible to conscious control or modification. He appears 
to place his emphasis on a psychology of the unconscious rather than the 
conscious. In this regard he counteracts a tendency in Freud's writing 
to move in the opposite direction. He feels that the ego is weak and 
totally unfitted for its role in helping the individual to actualize 
the reality principle. Agreeing with Freud and others that the long 
stage of infancy with its dependence and helplessness makes necessary 
the rise of the super-ego function he goes on to explain much of the la-
ter aggression of the super-ego by the passivity attached to infancy rath-
er than the sexual urges of the infant toward the parent. 
In general, the Oedipus complex is 
frequently misunderstood and means 
only that 1the boy desires his mother 
sexually.• Its pre-history, which is 
suffused with fright, terror, massive 
passivity, is entirely disregarded. 
The boy's identification with the father's 
'cruelty' has one major purpose; to coun-
teract passivity by demoting the Giantess. 1 
At this point Bergler is nearer in viewpoint to Suttie, Fromm and 
Horney in their contention that sexual desire is not the core of neurotic 
development. Here is implied that a disturbance in human relations is at 
the heart of the problem. He ignores this implication however, and goes 
on to reiterate the Freudian position that the super-ego is determined by 
certain biologically given factors and that they are impossible to modify. 
1. E. Bergler, The Battle of the Conscience, p. 272. 
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He does acknowledge that the restrictionsof the culture are man-made and 
therefore can be modified, He feels that the proper social and parental 
relations are important where cultural factors are involved; where super-
ego restrictions are involved he feels that only analysis with its abil-
ity to probe into the unconscious can resolve the conflict. 
v, Super-Ego as Agent of Death-Instinct 
Bergler 1s position seems to imply the following: (1) The core of the 
super-ego consists of the introjected educational authority (mother, 
father and their successive representatives); what is introjected is not 
the real parents but the mother and father as the child sees them through 
the eyes of his own projections as has been noted previously in our dis-
cussions of the English analysts. (2) The super-ego is not a benevolent 
institution. While containing some fragments of the life-instinct, it 
contains primarily the accumulation of hate and anger resulting from the 
long stage of passivity experienced in infancy. (3) The real function of 
the super-ego is to impose exavgerated and unrealistic restrictions on 
the id, that the ego cannot take. (4) In the so-called normal conscience 
function complete restriction is achieved thereby keeping id impulses 
from gaining a foothold in consciousness; in the neurotic and criminotic 
conscience tho super-ego fru1ccion is susceptible to bribery, allowing many 
id impulses to find expression without first undergoing socialization 
through the process of sublimation, \ihen this occurs the super-ego ac-
cepts the penalty of guilt, unhappiness and depression, (5) All of these 
statements are predicated on the belief that the goal of human life is to 
find opportunity for more complete instinctual gratification, These state-
99 
ments also presuppose the validity of Freud's life-death instinct theory. 
Bergler's basic belief that the ego-ideal is unconscious does not 
seem to be upheld by other evidence. Such a belief also leads to the con-
clusion that we are unaware of our most primary desires, and hence not re-
sponsible for what happens, either positive or negative. He also assumes 
that the only approach to the super-ego is to diminish its strength, in 
order that more id impulses can find gratification. 
This writer has been contending that the super-ego while embodying 
considerable aggression arising from the passive situation of infancy, 
also holds many positive strivings, among them those which seek to tran-
scend the primitive id impulses. It is one thing to give up certain sex-
ual expressions because the super-ego function indicates they are "bad"; 
it is quite another to give them up because something infinitely more sat-
isfying and lasting has been found to take their place. Bergler is right 
in his evaluation of many of the functions of the super-ego. Unfortu-
nately he describes what to this writer is only the childish and immature 
conscience. His emphasis on unconscious functions of the super-ego is 
difficult either to affirm or contradict. He follows a thin line of in-
ference without adequate support of his theories. Any kind of moral con-
trol presupposes that an individual has some awareness of his motives and 
behavior and that such awareness presents the condition for his being re-
sponsible. To follow Bergler 1 s argument to its logical conclusion would 
remove any sense of responsibility from man for an overwhelming amount of 
his behavior. 
Bergler assumes further, that if a sharp discrepancy exists between 
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the ego-ideal and the ego that the only solution is to set about lower-
ing the ego-ideal, bringing it into harmony with the ego that exists. An 
alternate course of action would be to see what could be done to enable 
the ego to achieve its ideal. Instead of reducing everything to its low-
est possible common denominator, one may find real satisfaction and a-
chievement by becoming the kind of person his ego-ideal indicates he is 
destined to be. 
Ih this chapter the views of three representative psychoanalytic 
writers have been presented and critically discussed. It has been shown 
that Freud, Flugel and Bergler agree that the super-ego is formed because 
of certain biological determinants; namely the presence of the life-death 
instinct battle and the long period of passivity through which every per-
son passes in infancy. They also agree that the super-ego and id func-
tions are in league against the ego. The super-ego contains accumulations 
of aggression and hate rather than love and other components of the life-
instincts. It is for them primarily a censoring function, seeing as its 
chief aim the repression of id impulses seeking entrance into conscious-
ness. The more positive aspects of the super-ego, referred to in this 
writing as the ego-ideal are thought to arise only from the infant's un-
limited search for power and glory. They are therefore seen as negative 
rather than positive components. 
We have acknowledged the human origins of the super-ego function, 
and have also acknowledged the presence of much aggression and hate within 
the super-ego. Yet we have suggested that these constitute only a part of 
the content of this function. we have seen in the concept of the ego-ideal 
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the existence of something which is both able to be modified and a goal 
toward which the individual may strive with some reasonable sense of 
expectation. It has been suggested that while in infancy the child sees 
his goal as that of satisfying instinctual desires, in coming to adult 
life he develops other desires of moral and religious aspirations. Such 
qualities as the search for truth, the capacity to love in altruistic 
devotion, the desire to grow intellectually and spiritually, can become 
goals with as much drive and impetus as the more physically limited goals 
of the child. It was finally suggested that rather than seeking to reduce 
the claims of the super-ego, one should, after careful evaluation search 
for ways by which its demands can be augmented rather than diminished. 
In the next chapter an evaluation of certain neo-Freudian concepts of the 
conscience will be considered. These concepts will be related to those 
presented in this chapter and they will be critically discussed as the 
material is presented. 
CHAPTER V 
SONE NEO-FREUDIAN CRITICISMS 
In the previous chapter the psychoanalytic concept of the conscience 
was discussed and critically evaluated. The views of Freud, Flugel and 
Bergler formed the basis of the chapter. It was shown that all three 
agree the super-ego is formed because of certain biological factors; 
namely the battle of the life and death instincts and the long struggle 
of dependence with assertive needs through which every person passes in 
infancy. These three further agreed that the super-ego and id are likely 
to function in league against the ego. Finally, they consider the ag-
gressive and destructive aspects of the super-ego to have more strength 
than the conserving and integrative tendencies emerging into the ego-
ideal. 
The writer has contended that although the super-ego has a repres-
sive role, it is also the source of man's sense of responsibility, his 
desire to search for the truth, his attempt to love rather than hate. 
Granting man has certain biological needs such as hunger for food and 
sexual expression, he is able to transcend the primitive needs and 
struggle to give expression to other potentials within himself manifest-
ing his own integrity, discovering more about the world of nature and 
human nature, and further exploring the potentialities of his own being. 
It is proposed that rather than seeking to reduce the claims of the super-
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ego, one should, after careful evaluation search for ways in which its 
demands can be implemented rather than diminished. 
1, Neo-Freudian Views 
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In this chapter some neo-Freudian views of the conscience will be 
presented, In particular, the concepts of the two neo-Freudians will be 
discussed in more detail: those of Erich Fromm and Karen Horney. Both 
were trained in psychoanalysis in Europe, Fromm as a non-medical analyst; 
and Horney through her training in medicine. Both practiced psychoanal-
ysis in its traditional orthodox sense for more than fifteen years. They 
began to modify theories and practices in their analytic practice prima-
rily as a result of two things; clinical evidence which suggested re-
peatedly that the many complexities of human behavior could not always 
be reduced to instinctual strivings nor traced back to infantile experi-
ences, and a removal from Europe to the American scene where the cultural 
and social factors in the molding of personality were recognized, while 
the European School continued to emphasize biological and instinctual 
factors as the primary causes. 
The term "neo-Freudian" designates the view of those persons who 
accept certain basic trends of thought concerning the role of unconscious 
processes and the ways in which they find expression, and hold to the 
analytic form of therapeutic treatment that brings these processes to 
awareness, yet deviate from the orthodox theories of Freud and differ 
with many of his interpretations. 
For example, neo-Freudian writers agree that in his discovery of 
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the Oedipus complex -- the importance of the infantile relation with par-
ents -- Freud made a profound contribution to our understanding of per-
sonality. They take issue with his assumption that sexual desires are at 
the root of this relation and Horney, for example, believes that fixations 
on the parents do not arise so much because of biological reasons as they 
do from describable conditions in the family relationships. Early rela-
tionships in their totality mold the character and while sexual factors 
play a part they constitute but one of many. 
In discussing the neo-Freudian view of conscience it will be neces-
sary to consider the basic personality concepts held by these two writ-
ers,for only in the light of such concepts can we discover their evalua-
tion of the conscience. The method of criticism will be primarily by 
contrast with the Freudian position. By examining the comparative and 
contrasting views of these neo-Freudian writers and evaluating them the 
work of these analysts will reveal significant aspects in the develop-
mental view of the conscience. 
Although Horney's first publication on New Ways in Psychoanalysisl 
(1939) antedates by two years Fromm's Escape From Freedom, his concepts 
were well-known to Horney and according to her testimony played a vital 
role in determining her own theories and concepts. In this chapter Fromm's 
concepts will be discussed first, then Horney's and finally a comparison 
of the two. 
1. K. Horney, New Wgys in Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 
1939). 
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2, FrOlllll 
·i. Vitality of Relationship 
In Escape From Freedom1 (1941) Fromm lays the groundwork for his con-
cept of personality and evaluation of the conscience, He departs from 
Freudian psychology, which is individualistic in emphasis, and talks of 
social psychology implying that it is not man attempting to satis~ his 
instinctual desires, but man in relation to man within the social envi-
ronment that constitutes the area of concern for psychology. He believes 
that the key problem of psychology is that of the individual's related-
ness toward the world of nature and human nature and not that of tbe sat-
isfaction or repression of this or that instinctual need, He further as-
sumes that the relation between man and society is not a static one deter-
mined by biological factors. Freud saw man's nature as essentially un-
changing and different from the demands of society, and ccncerned with 
the satis~ing or frustrating of these given drives. Fromm believes that 
society has not only a supressing function but also a creative function, 
that in a real sense it determines much of man's nature and desire. In 
the interaction of man and society Fromm sees a great deal of fiexibili ty 
and opportunity for modification. In other words, he believes that psy-
chological forces are socially con:iitioned, 
There are two types of needs; (1) the physiologically conditioned 
needs like hunger and thirst which can be summarized in the notion of a 
need for self-preservation, (2) The other type of needs are rooted not 
in the physical process but in the essence of the human mode and practice 
1. E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 
1941). 
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of life: namely the need to be related to the world outside oneself and 
avoid loneliness. Both sets of needs are subject to adaptation, change 
and variation in emphasis depending upon social and cultural conditions. 
ii. Spontaneity 
In his first work Fromm contends that as man gained freedom in the 
sense of emerging from the original dependence upon others to become an 
"individual", he was confronted with the necessity of uniting himself 
again with the world in what he calls the "spontaneity of love and pro-
ductive w:Jrk". Otherwise he would relapse to a kind of abject security 
with man and the world which eventually would destroy both his freedom 
and the integrity of his individual self. 
In the loss of external authority and the rise of internal author-
ity, symbolized by Luther's and Calvin's position in the reformation, 
Fromm sees a further attempt to deny man an opportunity to express himself 
with spontaneity. He contends that internalized authority appearing in 
the form of conscience or super-ego rules with a harshness as great as 
external authority, and that its dictates are not governed by demands of 
the individual self but by social demands which have assumed the dignity 
of ethical and moral norms. They are even harsher than external demands 
because the person feels them to be his own orders, and rebellion against 
self is even more costly than rebellion against external authority. 
iii. Inner Dynamism 
In developing his idea of the authoritarian conscience Fromm utilizes 
several other concepts to form his view of man. He believes that destruc-
tiveness is not an inevitable consequence of the death instinct but arises 
107 
only when growth and freedom are threatened. The amount of destructive-
ness to be found in individuals is proportionate to the amount to which 
the expansiveness of life is curtailed. He believes life has an "inner 
dynamism" of its own which tends to grow and to be expressed. Destruc-
tiveness results not from a fixed instinctual drive, but from unlived 
life. 
One might immediately question why there is so much unlived life if 
persons have a tendency to grow and live. Fromm answers by saying that 
man has real ambivalence toward accepting the progressive role of growth 
that society has thrust upon him. While on the one hand he wants freedom 
and its fruits of spontaneity in the expression of his sensuous, emotional 
and intellectual capacities, he also feels powerless and helpless as he 
sees the world about him. For many persons the freedom offered by the 
separation from primary bonds is too much; they are driven into new bond-
age and while never recapturing their lost security symbolized by the par-
ent-child relationship they find comfort in forgetting their self as a 
separate entity. In this regression the individual substitutes a pseudo-
self for the real self. This pseudo-self becomes for Horney the "ideal-
ized image", for Riesman in The Lonely Crowd it is the "other-directed 
self. 11 Whatever name is chosen this false image performs the same func-
tion. It is an agent not far the real self but for external authority 
that is internalized, bringing with it occasional feelings of security 
but only at the cost of losing the feelings, thoughts, and desires of the 
real self. vfuat is repressed consists not only of the feelings of help-
lessness and anger which were dominant in infancy but also the very best 
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.things which belonged to the real self. 
Freud talked of free association as a process in which a person 
tries to uncover this real self of which Fromm speaks. In the expres-
sion of spontaneous feeling one does not say what is expected but what 
is original, unique to the person involved. Fromm implies that here 
Freud stopped too soon. That along with repressing evil wishes and de-
sires, people also repress the real self with its creative and original 
thrust. This writer agrees with Fromm that the authoritarian conscience, 
with its function of upholding external beliefs or those alien to the in-
dividual, is negative and thwarts growth by forcibly repressing the aspi-
rations striving for expression within the personality. 
iv. Freedom 
Fromm thus sees the function of conscience arising out of man's prob-
lem in handling his emerging freedom. In the rise of Protestantism he 
sees the emphasis on the internal feeling of the person as opposed to the 
external authority of the church. This is one manifestation of the author-
itarian conscience, which for him is the voice of an internalized external 
authority, the parent, the state, the church or whoever the authorities in 
a culture happen to be. In Man For Himself (1947) he expands this idea of 
the authoritarian conscience equating it with what Freud called the super-
ego, He insists that this is only one form of conscience or rather a pre-
liminary stage in the development of the humanistic conscience. 
The good authoritarian conscience consists of consciousness of pleas-
ing the internalized authority; a guilty conscience is the consciousness 
of displeasing it. When conscience functions primarily as an agent of some 
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authority that has been internalized but is not rooted in the real self 
the capacity to grow is limited. Pleasing the authority implies well-
being and closeness to the authority (whether it be parent, teacher or 
God). The guilty conscience produces fear and insecurity, because actL~g 
against the will of the authority implies the danger of being punished and 
separated from the authority. 
Fromm illustrates this point with the Biblical story of Cain's crime 
and punishment showing that what man is most afraid of is not punishment 
but rejection. God accepted Abel's offerings but did not accept Cain's. 
By thus rejecting Cain God separated him from what he needed most, namely 
a meaningful relation with the authority and other men. This punishment 
was one of which Cain had to say: "My punishment is greater than I can 
bear." 
In man's search for freedom Fromm sees a re-enactment of this ancient 
problem. •fuile separated from the primary authorities on the one hand man 
cannot stand on the other hand the isolation which his freedom brings. 
Fromm contends that one alternative to the vicious circle is escape which 
leads many to forsake their negative freedom for certain types of security, 
illustrated in the development of the authoritarian conscience. The other 
alternative is to realize the real self by being oneself. This happens 
when by spontaneous activity man once again relates himself to the world 
and people about him, not in the sense of a child to an all-powerful par-
ent but as an individual with dignity and worth of his own, with ideals 
which are not a mere reflection of the parent's wishes but which spring 
from the source of his own being, ideals which are expressions of his real 
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self quite different from those upheld by the pseudo-self. 
Fromm also argues that there is no higher pov1er than this unique in-
dividual self. He seems to defend this idea because of the kind of super-
natural authority he finds portrayed in the report of Cain and Abel. If 
this is the only kind of higher authority, then the Ttlriter would agree 
with Fromm. It appears however, that in religious experience as well as 
in human experience there has been change, not merely a reappearance of 
what originally existed in the beginning. The story of the prodigal son 
contrasted with the story of Cain and Abel vividly illustrates the kind 
of religious authority represented in the New Testament as opposed to the 
more primitive authority figures portrayed in Genesis. Fromm does not 
imply that all authority is equal. What he wants to get away from is au-
thority that stifles, that produces stagnation and concentrates on blind 
obedience. Authority that recognizes the dignity and worth of persons is 
sought not because it must be but because it ought to be. As with Freud 
what Fromm sees so clearly in the human dilemma he refuses to acknowledge 
in the religious realm. ~ rejecting the instinctive basis for conscience 
and substituting man's quest for freedom he does, however, take a signif-
icant step forward. 
v. Authoritarian Conscience 
Building on Freud's investigations, Fromm concludes that two signifi-
cant consequences occur as a result of the development of the authoritar-
ian conscience. 
(1) Man finds goodness in obedience, badness in disobedience to au-
thority. Guilt feelings result from one's dependence on an irrational au-
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thority and from the feelin~ that it is one's duty to please that author-
ity, The guilt of unavoidable transgressions before authority coupled 
with the need for its forgiveness creates an endless chain of offense, 
guilt feeling and the need for forgiveness. Horney agrees with this ob-
servation giving it the term "vicious circle"; Freud called this "repeti-
tion compulsion". Freud saw this development as a consequence of the bas-
ic instinctual conflict. Fromm sees this circle developing as a result 
of the interaction between child and parent coupled with other authori-
tarian forces in the social structure. Freud thought religion in gener-
al represented irrational authority and thus explained its existence as 
a neurotic manifestation of the repetition compulsion described above. 
Fromm sees religion not as neurosis but as a system of reference. He does 
feel that while effective for many people it is essentially limiting be-
cause of its appeal to irrational authority and its insistence that this 
authority is basically different from man and as a consequence forever be-
yond him. He admits that the idea of being created in "God's image" tran-
scends the authoritarian structure appearing in many religious documents 
and implies that if such an idea were dominant religion would lose some of 
its irrational aspects. Such an idea, however, he does not pursue, 
(2) The other implication stemming from the internalization of au-
thority is seen where man takes over the role of the authority by treat-
ing himself with the same strictness and cruelty. Here Fromm agrees with 
Freud that the authoritarian conscience requires not only that man become 
the obedient slave but also the strict taskmaster, treating himself as his 
own slave. Whether the root of this aggression is to be found as Freud 
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assumed in the death instinct, or as Fromm contends in the parent-child 
relationship where the struggle for psychological freedom is waged is be-
side the point; What matters is the fact that the authoritarian conscience 
is fed by destructiveness against the person's own self so that destruc-
tive strivings are thus permitted to operate under the disguise of virtue. 
In his analysis of the Oedipus complex Fromm acknowledges the validity of 
Freud's observation concerning the conflict between parent and child, and 
the child's failure to solve this authority conflict satisfactorily. Fromm 
sees this conflict not as a consequence of sexual rivalry but resulting 
from the child's reaction to the pressure of parental authority, which is 
itself an intrinsic part of the society in which we live. 
vi. Humanistic Conscience 
Freud's error, says Fromm, is in assuming that all conscience func-
tion is authoritarian and crippling. ~~re psychological freedom is ex-
perienced and where authority is not irrational Fromm sees the development 
of a humanistic conscience. It is a reaction of our true self to what is 
going on within our total personality. Its roots are in the "inner dyna-
mism" which is a part of every person and is characterized by the strivings 
for justice, truth and freedom which are seen in human experience. Human-
istic conscience is a function of the real self while authoritarian con-
science is a function of the pseudo-self. Humanistic conscience concerns 
itself not so much with obedience as it does with productivity. Represent-
ing the expression of our true selves, it constitutes the reaction of our 
total personality, not to "goodness" or "badness" as such; but to the prop-
er functioning or disfunctioning of our total personality. The humanistic 
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.conscience becomes the voice of the self that potentially is in contrast 
to the pseudo-self, summoning us back to the true self. The true self 
insists on exploring its own potential, creating its own moral fiber, 
making its own choices, not merely because some outside authority said 
they were best, but because in the process of growth the true self indi-
cated that such morality, choices and potentials were best for that par-
ticular person. 
Fromm implies in this discussion that "social adjustment" is not the 
goal of life; that when conscience is healthy and free it often requires 
the person to become a non-conformist, it induces rebellion in some in-
stances, and it is responsible for the evolution seen within the history 
of man and society. The source of the "inner dynamism" making all this 
possible is shadoWY and vague within Fromm's analysis. Restricting himself 
to human experiences alone, it does not appear feasible to him as it does 
to this writer that the source of the inner dynamism could be outside the 
self, namely in the creative religious authority which was in the begin-
ning and which was denied by man as he found it easier to create a pseudo-
self rather than live up to the self that was created in God's image. 
Here however, as with Freud, the writer accepts much of Fromm's observa-
tion about authoritarian religion without agreeing to the theory inferred 
from that observation. 
Before turning to a discussion of Horney's view of the conscience we 
can restate at this point the important differences between the psycholog-
ical approach followed by Fromm in contrast to the approach taken by B'reud. 
(1) While Freud looks upon human nature as biologically fixed and de-
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terrnined, Fromm sees it as essentially historically conditioned, He ac-
knowledges the importance of biological factors and pleads not for a frag-
mentation between the biological and cultural but for acknowledgment of 
their interrelation, 
(2) Freud's essential principle is to look upon man as an entirely 
closed system, given by nature certain drives known as life and death 
instincts. He interprets the development of personality as a reaction to 
satisfactions and frustrations of these drives. Fromm sees a more valid 
approacn to personality in understanding man's relation to the world, to 
other persons, and to himself, He believes that man is primarily a social 
being and not as Freud assumes, primarily self-sufficient and only depen-
dent on others for satisfaction of his instinctual needs. Man's related-
ness rather than the satisfaction of a specific instinctual drive is seen 
as the crucial problem in Fromm's psychology, 
(3) Freud believes that all ideals spring from man's instinctual ori-
entation. An illustration is found in his explanation of the sense of jus-
tice as the outcome of the original envy a child has for anybody who has 
more than he. Fromm holds that ideals such as those represented by truth 
and justice are often rationalizations, yet they can be genuine strivings, 
based not on instinctual demands, but on a sense of oughtness manifested 
by the real self. 
(4) A final point of difference is one which Fromm calls the dif-
ferentiation between psychological phenomena of want and those of abund-
ance. He contends that the primitive level of human existence revolves a-
round want. Earlier in this chapter Fromm's idea of want was elaborated. 
It consists of the satisfaction of primary needs such as those found in 
food, water and shelter. After these needs have found satisfaction Fromm 
contends that strivings concerned with phenomena of abundance can be pur-
sued. Free or spontaneous acts are always phenomena of abundance. Freud 
limits himself to a psychology of wants. Pleasure, for him, consists in 
the removal of painful tension, The spontaneous joy resulting from an 
experience of love and tenderness escapes him, Fromm contends that Freud's 
analysis is true so long as we confine ourselves to primitive and primary 
experience, It is here that Fromm and Freud sharply differ •Qth respect 
to the function of conscience. Fromm agrees with ~reud's analysis of the 
super-ego as being essentially destructive and crippling in its effect on 
the total personality. He says, however, that this for him is the author-
itarian conscience, the conscience that necessarily precedes the develop-
ment of another kind of conscience function seen in the operation of the 
humanistic conscience, After primary needs are met, after man evolves, 
Fromm sees him attempting to develop his real self. While not specific 
in defining what this real self is, he implies that it is powered by an 
inner dynamism which manifests itself in free and spontaneous experience 
and in the development of integrity, phenomena of abundance such as truth 
and justice and in the positive aspects of freedom which unite man with 
others and with the environment not in a compulsive way but freely and 
without denying the inherent dignity and worth of the person. In maturity 
the authoritarian conscience is not repressed; it is discarded and replaced 
by the humanistic conscience, the expression of man's mature self-interest 
and integrity. 
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2. Horney 
i. Core of Neurosis 
Horney concerns herself primarily with neurotic conflict, She be-
lieves that culture, rather than playing a mechanical role in that it 
frustrates libidinal or other drives as claimed by Freud, provides the 
framework within which personality develops and operates. In short, spe-
cific cultural conditions engender specific qualities and faculties in 
people. In her first work New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939) she indicates 
her growing conviction that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitation 
set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology. For her 
the core of neurosis is found not in the sexual factors operative in the 
Oedipus complex but in the entirety of infantile experience combined to 
form a certain character structure. She believes that the person and the 
environment interact rather than existing independently of each other. 
Out of this interaction comes the experiences leading either to neurosis 
or to emotional health. For Horney, neurosis is prevalent because of the 
many adverse influences in the culture Which make a child feel helpless 
and defenseless, resulting in a conception of the world AS potentially 
menacing. It is this dread of potential dangers that drives the child to 
develop certain neurotic patterns in his attempt to cope with such a world. 
ii. Appearance of Perfection 
The rise of so-called super-ego function appears as one neurotic trend 
permitting the child to deal with the potentially dangerous world about him. 
Freud, bound by his instinct theory, conceives the super-ego as an inner 
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~gency of a primarily forbidding character, dominated by aggression and 
in league with the id. This function being essentially restrictive and 
destructive has the power to destroy. \mile Freud conceives the super-
ego as arising from infantile love, hatred and fear, he believes it soon 
becomes an autonomous inner function with a primary task of repressing id 
forces and denying pleasure and happiness. Rather than being driven by a 
need for an ever-increasing perfection, as Freud assumes, Horney believes 
the function is motivated by a need to maintain the appearance of perfec-
tion. Such an appearance grows not out of the fixed ccnflict between the 
life and death instincts, but out of two factors; one is the total rela-
tion existing between the person and his environment including the contact 
with important persons such as parents and authority figures; and another 
is the particular capacities, tendencies and potentials operative within 
the individual person. This appearance of perfection is characterized by 
Horney as "the search for glory " (Neurosis and Human Growth, 1950). lfuen 
the child discovers that his world is potentially dangerous he sets about 
constructing safety measures that will prevent him from being overwhelmed. 
Common to all, contends Horney, is the creation of an "idealized image" 
which at one stroke gives the person unlimited power and ability to deal 
with any of the dangers which life presents. This idealized image once 
conceived commands all the energy of the person. 
The real self in contrast, consists of the alive, unique "personal 
center" of ourselves; the only part that can and "oants to grow. The real 
self has a tendency to grow, it is inherent within personality. This be-
lief is in sharp contrast to Freud's pessimistic concept of personality as 
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being locked in endless struggle between life and death instincts. The 
real self doesn 1 t have a chance in childhood primarily because the social 
conditions are unavoidable. Parents are caught in their own neurotic con-
flicts, social pressure denies the child freedom to be, to explore, to re-
bel; they present a stereotype mold into which each child is thrust, often 
against his will. In the face of such pressure the development of the 
real self, fragile, sensitive and unique, is too dangerous. Hence there 
arises in response to both the internal and external need, the idealized 
self, characterized by its search for glory. 
Following this line of thought we can see how for Horney the whole 
concept of the super-ego is changed. She regards the super-ego function 
as directed toward a pretense of perfection which it is necessary to main-
tain. It constitutes a need within the personality rather than, as, for 
Freud, a special agency within the ego or id. So long as the energy of 
the person is utilized in maintaining the idealized image this function 
is required. Once stripped of such a neurotic concept, Horney contends 
this need is not required and will disappear. 
iii. Nature of Repression 
One implication arising from this point of view involves the dynamics 
of repression, both in the force which represses and in the factors which 
are repressed. Freud believed that fear of the super-ego is the force 
which brings about repression. Horney believes this view is too narrow. 
She contends that any drive or need can be repressed if it imperils another 
drive or need which is of vital importance to the individual. Freud argues 
that it is the "bad" in man that is repressed. Horney argues for more 
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flexibility saying that what is repressed depends on the kL~d of facade 
or idealized image which the individual feels forced to maintain. For 
example, the necessity to maintain a certain facade may lead not only to 
repressing anti-social drives but also to repressing the most vital fac-
tors in a person such as spontaneous wishes, feelings and judgments. This 
argument coincides with the •~iter's thesis that often persons repress the 
most idealistic thrusts of their own being and that the super-ego, while 
many times containing harshness and aggressiveness, often attempts to 
point toward the real self with its desires for integrity, love and justice. 
Freud argues that the super-ego as the inner representative of moral 
demands and prohibitions is similar to the more conscious ideals and stand-
ards held by the individual. He believes that both, while the inner de-
mands are more exacting, stem from a discharge of cruelty against the self. 
Horney, in contrast, insists that when ideals represent the standards, 
feelings and behavior which the individual recognizes as being part of his 
true self, they are different qualitatively as well as quantitatively from 
those upheld by the idealized self and stand in sharp contrast tc the com-
pulsive ego-alien demands set forth by the super-ego. Thus, H0 rney recog-
nizes the fact that people may repress not only their so-called evil wish-
es, but that they also may repress the demands of the real self. She ac-
knowledges that valid ideals may guide into maturity. They are different 
from the pseudo-ideals of the super-ego, they lack the compulsive and un-
realistic qualities so often manifest by the super-ego and they are flex-
ible and subject to modification as the real self grows in contrast to the 
inflexible and impossible goals held by the idealized self-image, 
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iv. Tyranny of the Shoulds 
In Neurosis and Human Growth1 Horney analyzes the "tyranny of the 
shoulds" and because of their proximity to Freud 1 s super-ego they will 
here be contrasted with Freud's view. Horney, we have noted, believes 
that neurosis arises as a consequence of disturbances in human relations. 
She believes the idealized self-image is developed as the child attempts 
to cope with the potential dangers in his world. These dangers stem not 
from instinctual urges but from conditions existing in the world repre-
sented by people, social conditions and cultural forces. The search for 
glory is the essential characteristic of the idealized self-image, There 
are outer as well as inner attempts to maintain this search. The inner 
attempts are by far the stronger and can be SUIIIIIled up as the "tyranny of 
the shoulds. 11 They comprise all that the neurotics should be able to do, 
feel and know. They also contain the taboos on how and what he should not 
be. Four basic qualities of the "shoulds" may be cited: 
(1) They are characterized by a disregard for feasibility. For ex-
ample, a minister well-known to this writer realizes that he cannot do ex-
tensive research, carry on a ministry to a large congregation, and fulfill 
a heavy speaking schedule. Yet, after attempts to reduce one of these ar-
eas of work, he persists in carrying on at the same pace. Limitation in 
time and energy are not for him. In this compulsive behavior Horney would 
see a reluctance on the part of the individual to acknowledge any of the 
realistic limitations imposed by being human. She would call this minis-
ter's behavior characteristic of the "search for glory" and would see it 
1. K. Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (New York: W. W. N0 rton and Co., 
1950), PP• 64-85. 
stemming not from real self-striving but from an attempt to maintain the 
idealized self-image. 
(2) Another characteristic of the "shoulds" is that they operate 
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with complete disregard for the person's own psychic condition. By this 
Horney refers tc what the person can feel or do as he is at present. A 
person who feels he should "never" make a mistake, when still in the learn-
ing part of his professional training would be an example of this condition. 
In a similar vein the religious person who feels he should never experience 
doubts would be an example of this tyrannical should, 
(3) Yet another characteristic of the "shoulds" is that they have a 
complete disregard for the conditions under which they could be fulfilled, 
This writer experienced the power of this type of "should" when first con-
fronted with the job of writing a dissertation. After extensive reading 
he felt that the material should flow from the typewriter in coherent and 
scientific fashion. Only after painful re-evaluation did he discover that 
undertaking such an original task made it impossible for such a thing tc 
happen. Repeatedly persons have acknowledged in conference with the wri-
ter, acute feelings of guilt for negative feelings they harbor toward par-
ents. These feelings have persisted even after it has been shown that there 
were realistic provocations for the existence of such negative feeling. To 
the individuals concerned however, conditions played no part in their feel-
ing. One "should" feel kindly disposed toward parents, irrespective of 
what experiences one has known with them. Such an inflexible rigid stand-
ard would be for Horney an example of this characteristic of the "shoulds", 
(4) The basic premise running through all the characteristics of the 
"shoulds" is this: nothing should be or is impossible for oneself. 
Horney acknowledges that "shoulds" are revealed clearly in demands 
that are directed against the past. She differs from Freud in pointing 
122 
to the fact that their influence is determined not so much by good or bad 
done in the past as by the present needs of the person. Instead of up-
holding the repetition-compulsion theory held by Freud, she believes that 
the final determinant of any experience in the past is to be found in the 
individual's present organization and concept of himself. In other words, 
if he still needs the protection and security that he longed for as a child, 
past experience will have a dominant influence on him. On the other hand, 
if he has grown in the expression of his real self, adopted goals and ideals 
that are germaine to his real being, then experiences of the past will lose 
much of their power over him and while acknowledging what they once meant, 
he will be liberated from their continued effect. Such a view puts the em-
phasis on the present rather than the past, on a dynamic rather than on a 
static view of personality. 
v. Comparison and Contrast with Freudian Super-Ego 
Obviously these characteristics attributed to the tyranny of the 
"shoulds" bear a close resemblance to Freud's description of the super-ego. 
The differences are as follows: 
(1) For Horney 11 shoulds" differ in quality as well as quantity from 
genuine ideals and moral precepts. Freud regarded "shoulds" as constitut-
ing morality in general leaving no room for objective morality. Any ideal, 
for Freud, grew out of an attempt to deal with the instinctual demands. 
Horney, allowing for a real self, one free from external or internal author-
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ity save that generated by the self in spontaneous striving indicates that 
"shoulds" represent only one type of morality. 
As does Fromm, she acknowledges that a healthy person can exist. Such 
an acknowledgment however, lacks documentation. She describes the neurotic 
personality without revealing clearly the characteristics of a normal per-
son. Aside from talking of the real self as being characterized by spon-
taneity and freedom Horney does not develop any further description of the 
so-called normal person. She does mention two characteristics which are 
observable in all neurosis, namely rigidity in reaction and discrepancy be-
tween potentialities and accomplishments. This leads one to assume that a 
normal person is characterized by flexibility and a realistic awareness of 
his desires and their relation to his actual accomplishments. The impor-
tant point separating Freud from Horney here is that Freud sees no hope for 
the eventual emergence of a normal healthy person due to his belief in 
fixed and unalterable instinctual drives. Horney does recognize, that per-
sons are not forever bound by instinctual drives, that the primary reasons 
for their neurotic manifestation are to be found in the culturally and so-
cially determined influences of the society, and thus are amenable to real 
change. She is thus optimistic about the eventual growth of personality. 
(2) Horney recognizes that both with valid ideas (stemming from the 
real self) and "shoulds" there is a coercive character. Unlike Freud, she 
insists that the source of this character differs not merely in quantity 
but also in quality. The compulsiveness of the "shoulds" grows out of de-
mands of the idealized self-image, when foreign to the real self. The au-
thority of the "shoulds" is not found in the real self; but either in some 
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internalized authority symbol such as parent, state, or church, or in the 
need of the idealized self-image to maintain its appearance of perfection. 
The source of the drive underlying ideals held by the real self grows out 
of the nature of freedom belonging to the real self, the free acceptance 
of self-imposed goals. 
It is the distinction between pseudo-ideals designed to maintain the 
appearance of perfection and ideals springing from the real self that con-
stitutes Horney's greatest contribution to our view of the place conscience 
can hold in the development of personality. The importance of this dis-
tinction will appear as additional characteristics if the "shoulds" are 
delineated. They do not aim at real change in the person but only at dis-
posing of imperfection by denial. They lack the moral seriousness of gen-
uine ideals. 
People in their grip are not striv-
ing, for instance, toward approxi-
mating a greater degree of honesty 
but are driven to attain the absolute 
in honesty--which is always just a-
round the corner, or is attained in 
imagination,! 
Horney criticizes Freud's assumption that because super-ego functions 
tend to uphold standards they represent morality in general. She shows how 
many of the "shoulds" are concerned not with moral questions but with such 
as "I should be able to get out of a Sunday afternoon traffic jam" or "I 
should be able to get away with aeything I want to do," Such questions 
are not only divorced from true moral standards but lack even a moral pre-
tense. When "shoulds" are characterized by a spirit of arrogance and aim 
1. K. Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 72. 
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at continuing the person 1 s appearance of perfection and at making him god-
like, then Horney contends they are the "neurotic counterfeit of normal 
moral strivings." Horney makes no attempt to define a "true morality" for 
all people. She merely claims that genuine moral striving must be con-
nected with development of the real self and that there is inherent within 
the real self a desire to adopt moral goals. One is reminded of Kant's 
philosophical argument that conscience demands obedience to the highest 
known value the person recognizes. Such a value might differ from person 
to person and from time to time. 
Horney notes that any general morality could not develop unless cul-
tural and social conditions were similar in all places. But if persons can 
only rediscover their real self, live amid conditions that are conducive to 
self growth and exploration, the real moral goals they develop will have a 
similarity irrespective of the dwelling place. 
(3) For Horney the source of the "tyranny of the shoulds" as well as 
their manifestation differs with each person. Unlike Freud, who contends 
that at the basis of all super-ego development is the instinctual conflict, 
Horney argues that we have no right to generalize from specific data about 
individual persons for all people. Such reasoning bears a close resem-
blance to Allport's argument in Personality where he says that there are 
no general laws for personality, only congruent individual laws for indi-
vidual J:B rsons. 
(4) llfith Freud, Horney indicates that the compulsive "shoulds" and 
their counterfeit moral standards are revealed most vividly in those whose 
idealized image lies in the direction of goodness and saintliness. She 
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~mplies that these feelings place severe restrictions on any spontaneous 
feelings which might linger in the real self searching for a means of ex-
pression, By implication she takes the position of both Freud and Fromm 
regarding religious feeling, Namely, that because it is so often seen in 
those pursuing an appearance of perfection it must be a negative influence 
and one to be regarded with suspicion, Yet if religious feelings issue 
from the real self their power and integrative character is astonishing. 
In her brief comtrlents on religion it appears that with Fromm she would re-
ject any religious feeling whose source was outside the individual himself. 
Thus while progressing a long way from the l<"reudian view of the super-ego 
in general and morality in particular, Horney is nee-Freudian in holding 
to a humanistic morality whose source must be human if it has any validity. 
Horney finds three types of conscience: (a) one characterized by inner 
submission to external authorities with the corresponding fear of discovery 
and punishment, (b) another of "condemnatory self-accusations" issuing from 
the neurotic striving to maintain the appearance of perfection which is a-
moral in origin and immoral in effect and (c) another which manifests it-
self as constructive discontent with the real self. That is what Fromm 
terms "man 1 s recall to himself," In her opinion only this third function 
can be regarded as a conscience function. 
vi. Humanistic Conscience as Seen by Fromm and Horney 
Thus far an attempt has been made to contrast the views of Fromm and 
Horney with those of Freud. In conclusion, let us compare the views of 
Horney and Fromm, There are more lines of agreement than disagreement, 
Both reject Freud's instinctual explanation of human behavior. Both agree 
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that social and cultural conditions within the environment are at the basis 
of neurotic difficulty, Fromm emphasizing the social conditions and Horney 
the disturbance in human relations. Both tend to emphasize the present 
rather than the past while acknowledging the vital role childhood experi-
ences play in the development of personality, especially the relation be-
tween parent and child. Because they both see neurosis developing from 
conditions prevailing in the environment, they are optimistic about the 
future. If the conditions can be changed, they foresee the eventual les-
sening of neurotic development. This optimism is in sharp contrast to 
Freud's inevitable pessimism stemming from his closed system of biological 
drives which plunge the individual into endless conflict as the life and 
death instincts do battle with each other. Both are hazy about what con-
stitutes the character of the real self. They agree that its observable 
traits are found in spontaneity, freedom from external pressure and the 
presence of goals arising out of convictions held by the self rather than 
the ideals and stmdards held by others. Both agree that there is a vast 
difference between pseudo-ideals held by those attempting to preserve an 
idealized self-image which embodies the appearance of perfection and god-
like qualities and those valid ideals and moral goals held by the self. 
They see each real self as a dynamism potentially good, loving and tender 
and assess the task of the therapist as that of helping to destroy the 
false self so that the real self can grow. This is a different goal than 
that held by the Freudian therapist who sees his function as one of reduc-
ing conscience demands and to enable the individual to find more adequate 
and socially acceptable ways to express instinctual needs. 
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One cannot help but feel that both have analyzed only neurotic reli-
gious experience issuing from an authoritarian base, Both seem to con-
ceptualize any god as a Frankenstein monster of a rigid and punitive char-
acter. The God concept revealed in the life of Jesus coupled with the 
feeling of oughtness experienced by innumerable persons who are freed 
from authoritarianism either does not concern them or is not in their area 
of awareness. Fromm presents only the authoritarian aspects of reforma-
tion religion implying that such religion is the only kind in existence. 
Both Horney and Fromm do agree that when conscience functions as man's 
recall to his true self, then its demands ought to be heeded rather than 
diminished, supported rather than ignored, Yet both fail to give support-
ing evidence for their contention that man is potentially good, that there 
is in every person a striving for self-development, and that people want a 
true morality. To leave the source of such important qualities shrouded 
in mystery is the dilemma of two authors that are restricted to humanistic 
concepts. If for both any external authority is forbidding and punitive 
one can see why the possible existence of such authority is rejected by 
them. 
Fromm explains the basic problem confronting modern man in his con-
cept of freedom. His analysis sees man as slowly emerging from a oneness 
with other man and nature, This evolution while freeing man from earlier 
ties has left him with a type of negative freedom, Although separated 
from primary ties, he has yet to develop more mature ties with the real 
world and the people within it. Many, finding ttis emerging freedom too 
painful, sacrifice it for a false but often temporarily satisfying security 
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by yielding to external authorities and pressures. These people deny 
growth to their real self by this adoption of authority other than their 
own. The authoritarian conscience with its emphasis on obedience and the 
upholding of external authority that has become internalized is the re-
sult of this inability to deal with emerging freedom in the face of the 
social and cultural patterns imposed on modern man. Fro~~ equates this 
authoritarian conscience with Freud's super-ego. He goes further however, 
insisting that when conscience, rather than being concerned with obedience 
to irrational and alien authority, acts as a moral agency serving our 
growth, being the reaction of our true self to the proper functioning or 
the malfunctioning of our total personality, such a conscience is healthy. 
In this state it perfor~ two vital functions: (1) it enables the person 
to discover more of his real potential, to develop more of the unique 
qualities which are inherent within his spontaneous and productive self; 
and (2) it provides the means by which the negative freedom now confronting 
modern ~n can be transcended resulting in a new way of relating to the 
physical world and the people in it. This new freedom is constantly bring-
ing voluntary relationship rather than a compulsive relationship. The ~­
ture and creative relatedness Fromm sees as the outgrowth of humanistic 
psychology and its contribution to the understanding of modern man. 
Horney does not picture man's dilemma in such a historical perspec-
tive, for she is more of a clinician than a sociologist. To this extent 
her theory of neurosis and its causes offer more clinical documentation 
for her criticism of Freud as well as for rupport of her own theoretical 
considerations. She finds the neurosis arising out of human relations. 
Through environmental factors W1ich obstruct the child's emotional growth 
she sees him developing instead of a basic confidence in self and others 
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a basic anxiety which is defined as a feeling of being isolated and help-
less to•~d a potentially hostile world. In an attempt to keep this basic 
anxiety at a minimum the child develops not his real self, but patterns of 
defense against people and objects in his danger-filled world. These de-
fenses develop an integrative function called the idealized image. This 
image usurps the individual's drive to grow and to actualize his given 
potentialities. Preserving this idealized image becomes the person's main 
task in life and his basic conflict is between such an idealized image and 
the real self. While rejecting Freud's instinctual theory, Horney does 
finally posit two opposite forces doing battle within personality, motiva-
tions that for her are culturally determined wlule for Freud's they are 
biologically given. 
She feels that the most significant conflict is that between the search 
for unlimited glory or power and self-hate. She sees a parallel in all hu-
man history where light and darkness have been contrasted as well as good 
and evil. 
To the writer, the explanation of this idealized image growing out of 
disturbances within self and relations with others is not adequate. It 
does not begin to explain the power and the destructiveness which results 
when the true self is pitted against the idealized image in later years. 
It is still a theory and not a demonstrable fact that modifications in the 
culture will alone alter the development of the pride system. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, this writer believes that there is yet another 
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step which must be taken. It concerns the supposition that in the begin-
ning there existed a set of environmental conditions in which the infant's 
world was not danger-ridden, From this sheltered nest of infancy, the 
child became anxious as he rebelled against the authority of parents and 
society and became more conscious of his own capacities. It may be justi-
fiably suggested that this moral law which existed from the beginning and 
whose source was not in man but in an objective outside authority, was not 
consciously realized until man's consciousness had expanded and developed. 
To a limited extent we see a parallel between the developing relation be-
tween parent and child and man and God. As Freud, Fromm and Horney have 
so vividly illustrated, a great deal of the problem between parent and 
child results from the child's own needs and his perception of the parents 
rather than from the parents as they really are. In a similar vein, much 
of the difficulty between man and God, described by Fromm as the struggle 
with irrational authority, centers not so much in the God concept as in 
man's concept of God. Fromm sees a vast difference between Reformation 
concepts of God and modern concepts of God. 
To us the pride system of which Horney speaks, developed partially as 
a result of human relations, but also as a consequence of man's effort to 
become like God. This may explain the tremendous power which such a system 
holds over the person, It also explains why changes in social and cultural 
conditions only partially resolve the neurotic dilemma. It also reveals 
why persons with religious feelings are either acutely disturbed or remark-
ably able to develop a creative selfhood. In this area is to be found the 
most potent sources of energy. Misused, such energy brings swift and pain-
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ful consequences. Properly used this source of energy may strengthen 
the dynamic wisdom of the healthy conscience and enable man to actualize 
his potentials. 
In this chapter we have presented nee-Freudian views of the con-
science as developed by Fromm and Horney. These views have been seen in 
contrast with Freud's concept of the super-ego. We have found nee-Freud-
ian views constituting a significant step toward a more adequate under-
standing of the conscience function. Both authors agree that conscience 
can outgrow its beginning. Both acknowledge that while the authoritar-
ian conscience serves a negative function the healthy conscience may 
serve an indispensable function in enabling man to discover and explore 
his real self. Both authors realize a qualitative as well as quantitative 
difference between pseudo ideals and those resulting from real self-striv-
ing. They reject Freud's instinctive explanation of all human behavior 
and acknowledge that in man there appears a tendency to grow and strive 
for moral goals. Finally, it was evident that Fromm and Horney take a 
dim view of religion. Horney ignores the religious area. Fromm analyzes 
the authoritarian manifestations of religion to the exclusion of any others. 
In the next chapter certain non-Freudian views of the conscience will 
be presented. An attempt will be made to show that they represent another 
step forward in understanding the conscience. 
CHAPTER VI 
SOME NON-FREUDIAN VIEWS OF CONSCIENCE 
In the preceeding chapters the psychoanalytic concept of the con-
science has been discussed, Freud's initial development of the concept 
has been presented and evaluated. It was shown that the ~'reudian claim 
asserts the super-ego is formed because of certain biological factors; 
namely the battle of the life and death instincts and the long struggle 
with dependent and assertive needs through which every person passes in 
infancy. It has further been shown that contemporary Freudian investi-
gators agree that the super-ego and id are likely to function in league 
against the ego. They also consider the aggressive and destructive as-
pects of the super-ego to have mare strength than the conserving and in-
tegrative tendencies emerging into the ego-ideal. 
In the previous chapter some nee-Freudian views have been presented. 
They were contrasted with Freudian views of the conscience. Differences 
were noted especially in the following areas: (l) Fromm and Horney agree 
that conscience can outgrow its early beginning whereas Freudians contend 
that its beginnings found in the parent-child relationship are dominant 
throughout life. (2) Fromm and Horney reject Freud's instinctive expla-
nation of all human behavior as well as his emphasis on the negative as-
pects of the super-ego. They emphasize the positive growth factors of con-
science as well as the tendency in personality to look toward moral goals 
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rather than instinctual gratification. 
1. Non-Freudian Views 
In this chapter some non-Freudian views of conscience will be pre-
sented. In particular the views of Gordon W. Allport, Hobart Mowrer, 
Rollo May and Harry Stack Sullivan will be presented. These four have 
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been engaged in both theoretical and clinical research relating to per-
sonality theory and counseling procedure. All are non-Freudian in the 
sense that they modifY the basic trends of his thought concerning the role 
of unconscious processes and the ways in which they find expression. All 
four go beyond the analytic form of therapeutic treatment with its empha-
sis on free association and unconscious patterns, and develop techniques 
and principles for dealing with conscious processes within an interperson-
al setting. While acknowledging their indebtedness to Freud and his fol-
lowers, each embarks on a new path regarding the nature of personality. 
The primary emphasis is on the present interpersonal relations of the in-
dividual rather than upon the past. Conscious factors are considered as 
more vital than unconscious phenomena. The procedure, in this chapter, 
will be to present the various authors' views of conscience, sketch briefly 
their theory of personality, and then compare and contrast their views with 
those presented thus far in this dissertation. These four men have been 
selected because to this writer their thinking about conscience, while 
utilizing the best from the past carries the concept forward and relates 
it to current thinking about personality and its structure. 
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2. The Concepts of Allport 
Gordon W. Allport has been professor of psychology in Harvard Univer-
sity for twenty-seven years, In his ~1riting about personality in that time 
he has manifested a continuing interest in the factor of self control with-
in personali~. While affirming the psychobiological nature of personality 
he has strongly rejected any approach to personality which places the PhY-
sical factors above the psychological. In his theory he has insisted that 
there are no general laws governing personality growth; only specific laws 
for individual persons. The uniqueness of the individual constitutes one 
of Allport's dominant themes. Rather than accept Freud's theory of in-
stincts he talks of "inborn dispositions" which constitute the raw material 
for the development of personality. They comprise at least three sets of 
factors. First, those which make for survival of the organism are often 
referred to as instincts. Second, these forming under the heading of "in-
heritance" associated with the family, stock, and rnce. Finally, there is 
another set of factors identified as latent or potential capacities that 
play a crucial role in the development of personality. Such a disposition 
would be what Allport calls "A disposition to form structuresJiL Such 
structures may include simple habits but they also include more complex 
structures such as conscience, self-concepts and a philosophy of life. 
i. Process of Becoming 
In Becoming (1955) Allport presents his mature thinking on conscience. 
He also reviews his earlier theory of personality claiming that personality 
1. G. W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 27, 
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i.s not present at birth either in disposition, or as the Freudians claim 
in instinctually given drives, but that it emerges as the infant moves 
from earlier to later states of development. The infant cannot possibly 
be a socialized being. His striving is directed toward the immediate 
object; it is transitory and impulsive and in no way referred to the self. 
As this initial layer of development gives way to a more complex one, 
momentary impulses are organized into patterns of strivings and interests 
in which the role of self-awareness plays a large part. 
While acknowledging the importance of initial influences Allport con-
tends that they need not remain dominant as later motives emerge. In Per-
sonality1 (1937) he calls this "functional autonomy" meaning that the mo-
tives of adults are varied and self-sustaining and while growing out of 
antecedent or earlier systems they are in adult years functionally inde-
pendent of them. The most dominant disposition in personality is that of 
individuation, the formation of an individual style of life that is self-
aware, self-critical, and self-enhancing. The process of "becoming" as 
Allport describes it can best be understood as the effort on the part of 
the personality to develop his unique adjustment to the environment and 
give recognition to this dominant tendency toward individuation and growth. 
ii. Theory of the Proprium 
Before considering Allport's view of conscience one other concept 
needs to be considered--that of the 11 proprium. 11 In discussing the con-
cept of self he distinguishes between what are matters of importance to 
the individual and what are merely matters of fact. For example, all of 
1. G. W. Allport, Personality (New York: Henry Holt and Co,, 1937), pp. 
191-211. 
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us have a variety of physioloe;ical habits such as eating and sleeping 
habits, which are part of our existence, yet these may be segmental and 
peripheral. Allport recommends that we call the central regions of our 
life regarded as peculiarly our own the proprium. For him the proprium 
includes "all aspects of personality that make for inward unity."l 
Among some of the propriate aspects of personality are the follow-
ing: 
(1) Appearing within the first five years are three aspects possess-
ing a heavy biological quality contained primarily within the organism it-
self. Bodily senses streaming together technically called 11 coenesthesis", 
involve certain organic sensations; their localization and recognition 
are a core of becoming. 
(2) Another group distinguishing a later stage of development in-
volve ego-extension or the expansion of what a person calls "mine" to 
include loved objects as well as causes, ideals and loyalties. The self-
image is another propriate function. It contains two aspects: what the 
person regards as his present status and what Horney calls his "idealized 
self-image" or what he w;:>uld like to become. Irrespective of whether 
this image is attainable or distorted, compulsive and restrictive or 
wholesome and helpful, it explains much of the propriate striving of the 
individual. 
(3) Propriate striving for Allport is sharply different from oppor-
tunistic striving or traditional concepts of motivation in terms of drives 
and their reduction. 11 Propriate striving," says Allport, "distinguishes 
1. G. w. Allport, Becoming, p. 40. 
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.itself from other forms of motivation in that, however beset by conflicts, 
it makes for unification of personality."l And this characteristic of pro-
priate striving is that it pursues long-range goals often increasing rath-
er than reducing tension. \Vhile motivations prevalent in some aspects of 
becoming may have as their aim the reduction of tension, propriate striv-
ing goes beyond physical satisfaction of instinctual pleasure and unifies 
the whole personality as it seeks long-range goals conceived of in non-
physical terms i.e. attainment of ideals and control of physical desires by 
moral values. 
Allport believes that propriate functions do not exist at birth, but 
can be distinguished beginning by the age of two or three. We start at 
birth with an organism which develops unique modes of adjusting to and 
mastering the environment; these modes we call personality. 
Whereas Freud and his followers claim that the instincts strive to-
ward pleasure and that the primary striving of the personality is to re-
duce the tension set up by the instincts, Allport claims that propriate 
striving often increases tension. It subordinates instinctual demands for 
the pursuit of ideals and long-range goals that often require much imme-
diate frustratim. This also calls for a distinction between what "happens 
to us" and what "we ourselves do." Allport borrows Maslow's terms to de-
scribe motives, referring to deficit and growth motives. Deficit motives 
call for the reduction of tension and restoration of equilibrium; growth 
motives, on the contrary, maintain tension and deny restoration of equilib-
rium in the interest of seemingly unattainable long-term goals. Allport 
1. Allport, Becoming, P• 68. 
believes this difference is all important, 
As such they (growth motives) dis-
tinguish human from animal becoming 
and adult from infant becoming, By 
growth motives we refer to the hold 
that ideals gain upon the process of 
development. Long-range purposes ••• 
are all of this order,l 
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The holding of long-range goals and the development of an ideal self-
image are more essential for the growing person according to Allport. Con-
science is that agent witldn the personality that controls momentary im-
pulses, that enables the person to direct his striving and energy in a 
direction consistent with the ideals, and goals, growing out of his pro-
priate striving. 
iii. Mature Conscience 
Allport sees two definite types of conscience. (l) "Must conscience 11 2 
clearly defined and analyzed by Freudians. This conscience function devel-
ops as a result of internalization of the authority system of the parents 
and symbols of authority prevalent in childhood. This conscience function 
has little to do with the person's self-image. It is primarily concerned 
with obedience to external values, As propriate striving begins to mani-
fest itself, and the child develops an ideal self-image and sense of values 
peculiarly his own, then conscience somehow shifts from "must" to "ought." 
Conscience then functions not primarily as an agent of obedience but as an 
agent of expression. It enables the person to make choices that are in har-
mony with the long-term goals of the ideal self-image, In effect it says to 
the person: "If you choose this goal it will help you fulfill your ideal 
l, Allport, Becoming, P• 68, 
2, Ibid., p. 71. 
140 
self-image; if you do that it will be damaging to your own self-chosen 
goals and will end in total frustration." An additional characteristic of 
"ought" conscience is that it shifts its interest from specific habits of 
obedience, and observance of group standards to broad value judgments and 
a high sense of individual responsibility. 
Of considerable importance is Allport's contention that one type of 
conscience gives way to another. He sees personality as a growing struc-
ture not limited by what occurs in the first few years of existence. His 
is an emergent theory. 
He argues with the Freudian supposition that conscience is primarily 
a repressive function. He feels that impulses incompatible with the ideal 
self-image do not always have to be repressed. Many simply evaporate. 
Conscience has as its primary task the guiding and directing of the person-
ality in paths that enable it to strive toward its long-term goals rather 
than merely to serve as the agent of repression for desires and impulses 
that were forbidden in childhood. 
Allport points to evidence suggesting that people are not always at-
tempting to reduce tension. Many people deny satisfaction to certain im-
pulses because of their desire to pursue long-term goals. What he terms 
"opportunistic becoming" is seen only in the small child or in the adult 
whose conscience development has been repressed. To explain the function 
of conscience therefore, as a repressive agent designed to prevent certain 
instinctual impulses from demanding satisfaction hardly explains the choices 
and behavior patterns of many adults. An immature conscience for Allport, 
would be characterized by fear and obedience to specific rules and regula-
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tions. The mature conscience is characterized by growth; it has emerged 
from being the internal voice of external authority; it has developed in 
proportion to the person's ideal self-image; its function is seen as a 
rudder rather than a repressive agent; its source of authority is not in 
childhood admonitions or parental wishes but in the desire of the person 
to observe his own value system and to make those ch:>ices which bring into 
more complete realization the qualities inherent in his ideal self-image. 
iv. Allport's Criticism of Freudian Super-Ego 
Obviously Allport takes sharp issue with the Freudian concept of con-
science. Some of the points of agreement and disagreement might be noted 
as follows: 
(1) Allport agrees with Freud that in childbood conscience develops 
in directions related to parental authority and cultural practice. Its 
source of authority is fear of punishment. Guilt arises in early con-
science over violation of external taboos. 
(2) Allport argues that this kind of conscience begins to disappear 
as the child develops an ideal self-image. While this image is influenced 
by parents and cultural surroundings it has certain qualities that are 
uniquely its own. For example, the child may want to make something of 
himself, a desire which is conditioned largely by parents and society, but 
this desire may become specific in his intent to become a physician. He 
soon begins to build a scheme of values and goals which will enable him to 
bring this desire into actuality. This will cause frustration of many in-
stinctual forces such as the desire for marriage and a family, an early at-
tainment of authority, the finding of a secure position. Through the long 
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process of school and the economic burden of medical training these desires 
may be thwarted for a long time. The factor enabling such frustration of 
desire in favor of attainment of long-term goals Allport calls conscience. 
l.t is not sc interested in repressing secondary desires as it is in help-
ing the person attain primary goals. 
(3) With his theory of emergence Allport disagrees with the Freudian 
supposition that persons are born with certain given instincts that can 
never be changed but only modified. He dismisses the idea that we are 
chained to infantile experience or desires. Adult systems of behavior 
while growing out of earlier ones, are independent of childhood and have 
validity in their own right. 
(4) The concept of 11 propriate striving" is different in kind as well 
as degree from instinctual striving, Allport insists that other than bio-
logical factors are at the basis of human motivation. He sharply separates 
the human from the animal. His inference that undesirable desires and mo-
tives can simply evaporate rather than being relegated to the limbo of the 
unconscious is consistent with the principle of functional autonomy which 
he advances in Personality (1937). Jinplicit further in this thinking is 
a tendency to attach less importance to the repetition-compulsion motive 
which is basic to Freudian theory and practice. 
(5) The unconscious as a concept or as a dynamic property has little 
concern for Allport. He is primarily interested in conscious processes 
and finds the conscience to be an agent functioning in consciousness rather 
than a factor making itself felt primarily in the unconscious. 
(6) As Freud illustrates his theories about the unconscious and nega-
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tive aspects of conscience with appropriate case material, Allport chooses 
illustrations that are appropriate to his more optimistic theories regard-
ing human personality. Allport makes no attempt to account for the de-
structive aspects of conscience nor does he deal with the extremely harsh 
and punishing conscience functions which are observable in so many persons. 
He assumes that where people suffer from conscience guilt and fear of pun-
ishment the cause may be found in an arrested development at an earlier 
stage, With his concept of stage of development he would explain patho-
logical systems in conscience functioning as due to the insufficient de-
velopment of an ideal self-image or to an earlier conflict with an author-
ity figure. In no way however, 'WOuld he feel that this is the dominant 
characteristic of conscience functioning. 
(7) A further basic difference between Freud and Allport is in their 
initial presupposition about human behavior. Freud starts with fixed drives 
and assumes all behavior may be explained as an attempt to give expression 
to them, Allport assumes the growth motive to be central in each person, 
He sees no specific motives as being automatically present but feels that 
each person develops his own growth tendencies and that his behavior can 
be explained as an attempt to attain the goals toward which his self-image 
aspires. In this process the function of conscience is to make choices 
which are in harmony with the person's self-chosen goals. This view stands 
in sharp contrast to Freud's assumption that instincts present at birth de-
mand gratification throughout life, never deviating either in intensity or 
desire, and that conscience is a function which prevents such drives from 
finding gratification. 
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Both Freud and Allport agree that the ego-ideal or ideal self-image 
is of vital importance to our understanding of the function of conscience. 
Both imply that this image is brought into being primarily through cultural 
and social contacts. Both fail to explain why the image is different for 
each person and why tiE image is characterized by qualities standing in 
sharp contrast to what they observe in others or what their physical de-
sires demand. Allport, not bound by Freud's instinct theory, traces the 
shift from "must" to "ought" conscience. Ilnplicit in this explanation is 
an idea that an ideal self-image is universal to human nature, that its 
specific form is determined by individual differences. Whereas Freud im-
plies that man desires instinctual gratification and an eventual return to 
the inorganic, Allport suggests that man really wants to be better than he 
is at any given t:ime, that this desire stems neither from neurotic sources 
or an unresolved Oedipal situation but from a genuine striving to actualize 
the best potential which is within him. While not believing in innate 
qualities, Allport talks about emergent conscience suggesting that person-
ality would strive toward realization of its ideal self-image irrespective 
of the social and cultural experiences to which it was exposed. 
3. Mowrer 
Mowrer became interested in the nature and function of conscience as 
he studied learning theory. In several published works, notably Learning 
Theory and Personality p[namicsl Mowrer advances the theory that neurosis 
1. 0. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics (New York: The 
Ronald Press Co., 1950). 
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is the product of id and ego funtioning in league against the super-ego, 
He agrees with Freud's major premise concerning neurosis; namely that the 
neurotic conflict originates in the fact that the disciplinary and power 
efforts of the parents are pitted against the child during his long period 
of relative dependence and helplessness. 
11owrer takes sharp issue however, with what might be termed Freud's 
second or minor premise that infantile desires in the sexual or aggres-
sive area are repressed by the super-ego and if "over-learned" persist 
tp~ough adolescence and carry on into adulthood with consequent neurotic 
manifestations. Based upon this assumption Freud and many others have 
assumed that the duty of the therapist should be conceived in terms of 
reducing the strength of the super-ego so that id wishes could find some 
socially acceptable gratification, 
Mowrer contends that just the reverse of this widely accepted posi-
tion is what occurs in a majority of instances. In the early years the 
child doesn't learn sufficiently to deal with instinctual desires and con-
flicts and as a consequence grows up with an unassimilated or under-devel-
oped super-ego. Because of resistance which the infantile ego raises a-
gainst pressures of society and the super-ego as representative of those 
forces it remains id-dominated and immature, Mowrer sees the task of the 
therapist thus, as that of strengthening the super-ego function and con-
sidering neurosis as a consequence of a "learning deficit" rather than a 
"learning excess. 11 
i, Theories of Neurosis 
Here it might be well to review the classical view of neurosis com-
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paring it with concepts held by other thinkers in the field who, while dif-
fering with many of Freud's ideas, agree as to what produces neurotic be-
havior. 
It will be recalled from a previous chapter that Freud pictured the 
super-ego as pl$Ying the role within the personality which is at first 
played by an external power, namely the parents. He argues that the super-
ego takes the place of the parental function and for the rest of the per-
son's life controls, punishes and threatens the ego in a way similar to 
that carried out by the parent during the early years. 
In Mowrer's terms, neurosis was for Freud both a "disorder of condi-
tioning" and a "disorder of problem solving. 111 In every instance Freud 
believed one of the central problems was the over-severity of the super-ego. 
While in many instances the clinical evidence revealed an excess of 
discipline and harshness on the part of parents, many clinical pictures 
lacked documentation in this regard. Although this lack of evidence puz-
zled Freud, he nevertheless insisted that somewhere the influence on the 
super-ego was excessive and needed to be reduced. A corollary of this be-
lief is fotmd in his instinctual theory which claims that the primary aim 
of the person is to achieve instinctual satisfaction. 
Along with the assumption that neurosis arises as a consequence of 
something that is done to the person (mal-conditioning nypothesis) Freud 
believed that neurosis can be understood only by positing an intrapsychic 
process called "repression," It is interesting to note that other writers,' 
1. 0. H. Mowrer, "Neurosis: A Disorder of Conditioning or Problem Solving?" 
Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences, 56 (1953), p. 277. 
who sharply diverge from Freud's theory agree up to this point. What Freud 
called repression, Rogers has called "denial of feeling," Sullivan select-
ive inattention," and Janet, Prince, and others have called "dissociation," 
The method of handling repressions by creation of S)mptoms, constituted for 
Freud a deficiency in proolem solving. He argued that by releasing re-
pressed material, especially that in the sexual and aggressive areas, the 
person found more adequate ways for finding gratification and thereby re-
duced the formation of symptoms and neurotic compulsive behavior, 
Dollard and Miller in Personality and PsychotherapY (1950) take es-
sentially the same position as Freud regarding the origin of neurotic be-
havior. They contend that neurosis arises because of excessive and unre-
alistic fears. While not holding to the theory of instincts, they do men-
tion sexual desires and aggressive behavior as the two areas of experience 
around which much neurotic behavior arises. With Freud, Dollard and Miller 
agree however that neurosis arises as a consequence of something that is 
done to the person and that the goal of therapy is to undo the traumatic 
experiences of judgment and harshness in which the child was first disci-
plined, providing a more permissive atmosphere in which to unlearn fear 
produced by these moments and relearn more acceptable adult patterns by 
which basic desires (notably in the sexual and aggressive areas) can be 
satisfied. 
Freud, Dollard, Miller and others are in agreement that neurosis has 
its origin in something that happens to the person, A bad environment, 
harsh parental commands, lack of acceptance all work on the person to pro-
duce repres~ion or dissociation which in turn brings neurotic behavior. 
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ii. Neurosis as a "Learning Deficit" 
Mowrer argues that neurosis arises not so much as a consequence of 
something happening to the individual as from something within the person, 
a misdirected attempt to cope with the problems with .Which he is confronted. 
While others argue that neurosis is something imposed from without, Mowrer 
insists that it is less an imposition than an invention and that basically 
its point of origin is internal rather than external. 
Neurosis is thus an expression, 
not of excessive conditioning, 
but of problem-solving skills and 
techniques which, under the sway 
of the primitive pleasure principle, 
are directed toward the prevention 
of conditioning and the avoidance of 
discipline which, in the long run, 
are to the individual's decided ad-
vantage.l 
Such a statement as the one quoted above implies an entirely different 
therapeutic approach to people with neurotic problems. It places an empha-
sis on the advantages of exposing the individual to the consequences of his 
action rather than of reducing false fears out of the past. It implies 
that the super-ego is not merely the smrce of negative hostile impression, 
characterized by harshness and over-severity, but that in many individuals 
the super-ego is under-developed, not adequate to the task of enabling 
adults to make choices leading to long-term goals and achievements other 
than the satisfaction of instinctual desires. 
Nowrer argues that the neurotic is not a person whose super-ego has 
overwhelmed the ego and raised fixed barriers against the id. Rather the 
1. o. H. Mowrer, "Neurosis: A Disorder of Conditioning or Problem Solving?" 
Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences, 56 (1953), p. 282. 
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neurotic is a person whose ego remains weak and infantile in adulthood and 
in league with the id attempts to keep dissociated from the influence and 
desire of the super-ego, This idea further implies that symptoms are not 
indicative of unexpressed instincts so much as of repudiated ideals. 1 
iii. Conscience as an Agent of Growth 
A comparison of Freud's and Mowrer's views of the conscience function 
would lead at least to the following observations. 
(1) Mowrer believes with other writers whose thought we have examined 
(Allport, Fromm and Horney) that there is more than a difference in quality 
between the animal and the human. While in the beginning similarities are 
great, the child as he gains self-consciousness finds that he is basically 
different from the animal who never achieves this status and is thus, in-
stinct-bound for life. It is for this reason that Mowrer rejects the in-
stinct theory claiming that only animals or human beings who reject their 
human potential are motivated primarily by instincts. 
(2) Mowrer accepts Freud's conceptual scheme of id, ego and super-ego. 
He also accepts Freud's supposition that neurosis implies an intrapsychic 
process called repression. He disagrees at the point of what is being re-
pressed. 
(3) Mowrer finds in parents and society more that is mature than im-
mature. He sees in the social scene the presence of values which are sound 
and while these values often repudiate instinctual desires they are the very 
values which alone bring long-term satisfaction to human beings. Anyone in 
the pursuit of truth finds it necessary to frustrate many immediate desires; 
1. o. H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and Personality Qynamics, p. 525. 
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those desiring to find the fullest expression of love must often move at 
least temporarily away from satisfaction before moving back into situa-
tions that bring long and lasting fulfillment in this area. Mowrer im-
plies that the ability to make detours, to withhold certain immediate sat-
isfactions, to substitute ideal achievement for impulse satisfaction is 
one of the distinguishing factors between neurotic and healthy persons. 
(4) Mowrer acknowledges that conflict is inescapable in human ex-
perience. He argues that the way conflict is handled is of crucial im-
portance. Freud assumes the greatest conflict comes over the treatment 
of instinctual desires; Mowrer argues that far greater is the conflict 
revolving around ideals, long-term goals and the fulfillment of desires 
leading not to biological but mental and spiritual goals. To assume that 
conflict in personality indicates that id forces are about to erupt is not 
substantiated in clinical experience where it is often discovered, accord-
ing to Mowrer, that repudiated ideals, basic personality integrity, or con-
science demands are about to erupt. 
(5) Mowrer's theory has important implications for the role of the 
therapist. If it is true that id and ego are in league against super-ego 
demands, and that the super-ego is often too weak and unassimilated, then 
it becomes the task of the therapist to strengthen the demands, rather than 
diminish them as is the assumption of the majority of therapists who follow 
Freud. 
(6) Another difference in the role of therapist revolves around the 
goal of having the patient verbalize material from the past. The import-
ance of this goal diminishes if we accept Mowrer's theory. The resolution 
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of conflict for the neurotic comes under this system not so much because 
he verbalizes id demands, but because he has opportunity to act in line 
with conscience demands. Therapy then becomes a finishing of the task 
started by the parents, though not sufficiently strengthened in the early 
years. The role of the therapist becomes that of helping the individual 
to be more human, repudiating many instinctual demands, while at the same 
time learning to handle his problems and conflicts as a person rather than 
an animal. In this role, the therapist cannot avoid being committed to a 
set of values, even as the Freudian is committed to a set of values which 
involve biological determinism, and the goal of enabling a person to find 
expression for a maximum number of instinctual demands. 
Since first reading of Mowrer's theory regarding the nature and func-
tion of conscience, this writer has been seeing a woman who first presented 
herself with classical neurotic symptoms, hysterical in nature. Nancy is 
an attractive, intelligent, professional person of thirty-three. In brief, 
her problem revolved around behavior which was contradictory to her ideals. 
For more than a decade she has been promiscuous with another professional 
person, many years older and with the responsibility of wife and family, 
The writer thought at first this was a classic example of Freud's Oedipus 
complex. This girl in early years had been the victim of a broken home. 
The relationship with the father left much to be desired; at first an in-
tense relationship, then broken abruptly and permanently. Since reaching 
puberty this woman has constantly found herself attracted to older men, al-
ready married. Although many men l1ave sought her interest and affection she 
has been "cold" and "uninterested" in them, Freudian theory would urge us 
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,to explore the childhood experiences referred to previously. It would fur-
ther explain the neurotic symptoms as arising because of an over-severe 
super-ego. Therapeutically one of the tasks would be to reduce the sever-
ity of the super-ego so that this conflict between desire and ideal could 
be reduced thereby alleviating the neurotic symptoms. 
But Mowrer's theory would see the problem as needing a strengthening 
of the suDer-ego demands. The resolution of tb..is girl's desire would be 
seen as faulty problem-solving. The basic task would be that of finishing 
the task begun and abruptly ended by the parents so that this person could 
find adult ways, ones that would not violate the integrity of the persons 
involved or the ideals of the supElr-ego, struggling for assimilation and 
acknowledgment on the part of the ego. As Mowrer's theory was followed in 
the therapeutic sessions the hysterical symptoms disappeared. Toward the 
end of the sessions the woman expr~ssed amazement that although her in-
stinctual pleasure was now denied, she knew a greater joy in the conscience 
pleasure she experiences as the result of the changed behavior which enables 
her to live up to the demands of her super-ego. The turning point came not 
when she was made aware of the Oedipal factors operating in her personality, 
but when she found support and strength for the conscience demands whose 
denial evidently produced the severe neurotic hysterical symptoms. Her 
anxiety was caused, according to Mowrer's theory by guilt over rejected 
ideals, rather than over the eruption of id forces into consciousness. Such 
a theory implies that action in aceordance with the standards of parents and 
society is fully as important as insight into infantile desires and experi-
ences. 
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In summary, the following statements might be made about J.Viowrer 's con-
cept of conscience. He refuses to believe that man is controlled by irra-
tional forces, contending that there is a difference in kind as well as de-
gree between animal and human behavior. Although the human uniqueness of 
man evolves out of biological material, the movement to higher levels indi-
cates control of the more primitive levels by the nigher ones. l1owrer sees 
the super-ego as often being too 1<eak, in that the ideals and standards 
which it symbolizes cannot break through into the ego and provide direction 
and control for the person to the extent necessary for adult behavior. Once 
freed from a biologically determiEed view of personality, Mowrer sees the 
world and its values as valid and worth striving for. The function of con-
science is to represent these traditional moral and ethical standards and 
see that they End representation in the ego choices and awareness of each 
person. Neurosis arises as a consequence of too little learning rather 
than too much, anxiety indicates that repressed material is about to break 
through into consciousness; but the material is often concerned with ethi-
cal and moral ideals not with instinctual desires searching for expression. 
Mowrer implies that there is a basic tendency operative within human per-
sonality striving toward emotional and spiritual growth and that the satis-
faction experienced when this growth is felt by the individual far exceeds 
the pleasurable sensation accompanying instinctual satisfaction. With All-
port, Mowrer argues for a more dignified and rational concept of human na-
ture than do the Freudians. While not denying the presence of id demands, 
he does insist that they can be controlled by super-ego activity and as a 
consequence bring lasting pleasure to the individual involved. Neurotic 
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behavior with its attendant pain and dissatisfaction stems from infantile 
behavior on the part of the indiYidual and an inability to strengthen the 
standards and principles inherent. within the super-ego. 
4. May 
i. Conscience and Anxiety 
Rollo May in The Meaning of Anxiety! (1950) and !1an 1 s Search For Him-
sel~ (1953) discusses the concept of conscience as it relates to anxiety. 
For May anxiety is experienced whenever a value considered by the individ-
ual as necessary to his existence is threatened. Anxiety always involves 
a threat to the "core" of personality. By suggesting that anxiety can stem 
from psychological and moral roots as well as from physical ones, May 
sharply disagrees with Freud who insists that anxiety is the feeling of 
apprehension felt by the person wh19never id forces, essentially physical in 
nature, threaten to break through into consciousness. 
May distinguishes between fear which he defines as the organism's re-
action to specific dangers and anxiety which he claims occurs on an entirely 
different level of experience and threatens the self-image of the person or 
the "essence" of his personality. 
May sees the difference between normal and neurotic anxiety in terms 
of association or dissociation rather than as apprehension over past or 
current experiences. In other words, so long as the person refrains from 
repression or separation of painful experiences and keeps them within the 
1. R. May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York: Ronald Press, 1950). 
2. ------- Man's Search For Himself (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 
1953). 
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the scope of his self-image they may be classified as normal anxieties, 
but when the person dissociates these experiences or threats from his 
self-image they become neurotic. May implies that all persons have anxiety; 
that the goal of therapy is not always to reduce anxiety but to replace dis-
sociation with association enabling the person to cope productively with 
the threats to his being. 
Basic to May's concept of anxiety is the self-image. Whatever else 
it may be he claims it is a system or organization, that as the body has 
an organic unity, so the mind has a psychic unity. May suggests that this 
psychic unity can be threatened by moral values and ideals as well as id-
produced anxiety. They appear however on two different levels and one must 
be separated from the other. 
ii. The Creative Conscience 
In talking of the "creative conscience"! May suggests that it differs 
from the authoritarian or "obedience" conscience in several ways. (1) The 
authoritarian conscience places its greatest emphasis on obedience. One is 
good to the extent that he obeys the dictates of society represPnted by par-
ents or their equivalents. There is nothing ethical in such blind obedi-
ence. (2) The authoritarian conscience clings to childhood patterns, di-
minishing any sense of freedom or choice in the new relationships made pos-
sible by growth from childhood to adulthood. (3) Where religious con-
science tends to provide a cosmic parent, one who will take care of every-
thing, that type of religious conscience is infantile and neurotic, the 
one type of religious conscience de,fined by Freud in his analysis of the 
1. R. May, Man's Search For Himself, P• 215. 
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super-ego. (4) May believes the creative conscience has within it reli-
gious elements. For him religion concerns the way one relates to his 
existence. Psychologically religion enables the person to choose values 
which are of ultimate concern to him, ones around which he can organize 
his psychic structure, his personalit~· patterns. (5) Creative conscience 
is not opposed to tradition i.e. dictates of parents and society. It is 
opposed to the authoritarian use of tradition irrespective of its origin. 
Such a conscience seeks to relate tradition to immediate experience, it 
seeks to enlarge the person's self awareness rather than acting exclusively 
as a repressive agent. (6) Creative conscience is distinguished primarily 
by ethical choices consciously made by the individual rather than obedience 
to whatever tradition he knows. This creative conscience further is char-
acterized by an ability to choose long-term goals which while producing im-
mediate pain and frustration, promise satisfaction on another level than 
the instinctual or physical. 
5. Harry Stack Sullivan 
i. Importance of Relationships 
The relationship between conscience and the self-image has been in-
vestigated by Harry Stack Sullivan in terms of the emphasis on the import-
ance of interpersonal relations in the formation of the self structure.l 
Sullivan's emphasis is that the actual events which occur in the life of 
a person are not so important as the type of relationship which exists be-
tween the experiencing self and those around him. That which is the end-
1. H. s. Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (WPshington: The 
William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947). 
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,result of the total relation of the person with significant persons Sullivan 
calls the 11 self system" or the 11 self dynamism. 11 
This is "the product of interpersonal experience arising from anxiety 
encountered in the pursuit of the satisfaction of general and zonal needs,nl 
With May and Allport, Sullivan argues that the self system is built out of 
experiences of approval and disapproval, reward and punishment as the person 
moves toward the goals of satisf8ction and security. As it grows, it func-
tions in accordance with the level it has attained, 
ii. Self System 
Sullivan's description of the origin of the self system and Freud's 
theory of the super-ego show a striking parallel. Sullivan points to the 
need for approval felt by the self at an early stage, especially by signi-
ficant persons. The self system therefore, functions like a microscope--
it focuses minutely on those actions which cause approval or disapproval. 
Also like the microscope, the self tends to disregard things other than 
that on which it is focused minutely. Hence, the self system is the "guard-
ian of awareness." When anything spectacular happens that is not in sym-
pathy with the self dynamism, anxiety appears. 
Although Sullivan's description of the origin of the self system and 
Freud's discussion of the super-ego are similar, Sullivan warns against try-
ing to identify the two, He says that he is not talking about a function 
of or identity with a parent. Neither is he describing the taking over by 
introjection of another's standard of values. Rather he refers to an or-
1. H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York: W. ~/. 
Morton and Co,, l9S3), P• 164. 
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ganizaticn of experience in a way that produces a minimum of anxiety as 
the education processes are confronted. 
Such a description of the self finds acceptance by Rogers1 who appears 
to equate the development of conscienc:e with the growth of the concept of 
the self. "Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism 
are those which are consistent with the concept of the self. n2 In corre-
spondence with Rogers the writer found a reluctance on Rogers' part to make 
this connection. He writes: "I believe other constructs better cover the 
phenomena which usually are contained under the broad label of conscience. 
For example, I suspect that the individual has a configuration of the self 
he wants to be, another overlapping configuration of the self he feels he 
should be and these tend to be discrepant from the way in which he perceives 
himself." 
iii. Conscience as the Total Self in Motion 
In M~, Sullivan and Rogers, the self-concept is taken seriously. Un-
like Horney who only talks of the idealized self-image as utterly impossible 
to achieve and a concept to be eliminated if possible, these authors claim 
that the self that is has a tendency to strive toward becoming like the self 
that is desired. Conscience thus becomes the total self in motion rather 
than a particular faculty of the personality. Since conscience is a func-
tiona! quality of the self, it develops as the self develops. Where a lim-
ited self concept exists there also may be found a limited conscience. 
These people imply that Freud talked exclusively of super-ego in terms of 
1. c. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), 
PP• 487-496. 
2. Ibid., P• 507. 
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~hat existing either in infants or in persons whose self-concept is lim-
ited. With Allport, however, they poj_nt to innumerable people who dis-
cover that as the self concept is enlarged and modified so the factor of 
moral control called conscience undergoes basic revisions. The expanded 
self enables the person to shift from "must" to "ought" conscience. The 
shift might be described as the total personality involved in a conscience 
decision. In the growing self an attempt is made to integrate all experi-
ences requiring change or producing pain in the limited self, these exper-
ences have a tendency to be dissociated or repressed, It is in this lim-
ited self concept that conscience becomes characterized by a repressive 
negative quality. fu the growing self' conscience is seen as an affirmative, 
ethical and moral function leading not to repression but to affirmation. 
In this chapter the views of four non-Freudians have been presented. 
Their views of conscience have been considered in the light of Freudian 
concepts of the super-ego. Similarities and differences have been noted, 
In stum~ary, the threads common to Allport, Mowrer and May and Sullivan 
might be noteQ, All agree that man is not limited to biological drives, 
either fixed or developed. All agree that there is operative within per-
sonality a function described as conscience. It is not something myste-
rious or supernatural automatically supplied at birth. Its potential how-
ever seems to be present at birth. These four subscribe to an emergent 
theory of conscience. They draw a clear distinction between mature and 
immature conscience, its creative and destructive aspects. They agree that 
Freud's analysis of the super-ego was partiallY correct. But they perceive 
that he dealt on1Y with the infantile conscience and assumed that all people 
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manifested such conscience functions. They further showed more concern 
with the expressive valid conscience demands than with its repressive 
function. Whether it is Mowrer's concept of "conscience pleasure" or May's 
use of the term "creative conscience" the implic2tion is the same, namely 
that much of modern man's trouble stems not from frustrated instinctual 
desire, but from unfulfilled conscience demands, ones which ought to be 
taken more seriously. The conscience function is seen as that which en-
ables man to become uniquely human, to free him from animal behavior, to 
give expression to his best psychic potential. The goal of human behavior 
is seen in terms of ethical and religi.ous values rather than the achieve-
ment of any physical goal. 
:Allport and May speak specifically about the value of the religious 
influence on conscience. They both di.stinguish between authoritarian or 
mature religious manifestations. Mowrer implies that it is impossible to 
find religious behavior, at least in its organized forms, that is not au-
thoritarian. All agree that conscience in its mature function is to be 
strengthened and its demands heeded. 
CHAPTER VII 
SlJMNARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to examine the concept of conscience in 
psychoanalytic theory and evaluate it in the light of certain nee-Freu-
dian and non-Freudian finding&. Freud's early conceptualization of the 
super-ego was presrnted in considerable detail. Contributions of other 
analytical writers were noted. 
In presenting the views of nee-Freudian and non-Freudian writers an 
attempt was made to relate their concepts to those ideas first advanced 
by Freud and then make an evaluation both by comparison and contrast. In 
every instance adknowledgment has been made of the constant influence 
Freud's concept of the super-ego had on later modifications and departures 
from his theory. 
The primary emphasis in this study has been on the psychological na-
ture of conscience. No attempt has been made to discuss other approaches 
to this concept such asthe ethical, philosophical or religious. Major at-
tention has been given to theory rather than clinical material in order to 
explore more thoroughly the theoretical problems connected with Freud's 
theory of the super-ego. 
Freud first became interested in the concept of conscience as he con-
sidered the qynamics of repression. The Interpretation of Dreams, published 
161 
162 
.in 1900 contains his first reference to the function of the super-ego, He 
noticed that in neurotic disturbances which came to his attention there 
were at least two types of repression always present. The first type con-
sisted of putting out of consciousness single traumatic episodes which had 
occurred in the past, the second type involved the repression in the deep 
unconscious of impulses and desires which never did become conscious, 
If repression was a characteristic of all neurotics it soon became 
necessary to postulate some kind of censoring activity. As Freud shifted 
his emphasis from the nature of repressed material to the repressing func-
tion he began to develop his concept from simple censorship to super-ego, 
By 1933 when New Introductory Lectures appeared Freud had further developed 
his concept of the super-ego until it included the following characteris-
tics. (l) That part of the libido which was neither connected with primi-
tive bodily satisfactions or directed to the self, he called narcissistic 
libido. As the child grows dissatisfied with the real self as a love object 
he sets out to construct a more worthy object, yet one which resembles the 
real self. As this ideal self is constructed the love called by Freud "sec-
ondary narcissism" is attached to it. (2) Another characteristic of the 
super-ego consists of the introjection into the child's mind of the princi-
ples, morals and attitudes of others, notably those of the parents and otter 
authority symbols which appear in early life, The external authority of the 
parents becomes internalized in the super-ego. (3) Along with an ideal 
self-image and the principles of parents and others, another characteristic 
of the super-ego is found in the recoil of aggression aroused by frustrat-
ing objects in the outer world. All Freudians agree that during the long 
and relatively helpless period of childhood the infant redirects toward 
himself much of the anger and hate which he feels toward the parents but 
dares not direct toward them. Building on rreud 1s original discovery 
others, notably Klein, Flugel and Bergler have expanded this concept of 
severe and aggressive components within the super-ego. (4) The primary 
characteristic of the super-ego for Freudians is found in regard to sex-
ual or aggressive impulses. The duty of the therapist was thus seen as 
that of reducing the strength of the super--ego especial~ in these areas. 
Neo-Freudians, such as Fromm, Horney etc., while recognizing the val-
idity of Freud's analysis of the destructive and harsh aspects of the super-
ego, maintain that the self-image is not altogether valueless. Fromm sug-
gests that there is a difference between the image that perpetuates the 
childhood concept of power and glory and a self-image which is in touch 
with reality and in proportion to a growing awareness of adult patterns 
of behavior. Neo-Freudians agree that Freud analyzed only the immature 
or authoritarian conscience. They argue that conscience can function in a 
mature way enabling a person to increase his producivity and more ably meet 
the demands and opportunities of adulthood. 
Non-Freudians, such as Allport, Mowrer and May see the conscience func-
tion primarily as something positive rather than negative. All agree that 
primitive patterns of behavior need not be carried over into adulthood. 
They argue that early beginnings may disappear rather than always being re-
pressed as claimed by Freudians. The instinct theory is rejected by non-
Freudians. They see the development of ideals and long term goals as the 
chief characteristics of adult behavior and mature conscience function. 
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Movement toward realization of an ideal self-image is the chief function 
of conscience. Here conscience is distinguished by its affirmative and 
positive tendencies, almost the reverse of the Freudian view of conscience 
function. While mature conscience often refutes and denies it is never be-
cause of blind obedience, it is because immediate frustration is often nec-
essary for long-term fulfillment. Conscience thereby is perceived as the 
total self involved in decisions which enable the person to achieve a more 
adequate attainment of the ideal self-image toward which he strives. The 
mature conscience for the non-Freudian includes other than parental and au-
thority commands known in childhood; it includes an ideal self-image uniquely 
arrived at by the individual as his awareness and experience develops. 
This study has led to the conclusion that there is a vast difference 
between immature and mature conscience functioning. It has contended that 
conscience occupies neither the same position nor performs the same function 
for each person. The study further suggests that conscience is not present 
at birth but develops as the person grows. Although the rreudian theory of 
conscience differs in many respects from the theory developed by neo-Freu-
dians and non-Freudians all agree that it is a crucial agent in determining 
behavior and in the implementation of ideals in personality. As the outcome 
of this study it is possible to set forth some distinguishing characteristics 
of the immature and creative conscience. 
1. Immature conscience rests upon the foundation of a basic authoritar-
ian orientation. This orientation includes the voice of internalized exter-
nal authority, the parent, the state, the church or whoever the authorities 
in a culture happen to be, The good authoritarian conscience consists of 
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consciousness of pleasing the internalized authority; a guilty conscience 
is the consciousness of displeasing it, This type of conscience, function-
ing as an agent of some authority that has been internalized but not rooted 
in the real self, will limit the capacities for growth on two counts: (a) 
Finding goodness in obedience to authority the person with authoritarian 
conscience is more interested in pleasing the authority than in exploring 
the attributes of his own personality and the situation in which he stands. 
(b) Coupled with the desire to please this foreign and irrational author-
ity comes the tendency where man takes over the role of the authority by 
treating himself with the same strictness and cruelty. In other words, man, 
under the sway of the authoritarian conscience not only becomes the obedi-
ent slave, he must also be the strict taskmaster, treating himself as his 
own slave, 
2, Immature conscience is distinguished by a repressive, negative 
functioning. Its influence is felt by a series of prohibitions revolving 
around what Fromm refers to as the psychological phenomena of want. Want 
consists of primary needs such as those found in food, water and shelter. 
The task of the conscience is seen in terms of denying expression to cer-
tain primitive wants especially in the sexual and aggressive areas. Con-
science is negative in that by denying satisfaction to primitive wants it 
increases the level of painful tension, Pleasure is thus denied and con-
science remains the grim task-master. 
3. Immature conscience is further characterized by a disproportionate 
sense of guilt. Guilt is a natural product of conscience, but conscience 
that has not grown up may produce guilt that is out of proportion to the act 
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committed. The so-called guilty conscience may come about because the emo-
ticnal content is displaced on something other than the actual cause of the 
guilt. Where desires toward parents, particularly those of a sexual or ag-
gressive nature have been forbidden and repressed, seemingly innocent situa-
tions in later life 1-rill trig;;er these feelings that remain very near the 
surface of experience. As a result where a person displaces his emotional 
content onto a seemingly threatening situation his sense of guilt is not 
only out of proportion to the fact, it is likely to remain unrelieved. 
4. Another characteristic of immature conscience is that the uncon-
scious elements of conscience achieve precedence over the conscious ele-
ments of its make-up. Freudians insist that the super-ego functions pri-
marily in the unconscious and is thereby irratiocal, out of touch with rea-
son, and highly charged with instinctual energy. Being largely unconscious, 
this type of conscience function is not responsible, nor is the person a-
Hare of consciously chosen paths for his life. He feels, rather, driven 
by forces of which he is not aware. The more unconscious parts of the con-
science are in control the more likely is the struggle to be seen in terms 
of primitive, childish, archaic Hants. 
5. Immature conscience is motivated by a need to maintain the appear-
ance of perfection. This idealized image which at one stroke gives the 
person unlimited power and ability to deal withany of the dangers ~<hich 
life presents develops as the child attempts to cope with the potential 
dangers in his ~<orld. For the Freudian these dangers stem from instinctual 
urges, for the neo-Freudians these dangers come from conditions existing in 
the world, such as the long period of dependence Hhich a child undergoes 
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and the disturbances in human relations which he observes about him, The 
idealized image has little connection to the real self which in turn is 
often neglected as the energy of the personality is expended to maintain 
the appearance of perfection, 
6. Immature conscience is characterized by what Horney calls the 
"tyranny of the shoulds." Four basic qualities of the shoulds are as 
follows: they are characterized by a disregard for feasibility, they oper-
ate with a complete disregard for what the person feels he can or cannot 
do at the present moment. These shoulds have a complete disregard for the 
conditions under which they could be fulfilled, The basic premise running 
through all the qualities mentioned is the phantasy that nothing should be 
or is impossible for oneself. 
7, Immature conscience attempts to maintain pseudo-ideals designed 
to maintain the appearance of perfection. The authority for such ideals 
is found not in the real self but either in some internalized authority 
symbol such as parent, or in the need of the idealized self-image to main-
tain its appearance of perfection. Pseudo-ideals aim only at disposing of 
imperfection, not at real change in the person. Such ideals have not only 
a compulsive and coercive character but they lack the authority to produce 
lasting change either in the perron or those about him. 
8, Immature conscience lacks an integrative capacity and functions 
in terms of immediate opportunistic goals. It fails to provide a matrix 
around which other personality traits can be organized. It is concerned 
only with immediate needs and desires. 
These characteristics emphasize that immature conscience is one in 
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which the activity of the restrictive, prohibitive conscience of child-
hood remains predominant in adulthood. There is little opportunity for 
the development of spontaneity and individuality. Immature conscience 
points to a person whose self-image is not fully developed. Two primary 
qualities of imna ture conscience revolve around (a) fear and obedience 
to specific rules and regulations, and (b) guilt arising over violation 
of external taboos. The source of authority for immature conscience de-
velops in direct relation to parental authority and social regulations. 
In contrast to immature conscience, mature conscience derives its 
sentiments from self-chosen goals, from a continuouslY productive rela-
tionship between the individual and his environment. The content of ma-
ture conscience has been assimilated, and not merely introjected. The ma-
ture self is related to the assimilated content in what Fromm calls a 
"spontaneous fashion." This permits a more creative approach to the di-
lemma of human existence. In further conclusion we may recognize the fol-
lowing characteristics of creative conscience. 
1. Creative conscience is an agent of expression rather than repres-
sion. It is preceded by "must" conscience which is primarily concerned 
with obedience to external authorities which have been internalized. As 
the child develops an adequate self-image and sense of values peculiarly 
his own, then, as Allport says, conscience shifts from "must" to "ought." 
Ideas that are incompatible with the growing self-image do not have to be 
repressed; many of them simply evapcrate. Creative conscience enables the 
individual to make choices consistent with the ideals and goals toward 
which his self-image indicates he ought to strive. 
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2. Creative conscience is characterized by a shift in interest from 
specific habits of obedience and observance of group standards to broad 
value judgments and a high sense of individual responsibility. Allport's 
use of "propriate striving" to indicate that quality which enables the per-
son to deny satisfaction of many immediate desires in the interest of at-
taining long term goals is appropriate here. Rather than being character-
ized by such moralistic terms as good and bad creRtive conscience asks the 
question: Is this type of behavior meaningful and does it seek to under-
stand and have relevance for the values of the present situation? 
3. The creative conscience is characterized by growth; it is emerg-
ing from being the internal voice of external authority; it is developing 
in proportion to the person's ideal self-image; its function is seen as a 
rudder rather than a repressive agent; its source of authority is not in 
childhood admonitions or parental wishes but in the desire of the person to 
observe his own value system and to make those choices which bring him into 
harmony with the qualities inherent in his ideal self-image. While early 
conscience function is primarily in response to demands for obedience to 
parental and cultural dictates, creative conscience outgrows these begin-
nings, leaving many of their manifestations behind for new norms and goals 
toward which to strive. Growth of conscience function is directly related 
to the ever changing and expanding self-image which seeks expression in in-
dividual behavior. 
4. The creative ccnscience often increases tension as it enables the 
individual to make choices which are in harmony with the ideals and goals 
accepted as valid by the self-image. The pursuit of long range goals re-
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~uires much immediate frustration and long detours around momentary satis-
factions, thereby increasing tension. This awareness of increased tension 
has been referred to by Mowrer as "conscience pleasure." 
5. Creative conscience is not opposed to tradition or the dictates 
of parents and society. It is opposed to the authoritarian use of tradi-
tion irrespective of its origin. Creative conscience seeks to relate tradi-
tion to immediate experience, assuming that many of the standards and norms 
which have withstood the passage of time point in the direction of mental 
and spiritual goals toward which the individual is striving. The past is 
neither repressed or ignored by the creative conscience; it is utilized in 
enabling the individual to appropriate from it those qualities and exper-
ences which will help him in his growth toward maturity. 
6. Creative conscience is distinguished primarily by its integrative 
function in that it enables the person to organize his patterns of behavior 
and his goals around a central, self-chosen goal toward which much of his 
experience is directed and in terms of which activity is evaluated. 
7• Creative conscience often has within it religious elements. Many 
times it has been acknowledged in this study that religious elements char-
acterized by such words as obedience, self-sacrifice, duty and resignation 
describe immature conscience and immature religion. While in childhood the 
God to whom the individual submits may well be one who is made in the image 
of those authorities to whom he has been submissive. Fromm well recognizes 
that many religions have a way of turning into "power systems" that exer-
cise control over people 1 s oonscience function. What is not grasped by Freud 
and neo-Freudians is that this power system exercises control but for a short 
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span of time. It is entirely possible as the ideal self-image is developed 
by the individual that he may rediscover the vital truths of his religion 
and incorporate them into the cre"tive conscience, not because he must, but 
because he ought. These religious values, accepted rationally and freely 
rather than compulsively and fearfully point to ultimate values and have 
more breadth and scope in the sense that religion concerns the way one re-
lates to his total existence. The creative conscience may therefore arise 
in religious experience. 
8. The creative conscience is to be conceived not as a separate enti-
ty existing parallel to the self, but as intrinsic with the self. This 
means that conscience is more than a faculty. It becomes, in its creative 
aspects, the function of the total self as it moves toward or away from that 
which is conceived as valuable to the self. This further makes co~science 
a functional dynamic quality rather than a constitutional part of the self 
as conceived by Freud and his followers. 
9. The creative conscience needs to be distinguished from super-ego. 
Super-ego, in the Freudian sense, emphasizes the negation and inhibition 
of the self, while conscience as conceived here has reference to both nega-
tive and positive functions of the self. Super-ego is largely unconscious; 
it is the result of repression and is relatively unchangeable. Creative 
conscience arises out of self recognition which creates a sense of ought-
ness and may change as this self conception is modified. The desire to 
live in terms of a self whose nature and destiny is related to values and 
goals freely arrived at and held together by religious elements will form 
the basis of the creative conscience. 
10. Creative conscience is characterized by individuality. It derives 
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its energy from self-chosen goals. This emphasizes the conscious function 
of conscience. The person is not driven by desires and impulses of which 
he has little or no awareness, but gathers his energy and strength from 
goals accepted as his own. This quality implies that conscience is not and 
cannot be the same in every person. While every person has goals toward 
which he strives, the specific nature of the goals will be different with 
each person. 
In summary we have noted that conscience may either be a help or hin-
drance to effective and mature living. It has been the contention of the 
writer that in Freudian theory we find a description of the immature con-
science, essentially authoritarian and repressive. Immature conscience 
functions on the basis of compulsion, prohibition, and a limited responsi-
bility. Mature conscience has been described as operating in the context 
of freedom, growth, and enlarging responsibility. Immature conscience is 
arrested by the immature development of the self; mature conscience emerges 
with the mature development of the self. 
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Tl:IE PSYCHOWGICAL NATURE OF CONSCIENCE IN FREUDIAN THEORY 
by 
Otis A. Maxfield 
Abstract of Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1957 
This dissertation attempts to investigate the psychological nature 
of the conscience in Freudian theory and evaluate it in the light of cer-
tain neo-Freudian and non-Freudian findings. Special attention is given 
to the original work of Sigmund Freud and particular emphasis is placed 
on his concept of the super-ego, In psychological literature conscience 
is generally referred to as the super-ego. 
For Freud, the super-ego comes into being through the psychic proces-
ses of repression, identification and introjection. Its central task is 
that of playing the role within the personality once occupied by the par-
ental or other authorities. The super-ego tends to accent the harshness, 
severity and restrictiveness of the parents far more than their love and 
kindness. Other Freudians, notably Bergler, Flugel, Klein and Jones ex-
pand Freud's early theories of conscience as a stern and punitive tendency 
in personality. They see the ideal self-image as of little value and 
rooted in unrealistic expectations. 
Neo-Freudians like Fromm and Horney see conscience as the source not 
merely of parental prohibitions carried over from childhood, but of grow-
ing moral responsibility. Noting a vast difference between the self-image 
which is in touch with reality and rooted in the growing experience of the 
1 
'individual, neo-Freudians agree that Freud analyzed only the authoritarian 
conscience. 
Non-F'reudians, such as Allport, Mowrer and hay see the conscience pri-
marily as positive rather than negative. These writers see conscience as 
the total self involved in integrative activity rather than a segmental 
faculty. Mature conscience includes an ideal self-image uniquely arrived 
at by the individual through his developing awareness and experience. 
As an outcome of this study it is possible to set forth some distjn-
guishing characteristics of the creative conscience. 
(l) Creative oonscience is an agent of expression rather than repres-
sion. It is preceded by the "must" conscience which is primarily concerned 
with obedience to external authorities which have been internalized. As 
the child develops an adequate self-image, conscience shifts from "must" to 
"ought", enabling the person to make choices consistent ,_1_ th the ideals and 
goals toward which his self-image indicates he ought to strive. 
(2) Creative conscience is not opposed to tradition or the dictates 
of parents and society, only to the authoritarian use of tradition irrespec-
tive of its origin. 
(3) Creative conscience is distinguished primarily by its jntegrative 
function in that it enables the person to organize his purposes around a 
central, self-chosen goal toward which much of his experience is directed 
and in terms of which activity is evaluated. 
(4) Creative conscience often has within it religious elements. Ac-
knowledging that religious attitudes characterized by obedience and duty 
may be i.mrlature, the creative conscience enables a person to rediscover the 
3 
vital truths of religious truth and love in a mature devotion to the ulti-
mate concerns of life. 
(5) The creative conscience needs to be distinguished from super-ego. 
In the Freudian sense super-ego emphasizes the negation and inhibition of 
the self, which is largely unconscious, and arises as the consequence of 
repression in rigid and unchangeable patterns. Creative conscience arises 
out of self-understanding and may change as this self-conception is modi-
fied. It is primarily conscious and acts more to affirm than to repress. 
(6) The creative conscience is to be conceived not as a separate enti-
ty existing parallel to the self, but as intrinsic with the self. More than 
a faculty, it becomes the function of the total self as it moves toward that 
which is perceived as valuable in the perspective of the utmost good to all 
concerned, This makes conscience a functional dynamic quality rather than 
a constitutional part of the self as conceived by Freud and his followers. 
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